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Abstract
In the aviation system, there are several feedback systems to prevent an accident. First of
all, the accident and serious incident reporting and investigation system is established by
the Chicago Convention.
In general, once an accident or a serious incident occurs, it must be reported to the
Investigation Authority in the state where the event occurred. The Investigation Authority
which receives the report conducts the investigation of the event. Then, based on the prob-
able causes identified, the Investigation Authority issues the recommendations to the Civil
Aviation Authority. Next, the Civil Aviation Authority which receives the recommenda-
tions takes corrective actions, including rulemaking, to prevent the recurrence of the event.
This feedback system ensures that an accident with the same causes will not occur again.
The feedback system described above can be considered a reactive approach. There are
also proactive feedback systems to prevent an accident.
In order to identify hazards that could potentially lead to an accident, the contracting
states of the Convention have mandatory reporting systems for incidents. In addition, some
contracting states even have voluntary reporting systems for safety-related occurrences not
limited to formally defined incidents. If these feedback systems are utilized to the full extent.
they could help in reducing the accident rate.
This thesis, aiming at offering insights for responsible authorities in contracting states
of the Chicago Convention to improve their aviation safety information feedback systems,
conducted a comparative analysis of the feedback systems in four contracting states of the
Chicago Convention: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Japan.
This thesis examined both mandatory reporting systems and voluntary reporting sys-
tems in each state. Furthermore, this thesis examined the rulemaking process in each Civil
Aviation Authority as part of the feedback systems.
This thesis identified several differences in the feedback systems in the four states. In
particular, this thesis identified a relatively larger number of differences in voluntary re-
porting systems than in mandatory reporting systems. On the other hand, as regards the
rulemaking process, this thesis showed that there are no substantial differences.
Thesis Supervisor: R. John Hansman, Jr.
Title: Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics and Engineering Systems Division
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Over the decades since 1960, the accident rate of commercial jet aircraft has decreased
steadily. However, over the last 20 years, the accident rate has leveled out at about 1
accident per million departures. This is shown in Figure 1-1.
Annual
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rate
(accidents
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million
departures)
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1-1: Accident rates and onboard fatalities of worldwide commercial jet fleet by year
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 1-2, operations of commercial jet aircraft has
shown steady increase.
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Year
Figure 1-2: Worldwide operations of commercial jet fleet by year [19]
The demand of air transport is predicted to continue to grow. For example, Boeing
forecasts that from 2008 to 2028 the average annual growth rate of airline traffic measured
in Revenue Passenger-Kilometers (RPK)a is 4.9% [201. Thus, without an improvement in
the accident rate, the number of accidents will increase, and eventually, public confidence
in air transport safety will be lost [26].
In the aviation system, there are several feedback systems developed to prevent acci-
dents. Figure 1-3 shows the generic model of the safety feedback systems.
aThe RPK is defined as the number of fare-paying passengers multiplied by the number of kilometers
they fly.
bManagement Organizations of voluntary reporting systems can be Investigation Authority or Civil Avi-
ation Authority.
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The large square in the top right of the figure shows how risk events occur. Following the
common practice in the civil aviation [56], this thesis defines hazard as a set of conditions
in the aviation system which could result in risk events. Hazards are created by one or
several unsafe conditions, and the figure shows many of the initiating unsafe conditions as
root causes and the unsafe conditions which follow the root causes as contributing causes.
Potential causes include: a flaw of aircraft or components design, a flaw of the mainte-
nance procedures of aircraft or components, mechanic's errors, a flaw of operational proce-
dures of aircraft, flight crews' errors, a flaw of airport design. a flaw of airspace design, Air
Traffic Controller's errors, a flaw of operational procedures of Air Traffic Control (ATC),
or a flaw of ATC facility configuration.
Hazards can result in the risk events with a certain likelihood with different levels of
severity, and this thesis categorizes the risk events into accidents, serious incidents, in-
cidents, and other safety-related occurrences. For example, International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) defines an incident as "an occurrence, other than an accident, associ-
ated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation."
and defines a serious incidents as "an incident involving circumstances indicating that an
accident nearly occurred." As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, accidents are also
formally defined by ICAO and in the contracting states of the Chicago Convention. This
thesis also categorizes the risk events which do not fall within the formally defined incidents
as other safety-related occurrences. Hazards do not inevitably result in the risk events [56].
This is shown in the figure as "No safety effects."
The right side of the figure and the large square in the bottom of the figure show
the systems in which how the risk events are reported and investigated. First of all, the
accident and serious incident reporting and investigation system, which is established by
the Convention on International Civil Aviation (also known as Chicago Convention), is
shown in the first level of the large square in the bottom of the figure and the arrows which
link the first level and the boxes of accidents and serious incidents.
In general, once an accident or a serious incident occurs, it must be reported to the
Investigation Authority in the state where the event occurred. The Investigation Authority
which receives the report conducts the investigation of the event.
The investigation starts with the fact finding. To find out what actually happened,
for example, wreckages of the aircraft and traces on the ground are investigated, recording
devices such as the Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder are analyzed, and
survivors and eye-witnesses are interviewed. Based on the evidence acquired, the Investi-
gation Authority identifies the root and contributing causes which led to the event. Then,
the Investigation Authority issues safety recommendations to the Civil Aviation Authority
(CAA).
Based on the safety recommendations, the CAA analyzes the risk. The CAA analyzes
the likelihood that the same event will occur again in the future. Next, the CAA assesses
the acceptability of the risk. If the risk is judged to be unacceptable, the CAA develops
corrective actions to mitigate the hazard. The CAA identifies one or several corrective
actions and adopts the best option among them, taking into account the technological
feasibility and economic viability of such actions. These processes are shown in the left of
the second level in the large square in the bottom of the figure.
The large square in the top left of the figure shows the corrective actions taken, respond-
ing to the unacceptable risk. The corrective actions which the CAA can take include the
rulemaking and the issuance of Airworthiness Directives or other directives.
For example, if the causes of the risk event are a low design standard of the aircraft, the
CAA develops a rule which sets the higher standard and requires aircraft manufacturers to
modify the aircraft design to meed the new standard.
If the causes of the risk event are a flaw of design, maintenance procedures, or operational
procedures, which is specific to the model of the aircraft involved, the CAA issues Airwor-
thiness Directives which require airlines or aircraft manufacturers to modify the aircraft
design or to change the maintenance procedures or operational procedures of the aircraft.
If the causes of the risk event are errors of flight crew or mechanics, the CAA issues other
directives which require the airlines or repair stations to change their training programs of
the flight crew or mechanics. In addition, if the causes of the risk event are a flaw of the
airport design, the CAA issue other directives which require the owner or operator of the
airport to change the airport design.
The CAA designs and designates the airspace and, in general, operates the Air Traffic
Control service. Therefore, if the causes of the risk event are a flaw of the airspace design,
the CAA changes the airspace design. Similarly, if the causes of the risk event are a flaw of
operational procedures of Air Traffic Control or a flaw of Air Traffic Control configuration,
the CAA changes them. In addition, if the causes of the risk event are errors of the Air
Traffic Controllers, the CAA changes their training programs of Air Traffic Controllers.
The Investigation Authority issues safety recommendations also to the organizations
in aviation industry such as airlines, manufacturers of the aircraft, repair stations, and
the owners or operators of the airports, if appropriate. The organizations which receive
the safety recommendations from the Investigation Authority analyze and assess the risk,
and if the risk is judged to be unacceptable, they develop and take corrective actions by
themselves. For example, airlines change the operational procedures of the aircraft or their
training programs of flight crew, manufacturers of the aircraft change the aircraft design.
repair stations change the maintenance procedures of the aircraft or their training programs
of mechanics, and the owners or operators of the airports change the airport design. This
is shown in the left of the fourth level of the large square in the bottom of the figure.
This feedback system described above ensures that an accident or a serious incident with
the same causes will not occur again. This feedback system is considered reactive approach.
There are also proactive feedback systems to prevent an accident.
It is common that after an accident occurs, we find that we have missed a number of
precursors that indicated the existence of hazard, and if we had recognized and appropriately
managed the risk, we could have averted the accident. Recognizing and managing the risk
before accidents actually occur offers an opportunity to improve safety.
In order to identify hazards that could potentially lead to an accident from these pre-
cursors, the CAA has a mandatory reporting and investigation system of incidents. This
systems is shown in the second level of the large square in the bottom of the figure and the
arrow which links the second level and the box of incidents.
In this system, incidents defined by regulations must be reported to the CAA. The CAA
first validates the contents of the collected reports. Then, the CAAs identifies hazards which
lead to the reported incidents, and then identifies the root and contributory causes of the
identified hazards. Next, the CAA analyzes the level of the risk associated with the hazards.
That is, the CAA analyzes the likelihood that the hazards can lead to the more severe risk
events and their severities. Then. as described in the accident and serious incident reporting
and investigation system, the CAA assesses the risk and develop corrective actions if the
risk is judged to be unacceptable. Lastly, the CAA takes corrective actions.
Furthermore. some states even have voluntary reporting systems for incidents and other
safety-related occurrences, in which persons involved in these kinds of risk events voluntarily
report them to the management organizations of voluntary reporting systems, be they
government or non-government organizations. This systems is shown in the third level of
the large square in the bottom of the figure and the arrows which link the third level and the
boxes of incidents and other safety-related occurrences. As with the CAA, the management
organizations of the voluntary reporting systems validate the collected reports, identify
hazards and their root and contributory causes, and analyze and assess the risk.
However, the management organizations of the voluntary reporting systems, unless they
are the CAA, have no authority to take corrective actions. Therefore, the the management
organizations issue safety alerts to the relevant organizations, including the CAA, so that
the relevant organizations can take corrective actions on a voluntary basis. These process
taken by the management organizations of voluntary reporting systems are described in
more detail in Chapter 2.
Lastly, some organizations in aviation industry, such as airlines, manufacturers of the
aircraft and repair stations, have their own internal reporting systems. In particular, many
airlines have such systems [68]. They collect reports of incidents and other safety-related
occurrences from their employees, analyze the reports, and take corrective actions by them-
selves. This is shown in the fourth level of the large square in the bottom of the figure and
the arrows which link the fourth level and the boxes of incidents and other safety-related
occurrences.
If these kinds of feedback systems described above are utilized to the full extent, they
could help in further reducing the accident rate.
1.2 Research Questions and Methodologies
As described above, the contracting states of the Chicago Convention have several feedback
systems to prevent accidents. However, as far as the author knows, no previous research
has been conducted which provides a comparative analysis of the feedback systems of the
contracting states in a comprehensive manner.
Therefore, aiming at offering insights for responsible authorities in contracting states to
improve their feedback systems, this thesis will examine the feedback systems established
in four contracting states, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and
Japan.
By conducting a comparative analysis of the feedback systems of these four contracting
states, this thesis will try to answer the question whether there are any practices which
should be learned by the responsible authorities in other contracting states.
This thesis will examine reporting and investigation systems in each state. More specif-
ically, this thesis will examine mandatory reporting systems of the Investigation Authority
and Civil Aviation Authority as well as voluntary reporting systems. Within these reporting
systems, this thesis will examine how and what events are reported and how they are inves-
tigated and analyzed. Particularly, since the Chicago Convention leaves the establishment
of voluntary reporting systems at contracting states' discretion, it is expected that there are
a larger number of differences in voluntary reporting systems than in mandatory reporting
systems among the four contracting states.
Furthermore, this thesis will examine how corrective actions are taken by the CAAs as
part of the feedback systems. As mentioned in the previous section, the CAAs can take
several kinds of corrective actions. However, this thesis will focus on rulemaking process
among them because the rulemaking is considered to be the most significant and there
exist common processes which the CAAs must follow for each rulemaking. In particular,
this thesis will compare the two essential requirements in rulemaking: public consultation
requirements and Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) requirements. Public consultation
concerning proposed rules aims at ensuring transparency and fairness in rulemaking. It also
aims at avoiding establishment of regulations that are inappropriate to the circumstances,
poorly adhered to, or unnecessary [17]. On the other hand, by systematically assessing the
potential impacts of new regulations, the RIA aims at improving the objectivity of the reg-
ulatory development process and at avoiding making rules which are too costly to comply
with [811.
Resources utilized in this study will include the laws and regulations that define the
systems and guidance materials issued or used by authorities in each contracting state.
1.3 Thesis Structure
Chapter 2 provides an overview of general characteristics of voluntary reporting systems.
This chapter forms the basis for the discussion in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 gives a brief description of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations which adopts the international stan-
dards and recommended practices regarding civil aviation. Then, this chapter describes the
international standards and recommended practices regarding reporting systems. Chap-
ters 4 to 7 describe the aviation safety information feedback systems in each state. The
structures of these chapters are as follows:
(1) Organizations
This section describes the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the Investigation Au-
thority. The CAA is responsible for implementing aeronautics law, which governs civil
aviation activities within state's jurisdiction, whereas the Investigation Authority is
responsible for accident and serious incident investigation. Although many contract-
ing states delegate responsibility for accident and serious incident investigation to the
CAA, this practice raises a potential conflict of interest whereby the investigators may
be required to report on shortcomings in the state's safety oversight performance, and
perhaps on even their own performance as regulators. Therefore, contracting states
are increasingly creating the Investigation Authority independent of the CAA [68].
All of the four states studied in this thesis have an Investigation Authority which is
independent of the CAA.
(2) Reporting and Investigation Systems
This section first describes mandatory reporting systems of the Investigation Author-
ity and the Civil Aviation Authority. Then, this section describes voluntary reporting
systems.
(3) Rulemaking Process
This section firstly describes a legal structure which governs civil aviation activities.
Secondly, this section describes the persons responsible for rulemaking. Then, this
section describes the public consultation requirements and Regulatory Impact Anal-
ysis (RIA) requirements which the CAA must follow in rulemaking. This section also
describes an annual regulatory plan, which some CAAs are required to make.
Next, Chapter 8 provides a comparative analysis of the feedback systems of the four
states. Finally, Chapter 9 provides conclusions.
Chapter 2
Brief Overview of Voluntary
Reporting Systems
As introduced in Chapter 1, the voluntary reporting systems aim at identifying hazards that
could potentially lead to an accident from incidents and other safety-related occurrences,
supplementing mandatory reporting systems.
This chapter first presents a conceptual model that helps in understanding the idea of
voluntary reporting systems, and then describes the general characteristics of such systems.
2.1 Idea of Voluntary Reporting Systems
The modern aviation system is designed to ensure that no single machinery failure, opera-
tional error, or combination of a few of these failures and errors will not immediately result
in an accident. It contains multiple layers of defenses and barriers to prevent an accident.
For example, as regards the design of aircraft, some system components may have one
or a few identical or different components, which fulfill the same function as back-ups. Even
when a redundancy breaks down, it is often designed to respond in a way that the failure
will cause no harm, or at least a minimum of harm, to other systems. It may also issue an
alert so that human operators can take recovery actions.
Reason, in his accident model, compared the layers of defenses to the layers of Swiss
cheese slices with some holes [110].
In Figure 2-1, an initiating undesirable event may progress through one or two more
layers of defense (through holes in the Swiss cheese slices), but usually another layer stops
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Figure 2-1: Reason's Swiss Cheese Model [56]
its progression. Accidents happen when all of these multiple layers of defenses break down
(holes in all the Swiss cheese slices line up) in some way.
Following this model, incidents and other safety-related occurrences are a large number
of outcomes of events which have had their progress toward accidents stopped by some
layers of defense.
Heinrich, in his study of industrial accidents published in 1929, concluded that for every
accident involving major injury, there were 29 accidents involving minor injury and 300
incidents involving no reportable injury. He also suggested that thousands of precursory
occurrences were taking place as well [64]. This classic empirical law is commonly known
as "Heinrich's Law." and often depicted as a pyramid as shown in Figure 2-2.
The idea of voluntary reporting systems is to collect reports of these abundant incidents
or other safety-related occurrences and identify latent hazards, which could lead to an
accident if undetected and thus uncorrected.
These hazards include, for example, poor equipment design, inappropriate operational
instructions, ambiguously written maintenance procedures, and inadequate communications
between management and line personnel [58].
Figure 2-2: Heinrich's Law (Adapted from [64])
2.2 Advantages of Voluntary Reporting Systems
Voluntary reporting systems have an advantage over mandatory reporting systems in that
voluntary reporting systems are more likely to identify unknown hazards than mandatory
reporting systems. The first reason for that is that, in voluntary reporting systems, the
reportable occurrences are usually broadly defined and individuals are encouraged to re-
port any occurrences which they perceive to have affected or could affect safety. On the
other hand, in mandatory reporting systems, in general, the reportable occurrences are
precisely defined. The broad definition of reportable occurrences in voluntary reporting sys-
tems enables the reporting of occurrences which cannot be captured by mandatory reporting
systems [1001.
The second reason is that, in voluntary reporting systems, reports usually describe not
only what happened, but also the reason why a reporter believes the undesirable event
happened. This is especially valuable in modern complex aviation systems, where human
operators closely interact with machines as part of the system [102].
According to statistics compiled by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
in the U.S., more than two-thirds of accidents involving Part 121 Operators are attributed
to human error. This is shown in Figure 2-3.
Some sources of human errors contributing to the accidents can be further traced back,
for example, to inadequate training or operating instructions. Understanding normal human
aSince each accident can have more than one cause identified, the sum of the causes exceeds 100%.
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Figure 2-3: Broad causes/factors for accidents involving Part 121 Operatorsa [106]
performance capabilities, limitations, and behavior in the operational context is a key for
accident prevention. The voluntary reporting systems afford valuable insights to understand
these human factors in a system which are not available by other means [68].
2.3 Analysis of Reports
This section describes the way the reports that have been collected are analyzed and the
risk associated with the identified hazard are analyzed and assessed, as commonly seen in
many voluntary reporting systems.
Data validation
The analysis of reports starts with the validation of the contents of reports to the greatest
extent possible. Thus, reporters may be contacted before there becomes no way to contact
them.
Furthermore, since voluntary reporting systems collect a wide range of incidents and
other safety-related occurrences, it is also necessary to prioritize reports in order to identify
reports that merit further analysis [101).
Identification of Hazards and their Root and Contributory Causes
The next step is the identification of hazards as well as the root and contributory causes
which lead to them. Broadly speaking, there are two ways of analyzing reports to identify
hazards. One way is a one-by-one analysis of reports, and another way is an analysis of
aggregate data stored in the database.
To this end, reporting forms usually have two fields: a check form field which identifies
the set of conditions in which the unsafe situation occurred, and a narrative field in which
a reporter describes how and why the situation occurred.
The check form field aids in standardizing the data, whereas the narratives field aids
in understanding the nature of hazards and human factors involved. After an analysis is
conducted for each report, both the text narratives and the coded information are stored
in the database to be used for later analyses. As an example, Figure 2-4 shows one of the
report forms of CHIRP of the U.K.
CHIRP
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Figure 2-4: CHIRP report form for pilot/flight crew
Care must be taken when conducting an analysis for hazard identification. First, since
reports represent what reporters communicate they saw or experienced, subjectivity is in-
herent. For example, like pilots and air traffic controllers for a traffic conflict, different
occupational groups see the same event differently, in terms of the interpretation of what
actually happened and the determination of what factors were important in the event.
The reported facts are usually not investigated, and hence, the accuracy of the reported
information is not fully verified.
Second, many factors can influence the decision to file a report, such as the lack of
awareness of systems, the motivation to file a report, and the perceived severity of the
event. Therefore, the number of reports describing similar events represent a portion of
the total number of such events that could have been reported. Hence, fluctuations in the
number of reports are not reliable indicators of changes in underlying safety conditions [43],
[68], [100].
Risk Analysis
Once a hazard and its causes are identified, the next step is to analyze the risk associated
with the hazard. One analytical tool which can be utilized for such an analysis is Proba-
bilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) [101]. In the PRA, the risk has two characteristics: (1) the
severity of adverse consequences and (2) the likelihood of occurrence of the adverse effects.
The PRA identifies root causes which lead to the identified hazard and evaluates the risk
associated with the hazard [97]. The analysis can be simple or complex, depending on the
case [56].
There are several analytical methods used in the PRA, and the two most common
methods are the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and the Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [97]. The
FTA is used to model the possible ways in which an identified hazard could arise from
causes in a system being studied, taking into account mitigations that could be used to
prevent an occurrence of the hazard. On the other hand, the ETA is used to model the
system state and the consequences of the hazard, taking into account mitigations that could
be incorporated to break an accident sequence in the event the hazard occurs [56].
The approach to hazard analysis described above can be illustrated using a Bow-Tie
Diagram. This diagram is useful in representing the link between causes., hazards, and
consequences (effects). In Figure 2-5, the left-hand side of the diagram can be viewed as
the FTA. while the right-hand side of the diagram can be viewed as the ETA [56].
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Figure 2-5: Bow-Tie Model [56]
Risk Assessment
After the risk is analyzed, it is compared to a risk acceptability matrix showing the likelihood
versus severity of the risk. The likelihood and severity of the risk should be considered as
those of the worst credible consequences from the hazard. Figure 2.3 shows an example of
the risk acceptability matrix.
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Figure 2-6: Risk Acceptability Matrix [56]
In Figure 2.3, "High Risk" is an unacceptable risk and corrective actions must be taken
so that the risk is reduced to medium or low level. "Medium Risk" is an acceptable risk.
Corrective actions do not have to be taken, but monitoring is needed. "Low Risk" is an
acceptable risk without restriction [56].
2.4 Use of Information and Analytical Results
The management organizations of voluntary reporting systems use information and analyti-
cal results acquired by the system in several ways. The following are the ways as commonly
seen in many voluntary reporting systems.
First, the management organizations issue safety alerts or recommendations to relevant
organizations, including the Civil Aviation Authority, which can take a corrective action if
they consider it necessary.
In some cases, the analysis of one report can trigger such an action. In other cases,
the analysis of aggregate data can trigger such an action. As previously shown in Figure
1-3, the examples of these corrective actions include a change of aircraft or components
design, a change of maintenance procedures and operational procedures, a change of training
programs, and a change of Air Traffic Control facility configuration.
Second, the management organizations publish a safety bulletin which contains selected
de-identified reports and suggestions to prevent a recurrence of the event. This allows
individuals to learn from others' experiences.
2.5 Incentives for Reporting
In order to achieve the expected outcome, voluntary reporting systems need to collect a
sufficiently large number of reports. However, there are several concerns among people that
can deter reporting incidents or other safety-related occurrences which may involve their
own errors.
Hart [63] summarized these concerns into four.
" Concern that the information may be used by a company management and/or regu-
latory authorities for punitive or enforcement purposes;
" Concern that the information may be used for a criminal prosecution;
" Concern that the information may be disseminated to the public or media; and
" Concern that the information may be used for a civil litigation.
Therefore, in order to address these concerns, voluntary reporting systems usually assure
the confidentiality of the reporter. Furthermore, in order to encourage reporting, they
usually afford immunity from enforcement actions by the Civil Aviation Authority against
violations of regulations as an incentive as well. This will be further discussed in Chapter
8.
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Chapter 3
International Standards and
Recommended Practices on
Reporting and Investigation
Systems
This chapter describes the international standards and recommended practices with regard
to reporting and investigation systems. First, this chapter gives a brief description of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and explains the Standards and Recom-
mended Practices (SARPs) which ICAO adopts. Then, this chapter describes the SARPs
with regard to reporting and investigation systems.
3.1 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a specialized agency of the United
Nations headquartered in Montreal, Canada.
ICAO was founded in 1944 based on the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(also known as Chicago Convention) signed by 52 member states in order to secure interna-
tional cooperation in establishing uniformity in regulations and standards, procedures, and
organization regarding civil aviation. As of 2009, the number of contracting states to the
Convention is 190[66].
According to the Chicago Convention, the organization is made up of an Assembly,
a Council and a Secretariat. The chief officers are the President of the Council and the
Secretary General [66].
From a regulatory perspective, ICAO's role is to provide procedures and guidance for
the safe conduct of international aircraft operations and to foster the planning and devel-
opment of air transport. This is largely achieved by adopting and amending the Standards
and Recommended Practices (SARPs) in accordance with Article 37, 54 and 90 of the
Convention, which are designated as the Annexes to the Convention [68].
The SARPs cover all technical and operational aspects of international civil aviation,
such as safety, personnel licensing, operation of aircraft. aerodromes, air traffic services,
accident investigation, and the environment.
The uniform application by contracting states of the specifications contained in the
Standards is recognized as necessary for the safety or regularity of international air navi-
gation while the uniform application of the specifications in the Recommended Practices is
regarded as desirable in the interest of safety. regularity or efficiency of the international
navigation.
In the event of non-compliance with Standards, in accordance with Article 38 of the
Chicago Convention, contracting states shall notify the Council of any differences. On the
other hand, in the event of non-compliance with Recommended Practices, contracting states
are invited to notify the Council of any differences. The differences to SARPs notified by
contracting states are published in the Supplements to the Annexes [67].
3.2 ICAO SARPs on Reporting and Investigation Systems
3.2.1 Accident and Serious Incident Investigation System
Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention "Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation" stip-
ulates international requirements for accident and incident investigation and reporting. It
defines the right and responsibilities of states such as the States of Occurrence, Registry,
Operator, Design and Manufacture, the definitions of which are prescribed in the Annex.
To provide a guidance on accident and incident investigation and reporting, ICAO has
published two materials, "Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation" and
"Accident/Incident Reporting Manual (ADREP Manual)."
Definitions
Annex 13 defines accident, incident, and serious incident as follows:
Accident. An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such
time as all such persons have disembarked, in which:
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:
- being in the aircraft, or
- direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have be-
come detached from the aircraft, or
- direct exposure to jet blast,
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by
other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas
normally available to the passengers and crew; or
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:
- adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics
of the aircraft, and
- would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected compo-
nent,
except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its
cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas,
tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or
c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.
Incident. An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an
aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.
Serious Incident. An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly
occurred.
Annex 13 also states that the difference between an accident and a serious incident lies
only in the result, and it lists the examples of serious incidents as shown below.
Near collisions requiring an avoidance manoeuvre to avoid a collision or an unsafe
situation or when an avoidance action would have been appropriate.
Controlled flight into terrain only marginally avoided.
Aborted take-offs on a closed or engaged runway.
Take-offs from a closed or engaged runway with marginal separation from obstacle(s).
Landings or attempted landings on a closed or engaged runway.
Gross failures to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial climb.
Fires and smoke in the passenger compartment, in cargo compartments or engine fires,
even though such fires were extinguished by the use of extinguishing agents.
Events requiring the emergency use of oxygen by the flight crew.
Aircraft structural failures or engine disintegrations not classified as an accident.
Multiple malfunctions of one or more aircraft systems seriously affecting the operation
of the aircraft.
Flight crew incapacitation in flight.
Fuel quantity requiring the declaration of an emergency by the pilot.
Take-off or landing incidents. Incidents such as undershooting, overrunning or running
off the side of runways.
System failures. weather phenomena, operations outside the approved flight envelope
or other occurrences which could have caused difficulties controlling the aircraft.
Failures of more than one system in a redundancy system mandatory for flight guid-
ance and navigation.
Annex 13 states that these incidents listed above are typical examples of incidents that
are likely to be serious incidents, and the list is not exhaustive and only serves as guidance
to the definition of serious incident.
Accident and Serious Incident Investigation
Annex 13 stipulates an accident investigation as a standard, whereas serious incident inves-
tigation as a recommended practice. The State of Occurrence has a primary responsibility
for the investigation, yet it may delegate the whole or any part of the conducting of such
investigation to another State.
Final Report
Annex 13 stipulates that the state conducted an accident or incident shall release the Final
Report as soon as possible and if the accident or incident involved an aircraft of a maximum
mass of over 5,700 kg, the state shall sent to ICAO a copy of the Final Report. In addition,
the investigation authority of the state conducting the investigation shall make recommen-
dations to the authorities such as civil aviation authorities and investigation authorities and
to ICAO, when appropriate. A state that receives the safety recommendations shall inform
the proposing State of the preventive action taken or under consideration, or the reasons
why no action will be taken.
ADREP Reporting
ICAO operates a computerized database known as the Accident/Incident Data Reporting
(ADREP) System, which facilitates the exchange of safety information among contracting
states. Annex 13 stipulates that the State conducted an investigation of an accident in-
volving an aircraft of maximum mass of over 2,250 kg or an investigation of an incident
involving an aircraft of a maximum mass of over 5,700 kg, the state shall send the Data
Report to ICAO.
3.2.2 Mandatory and Voluntary Incident Reporting Systems
As one of accident preventive measures, Annex 13 stipulates as a standard that contracting
states shall establish a mandatory incident reporting system.
On the other hand, as regards the voluntary incident reporting system, Annex 13 leaves
an establishment of such a system as a recommended practice. It also stipulates that, when
contracting states establish a voluntary reporting system, it shall be non-punitive and afford
protection to the sources of the information.
In addition, Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention "Airworthiness of Aircraft" stipulates
the procedures for certification and continuing airworthiness of the aircraft.
Annex 8 stipulates that State of Registry shall ensure that, in respect of aeroplanes
over 5,700 kg and helicopters over 3,175 kg maximum certificated take-off mass, there
exists a system whereby information on faults, malfunctions, defects and other occurrences
that cause or might cause adverse effects on the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft is
transmitted to the organization responsible for the type design of that aircraft.
The Sate of Design must transmit to the State of Registry and other contracting states on
request, any generally applicable information which it has found necessary for the continuing
airworthiness of the aircraft, including its engines and propellers when applicable, and for
the safe operation of the aircraft, and notification of the suspension or revocation of a Type
Certificate. This information may take a form of Airworthiness Directive.
The State of Registry, upon receipt of the information from the State of Design, must
adopt the information directly or assess the information and take corrective action.
Chapter 4
United States
4.1 Organizations
4.1.1 Civil Aviation Authority: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is the organization responsible for the safety
of civil aviation in the U.S.
From 1940 to 1958, two agencies within the Department of Commerce, the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration (CAA) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), regulated the civil
aviation in the U.S. The CAA was responsible for air traffic control, airman and aircraft
certification, safety enforcement, and airway development. The CAB was entrusted with
safety rule-making, accident investigation, and economic regulation of the airlines. In 1958,
Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act, which established a new independent agency
under the name of the Federal Aviation Agency. The act transferred the functions of the
CAA and safety rulemaking from the CAB to the agency. In 1966, the Congress authorized
the creation of a cabinet department that would combine major Federal transportation re-
sponsibilities. In 1967, the Department of Transportation (DOT) began full operations. At
the same time the Federal Aviation Agency became a part of the DOT and adopted its
present name [35].
4.1.2 Investigation Authority: National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent Federal agency,
charged with investigating civil aviation accidents and serious incidents. It also conducts
investigation of marine accidents, railroad accidents, highway accidents, pipeline accidents,
and hazardous material accidents.
The Board derives its authority from Title 49 of the United States Code (U.S.C.), and
the rules of the Board are stipulated in Chapter VIII of Title 49 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR).
The NTSB was established by statute in 1967, taking over the accident investigation
function from the CAB. Although independent, the NTSB relied on the DOT for funding
and administrative support. In 1975, the NTSB was reestablished as an independent agency
by the Independent Safety Board Act [108].
The Board consists of 5 Members appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate. In the year 2007, the Board had 378 staff members [59].
4.2 Reporting and Investigation Systems
In the U.S., other than an accident and serious incident reporting and investigation system
by the NTSB, the FAA has a mandatory incident reporting system. In addition, the FAA
has a separate reporting and investigation system for Near Midair Collisions.
As regards the voluntary reporting systems, there are three systems: Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS), Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), and Voluntary Dis-
closure Reporting Program (VDRP). The ASAP is managed by NASA, and the ASAP and
the VDRP are managed by the FAA. Lastly, Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA)
program is also discussed.
4.2.1 Accident and Serious Incident Reporting and Investigation System
Definitions
Section 830.2 of 49 CFR defines aircraft accident and incident as follows:
Aircraft accident means an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which
takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and
all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury,
or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.
Incident means an occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of
an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations.
Reporting Requirements to the NTSB
Section 830.5 of 49 CFR stipulates that the operator of aircraft shall immediately notify
the NTSB when
(a) An aircraft accident or any of the following listed incidents occur:
(1) Flight control system malfunction or failure;
(2) Inability of any required flight crewmember to perform normal flight duties as a
result of injury or illness;
(3) Failure of structural components of a turbine engine excluding compressor and
turbine blades and vanes;
In-flight fire; or
Aircraft collide in flight.
(6) Damage to property, other than the aircraft, estimated to exceed $25,000 for
repair (including materials and labor) or fair market value in the event of total
loss, whichever is less.
(7) For large multiengine aircraft (more than 12,500 pounds maximum certificated
takeoff weight):
(i) In-flight failure of electrical systems which requires the sustained use of an
emergency bus powered by a back-up source such as a battery, auxiliary
power unit, or air-driven generator to retain flight control or essential in-
struments:
(ii) In-flight failure of hydraulic systems that results in sustained reliance on the
sole remaining hydraulic or mechanical system for movement of flight control
surfaces:
(iii) Sustained loss of the power or thrust produced by two or more engines; and
(iv) An evacuation of an aircraft in which an emergency egress system is utilized.
(b) An aircraft is overdue and is believed to have been involved in an accident.
The operator of aircraft shall also file a report within 10 days after an accident, or after
7 days if an overdue aircraft is still missing. A report on an incident for which immediate
notification is required shall be filed only as requested (Section 830.15). The NTSB notifies
the FAA immediately when it receives notification of an aircraft accident or incident from
a non-FAA source [53].
Categories of Investigation Level
The every NTSB accident or incident investigation falls within one of five categories below
[96].
Major Investigation
This investigation usually entails an accident involving a commercial airliner or cargo
aircraft. The headquarters of the NTSB in Washington D.C. dispatches a "Go Team"
of investigators to investigate such an accident.
Major Investigation, regional office
This investigation is for a less serious accident in which significant safety issues have
been identified. Some nonfatal airline accidents and most small commuter airline
accidents fall into this category. The investigation is handled by one of the NTSB's
six regional offices, at least at the outset.
Field Investigation
This investigation is for an airline accident or incident with no fatalities such as an
incident involving air turbulence or a General Aviation accident. The investigation is
conducted by the nearest regional office and at least one investigator goes to the site
of the accident.
Limited Investigation
This investigation is conducted subsequent to an event involving General Aviation
aircraft, and sometimes called a "desk investigation." This investigation is carried out
by U.S. mail or over the telephone.
Delegated Investigation
This investigation is delegated to the FAA. Details are included in Subsection 4.2.1.
Delegation of Certain Accident Investigations to the FAA
Certain aviation accident investigations may be conducted by the FAA, pursuant to a "Re-
quest to the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to investigate Certain Aircraft
Accidents" (Section 831.2). Based on the request, on behalf of the NTSB, the FAA in-
vestigates the facts, conditions, and circumstances surrounding the civil aircraft accidents
involving rotorcraft, aerial application, amateur-built aircraft, restricted category aircraft,
and fixed-wing aircraft which have a certificated maximum gross takeoff weight of 12,500
pounds or less with some exceptions.
After the investigation, the Secretary sends a report containing the identified facts,
conditions, and circumstances surrounding an accident to the Board, from which the Board
may determine the probable cause. The Board still assumes the full responsibility for
the investigation of the accident. The request to the Secretary is due to the insufficient
funds available to the Board to provide adequate facilities and personnel to investigate all
accidents involving civil aircraft.
Party System
One of the characteristics of the NTSB investigation is its party system.
When the NTSB receives a notification of a major accident, the Director or Deputy
Director of the Office of Aviation Safety (OAS), in consultation with the Chairman and/or
Executive or Managing Director of the Board, decides whether to launch a "Go Team,"
which is comprised of three or four to more than a dozen NTSB investigators.
The NTSB designates the Investigator-in-Charge (IIC) for the Go Team from the Major
Investigations Division (AS-10). The IIC organizes, conducts, controls, and manages the
field phase of the investigation. Divisions of the OAS and the Office of Research and
Engineering (ORE) provide specialists and laboratory support.
The 1IC designates parties to participate in the investigation. By regulation, parties are
limited to those persons, government agencies, companies., and associations whose employees
functions, activities, or products were involved in the accident and who can provide suitable
qualified technical personnel actively to assist in the investigation. The IIC typically confers
party status to the operator, aircraft and component manufacturers, and labor organizations
[93].
Except for the FAA, which is allowed to participate in every investigation by statute (49
U.S.C. 1132), party status is a privilege, and not a right [96]. In addition, any person who
also represents claimants or insurers or those occupying a legal position may not participate
in the investigation. Participants in the investigation must be responsive to the NTSB
representatives (49 CFR 831.11).
The NTSB Go Team forms discipline-oriented working groups, led by the NTSB senior
investigator as a group chairman, and overseen by the IIC. Party representatives are assigned
to the appropriate working groups and help in developing the findings relevant to their areas
of expertise. They are expected to remain with the investigation until it is completed or
until released by the group chairman or the IIC [96].
The NTSB party system has both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is
that it allows the NTSB to utilize the party's technical expertise in aircraft design, airline
operations, functioning of flight systems, and other domains, which would not otherwise be
available. One disadvantage is that it presents inherent conflicts of interest for entities in
an investigation that may be involved in related litigation.
In order to ensure that the parties conduct investigation solely for fact-finding purposes,
the regulation stipulates that the participants may lose their status if they do not comply
with their assigned duties and activity proscriptions or instructions, orif they conduct them-
selves in a manner prejudicial to the investigation. Furthermore, all party representatives
other than the ones of the FAA are required to sign the "Statement of Party Representatives
to NTSB Investigation," which states, "participation is not for the purposes of preparing
for the litigation." (49 CFR 831.11)
Nevertheless, a full disclosure of relevant information by parties during major investi-
gations to avoid liability has not always been assured. For example, a case was reported
in which one party representative in the investigation of an accident attempted to remove
parts from the wreckage reconstruction site. In addition, critics of the party system are
pointing out the possibility of willfully providing misinformation by one party to thrust
future liability to another party [96].
Investigative Priority
The NTSB provides for the participation by other Federal agencies in accident or incident
investigation. However, any investigation conducted by the NTSB has priority over all other
investigations of such accident conducted by other Federal agencies. In addition, those
participating agencies may not participate in the NTSB's determination of the probable
cause of the accident or incident.
In cases of suspected criminal activity, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may
participate in the investigation. As the result of recent legislation, if the Attorney General,
in consultation with the Chairman of the NTSB, determines and notifies the NTSB that the
circumstances reasonably indicate that the accident may have been caused by an intentional
criminal act, the NTSB will relinquish investigative priority to the FBI. The relinquishment
of investigative priority by the NTSB must not otherwise affect the authority of the NTSB
to continue its investigation (49 U.S.C 1131).
FAA Participation in the NTSB Accident Investigation
As mentioned above, by statute, the FAA has a right to participate in every accident
investigation.
When an accident occurs, either the Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) with juris-
diction in the accident area or the Accident Investigation Division (AAI-100) at the Office
of Accident Investigation (AAI) designates the IIC, who is responsible for the overall FAA
investigation and is a principal contact for all aspects of the investigation. The "Go Team",
a team of technical specialists, is also designated as necessary.
The FAA IIC will conduct an investigation of all accidents regardless of whether the
NTSB conducts an on-scene investigation. In the absence of the NTSB, the FAA IIC has
the same authority and responsibility as the NTSB.
In addition to assisting the NTSB to identify facts, conditions, and circumstances leading
to an accident, the FAA will determine whether -
" Performance of FAA facilities or functions was a factor.
" Performance of non-FAA owned and operated ATC facilities or navigational aids was
a factor.
" Airworthiness of FAA-certificated aircraft was a factor.
" Competency of FAA-certificated airmen, air agencies, commercial operators, or air
carriers was involved.
o Federal Aviation Regulations were adequate.
" Airport certification safety standards or operations were involved.
" Airport security standards or operations were involved.
" Airman medical qualifications were involved.
" There was a violation of Federal Aviation Regulations [53].
The FAA has its own Safety Recommendation Program, under which the FAA inspectors
can submit safety recommendations to the FAA headquarters based on the findings in the
investigation.
When an FAA inspector finds the deficiencies of design, operation, or maintenance
practices or of established standards, procedures, or policies as a result of the accident
investigation, the FAA inspector, FAA manager, or any other FAA employees prepare a
memorandum which includes a description of the accident and the deficient areas, followed
by safety recommendations. If possible, the recommendation should specify how it will
resolve the identified safety problem.
The memorandum is sent to the Recommendation and Analysis Division (AAI-200) at
the AAI. AAI-200 reviews each recommendation and forwards the recommendation to the
FAA action office, which must respond to the recommendation.
The FAA action office has 90 days to evaluate the recommendation and forward its
response to AAI-200. The response must include one of the following elements:
" Reasons if the office rejects the recommendation.
" An implementation plan of corrective action and/or a description of corrective action
which has been already done if the office accepts the recommendation.
A Safety Recommendation Review Board (SRRB) chaired by a representative of AAI-
200 and composed of a minimum of two other technically qualified persons reviews all
responses from the FAA action offices. Following the final decision of the SRRB, a mem-
orandum accepting or rejecting the recommendation will be forwarded to the originator of
the recommendation.
In addition, the FAA will take corrective actions. For example, the FAA suspends
or revokes the certification when an investigation reveals actual or suspected deficiencies
related to the competency of an FAA-certified airman [53].
Final Report and Safety Recommendations
After the accident investigation, the NTSB publishes a report. Specifically, the NTSB
publishes a detailed narrative accident report in connection with the investigation into
those accidents which the NTSB determines to warrant such a report. The report will set
forth the facts, conditions and circumstances relating to the accident and the probable cause
thereof, along with any appropriate recommendations (49 CFR 845.40).
When the NTSB submits a recommendation to the Secretary of Transportation, the
Secretary gives a formal written response to each recommendation not later than 90 days
after receiving the recommendation (49 U.S.C. 1135).
Such a response must indicate whether the Secretary intends -
(1) to carry out procedures to adopt the complete recommendation;
(2) to carry out procedures to adopt a part of the recommendation; or
(3) to refuse to carry out procedures to adopt the recommendation.
When the Secretary intends to carry out procedures to adopt the complete or a part
of the recommendation, the response must include a copy of a proposed timetable for
completing the procedures. When the Secretary intends to refuse to carry out procedures
to adopt the complete recommendation or a part of it, the response must detail the reasons
for the refusal.
Furthermore, each year, the Secretary is required to submit a report to Congress and
to the NTSB describing the regulatory status of each recommendation that is on the most
wanted list of the NTSB. The Secretary must continue to report on the regulatory status of
each such recommendation in subsequent years until final regulatory action is taken on that
recommendation, or until the Secretary or an Administration within the DOT determines
and states in such a report that no action should be taken (49 U.S.C. 1135).
In the FAA, the AAI serves as the FAA's focal point for receiving, processing, managing,
and tracking NTSB safety recommendations. The AAI assigns action to the appropriate
program offices having subject matter responsibility for the NTSB safety recommenda-
tions. Next, the program offices to which a safety recommendation action is assigned con-
duct a technical evaluation of each safety recommendation to determine the feasibility of
implementing the recommendation or alternative actions needed to respond to the safety
recommendation issue. Then, the offices prepare proposed responses to the safety recom-
mendations and submit them to the AAI. The AAI reviews and evaluates the proposed
responses submitted from program offices for adequacy, accuracy, and appropriateness in
resolving the safety issues addressed, and prepares the FAA responses to the NTSB.
All NTSB safety recommendations are considered active and subject to priority attention
until appropriate action has been completed and the safety recommendations have been
classified as "closed" by the NTSB [50].
4.2.2 Incident Reporting and Investigation System
In the U.S., incidents such as runway incursions, emergency evacuations, and maneuvers by
pilots due to an emergency and/or Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
Resolution Advisory (RA) that results in the loss of separation are reported by Air Traffic
Control (ATC) facilities to the appropriate FAA offices such as the FSDO and the Washing-
ton Operations Center [53). The incident investigation is usually conducted by the FSDO
or the Flight Standard Services (AFS) [54].
The FAA has another incident reporting system called the Service Difficulty Reporting
System. Service Difficulty Reporting System collects incidents which arise from a failure,
malfunction, or defect of aircraft or its components.
Part 121, 125, and 135 of 14 CFR stipulate that aircraft operators certified under each
part shall submit a report of an occurrence or a detection of a failure, malfunction, or defect
to the FAA. Title 14 CFR Part 145 imposes the similar requirements on the repair station
(refer to Appendix B., Section B.1, Subsection B.1.1).
Additionally, Part 21 of 14 CFR stipulates that the holder of a Type Certificate, a
Supplemental Type Certificate, a Parts Manufacturer Approval, or a Technical Standard
Order or licensee of a Type Certificate and a Supplemental Type Certificate shall report
any failure, malfunction, or defect in any product, part, process, or article manufactured by
it that has resulted in the occurrences listed in the regulation. It shall also report any defect
in any product, part, or article manufactured by it that has left its quality control system
and that it determines could result in the regulation. (For the list of the occurrences, refer
to Appendix B, Section B.1, Subsection B.1.1.)
The data derived from the reports are encoded and entered into the database at the
Aviation Standards National Field Office. The SDR system is primarily used to detect short-
term safety problems. The SDR system automatically tracks trends in reports according
to aircraft and component type. If the monthly or annual trend in reports exceeds a preset
value, then the system alerts the analysts at the office. The Airworthiness Directive or
safety alerts are issued when the trend alert proves serious [127].
4.2.3 Near Midair Collision (NMAC) Reporting and Investigation Sys-
tem
The Near Midair Collision (NMAC) should be reported to the FAA, which has a separate
reporting system for the NMAC. In the U.S., the NMAC is defined as "an incident associated
with the operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of collision occurs as a result of
proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a report is received from a pilot or a
flight crew member that a collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft" [40].
Under the system, pilots and/or flight crew are responsible for determining whether an
NMAC actually occurred, and if so, should report the incident immediately to the nearest
Air Carrier District Office (ACDO) or FSDO of the FAA. However, there is no regulatory
or legal requirement that they report an NMAC, although they are encouraged to do so
[461.
Investigation
All NMAC reports are throughly investigated by the FAA Flight Standards inspectors. In
investigations, existing radar, communication, and weather data are examined in the con-
duct of the investigation. When possible. all flight crew members are interviewed regarding
factors involving the NMAC. Air traffic controllers are also interviewed in cases where one
or more of the involved aircraft was provided ATC service. Both flight and ATC procedures
will be evaluated [40]. The investigation should be completed in 90 days [54]. The FAA
inspectors determine the probable causes, classify the events, and create a final report and
classify the degree of risk of NMAC into three categories, as shown in Table 4.1 [55].
Table 4.1: NMAC risk categories [55]
The number of NMACs reported to the FAA is shown in Figure 4-1. In particular, the
number of NMACs involving Part 121 Operator which are reported to the FAA is shown in
Figure 4-2.
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Figure 4-1: Number of NMACs reported to the FAA per year (Data Source: [22])
Category Definition
Critical A situation in which collision avoidance was due to chance rather than a
pilot's act. Less than 100 feet of aircraft separation is considered critical.
Potential A situation which would probably have resulted in a collision if no action
had been taken by either pilot. Less than 500 feet of aircraft separation
is usually required in this case.
No Hazard A situation in which direction and altitude would have made a midair
collision improbable regardless of evasive actions.
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Figure 4-2: Number of NMACs involving Part 121 Operators which are reported to the
FAA per yearb (Data Source: [22])
After the investigation, the final reports are submitted to the FAA Headquarters, where
they are compiled and analyzed, and the programs, policies, and procedures aiming at
reducing the occurrences of NMACs are developed. Although the NMAC reporting is
voluntary, when the investigation reveals a violation of regulations, enforcement action will
be pursued [40].
4.2.4 Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary, confidential and non-punitive
reporting system.
The purposes of the ASRS are:
" Identify deficiencies and discrepancies in the National Aviation System.
* Support policy formulation and planning to improve the National Aviation System
by providing data.
* Enhance the foundation of human factors research [103].
bNo data is available on risk categories.
History
The ASRS was established in 1976 under a Memorandum of Agreement between the FAA
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and was designed and devel-
oped by NASA.
The accident of the Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 514 in 1974 triggered the es-
tablishment of the ASRS. On December 1, 1974, the TWA Flight 514 was inbound through
cloudy and turbulent skies to Dulles Airport in Washington, DC. It descended below the
minimum safe altitude for the area it was flying through and collided with a Virginia moun-
tain top. All passengers and the flight crew were killed.
The NTSB accident investigation revealed that the flight crew had misunderstood ATC
approach instructions and descended prematurely to the final approach altitude, and they
also misinterpreted an approach chart in the process.
During the investigation, another disturbing and provocative finding emerged: six weeks
prior to the accident, a United Airlines flight crew had experienced a similar misunder-
standing but had narrowly escaped the same fate during a nighttime approach at the same
location. They discovered their mistake after landing. They reported the incident to their
company's new internal reporting system, and a cautionary notice was issued to all United
Airlines pilots about the potential hazard. Unfortunately, however, at the time there existed
no methods to share this knowledge with other operators and the crew of the TWA 514
was unaware of the hazard. This case led to the determination that such safety information
must be shared with the aviation community and an idea of a national aviation incident
reporting system was born [102].
Management
The FAA recognizes that its regulatory and enforcement roles would discourage the avia-
tion community from trusting and using the ASRS if the FAA were to operate the system.
Therefore, although most of the funding for the ASRS is provided by the FAA, the ASRS
is administered by NASA, which sets its policies independently. NASA., a research orga-
nization with no regulatory or enforcement role, is afforded an opportunity to enhance its
research capability through access to the human factors data generated by the ASRS [102].
A NASA ASRS Advisory Subcommittee, composed of representatives from the aviation
community, including the Department of Defense, NASA, and the FAA, advises NASA on
the conduct of the ASRS. The subcommittee conducts periodic meetings to evaluate and
ensure the effectiveness of the reporting system [36].
In addition, to avoid conflicts of interest, ASRS analysts, researchers, and management
personnel are not permitted to have ongoing employment relationships with the FAA, air-
lines, or similar organizations [92].
Reports
Pilots, flight engineers, air traffic controllers, cabin crew members. maintenance technicians.
dispatchers, ground personnel, and others involved in aviation operations can submit reports
to the ASRS.
Currently, the ASRS receives 3,300 reports per month on average, and the cumulative
incident reports received so far have exceeded 700,000 since 1976 [103]. Figure 4-3 shows
the number of reports submitted to the ASRS as well as its reporter distribution.
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Figure 4-3: Number of reports submitted and reporter distribution of the ASRS [103]
Analysis
The ASRS Expert Analyst staff, composed of pilots, air traffic controllers, mechanics, re-
searchers. system experts, and managers. identify any hazards in the reports and flag that
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information for immediate action. A minimum of two analysts read each report received
[103].
The Expert Analysts first classify reports by their safety significance. Potentially signif-
icant events are further classified as urgent situations that require immediate intervention
or as events that warrant in-depth analysis.
These analysts identify accident precursors both by examining critical incidents in de-
tail and by noticing patterns in the data. Further, after an aircraft accident, they routinely
search the database for near accidents that occurred under similar conditions. After identi-
fying a critical near accident, they scan the database to formulate hypothesis about potential
accident precursors [100].
Confidentiality
Each report form has a tear-off portion which contains the information on the identity of
a reporter. This identification strip section provides the staff with the means by which the
reporter can be contacted, in case additional information is sought in order to understand
completely the content of the report.
After the clarification of the content, the tear-off portion is removed and returned to
the reporter. It will provide the reporter with proof of having filed a report on a specific
incident or other safety-related occurrence.
Except in the case of reports describing accidents or criminal activities, no copy of an
ASRS form's identification strip is created or retained for ASRS files. Prompt return of
identification strips is a primary element of the ASRS's report de-identification process and
ensures the reporter's anonymity [36].
Some reports are entered into the ASRS database together with the observations of the
ASRS Expert Analyst staff. The reports that are entered into the database are less than
20 percent of the reports submitted because of resource constraints [42],[101].
Before the data is entered into the database, all information that might assist in estab-
lishing the identification of persons filing ASRS reports and parties named in those reports
are deleted with the exception of reports containing information on accidents or criminal
offenses. Even dates, times, and related information are either generalized or eliminated
if they could be used to infer an identity. This de-identification is accomplished normally
within 72 hours after NASA's receipt of the reports.
Furthermore, it is assured that the FAA will not seek, and NASA will not release or make
available to the FAA. any report filed with NASA under the ASRS or any other information
that might reveal the identity of any party involved in an occurrence or incident reported
under the ASRS [36].
In this way, the ASRS protects the identities of the reporter and all other parties involved
in an occurrence. To date, no reporter's identity has never been breached [92].
Immunity
Reports may include violations of the Federal Aviation Regulations. However, the FAA
considers the filing of a report to be indicative of a constructive attitude and such an
attitude will tend to prevent future violations; hence, the FAA provides limited immunity
from regulatory enforcement action to reporters [361.
Section 91.25 of 14 CFR stipulates that the FAA shall not use reports submitted to
NASA under the Aviation Safety Reporting Program, or information derived therefrom in
any enforcement action except information concerning criminal offenses or accidents.
Here. any reports containing information regarding criminal offenses are forwarded to
the FAA and the Department of Justice and any reports containing information regarding
aviation accidents are forwarded to the NTSB [42].
FAA Advisory Circular AC No.00-46D [36] lays down other conditions to meet so that
neither a civil penalty nor certificate suspension will be imposed although a finding of
violation may be made.
These conditions are:
" The violation was inadvertent and not deliberate.
" A reporter filed a report within 10 days of incident.
" The action does not involve an action which discloses a lack of qualification or com-
petency of the certificate holder.
" A person has not been found in any prior FAA enforcement action to have com-
mitted a violation of 49 U.S.C. Subtitle VII "Aviation Programs," or any regulation
promulgated there for a period of five years prior to the date of occurrence.
Issuance of Alerting Messages
The ASRS has no direct operational authority of its own, hence, it issues alerting messages
to the appropriate FAA offices or other aviation authorities so that they can evaluate the
information and take needed corrective actions.
As a Federal agency, NASA is well positioned to disseminate safety alerts to key orga-
nizations and stakeholders throughout the national aviation system. The ASRS has issued
more than 4,000 alerting messages since 1976. Alerting messages are issued on subjects
that include airport facilities, airspace design, aircraft design, navigation aids, charting,
procedures, and other conditions and situations that might compromise safe flight [102].
Table 4.2 shows the number of alerting messages issued by year.
Table 4.2: Number of alerting messages issued by year (Data Source: [25])
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average
- 154 250 282 213 214 304 208 192 342 239.9
Further, twice a month the ASRS has teleconferences with the FAA Office of Safety on
the most important alerting items seen in its recent report flow [102].
Database Utilization
The public can directly access the database on-line and can download reports. In addition,
on requests from individuals and organizations, including aircraft manufacturers, airlines
and academies, who wish to acquire data on a particular subject, the ASRS will search its
database, download relevant reports, and send them to the requester at no cost under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provisions [102]. The ASRS has responded to over
7,000 Search Requests since 1976 [103].
In cases when government organizations such as the FAA, the NTSB, and the U.S.
Congress need data for rulemaking, airspace design, accident investigation or other circum-
stances in a short time, the ASRS responds to the requests in "Quick Response". The
ASRS analyzes relevant incident data and provides a data synopsis within a brief period (1
to 2 weeks) [102].
The ASRS also conducts research. Research agendas are developed in collaboration
with government and industry safety organizations. As of the end of 2009, the ASRS had
published 63 research studies, most of which examined human performance issues in real
world operations.
Publication of Safety Bulletins
The ASRS publishes a monthly safety bulletin named "CALLBACK" and a safety journal
named "ASRS Directline."
The purpose of CALLBACK is to educate a broad aviation audience in safety issues. In
addition to excerpts from ASRS incident reports with supporting commentaries, it contains
occasional summaries of ASRS research efforts and related aviation safety information. The
CALLBACK is distributed throughout the U.S. and to the international community.
The ASRS Directline is published to meet the needs of the operators and flight crews
of airlines. Articles focus on subjects of special interest to the group, such as pilot-ATC
issues, factors associated with altitude deviations, confusing call sign problems, and other
issues deemed important by the ASRS analysts. Its distribution is directed to operational
managers, safety officers, training organizations, and publications departments [102].
4.2.5 Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)
The Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) is a voluntary reporting system jointly estab-
lished by the FAA and the aviation industry. The objective of the ASAP is to encourage
employees of the airlines authorized to operate under 14 CFR Part 121 and employees of
the repair stations which hold certificates under 14 CFR Part 145 to voluntarily report
safety issues to company management and to the FAA for resolution. Enforcement-related
incentives have been designed into the program so that the employees are willing to report
safety issues without fear that the FAA will use reports accepted under the program to take
a legal enforcement action against them, or that companies will use such information to
take a disciplinary action [37].
History
The first ASAP began in 1994 when representatives of the Southwest Region of the FAA
Flight Standards Division joined the pilots' association and management of American Air-
lines to promote the confidential disclosure and correction of potentially dangerous condi-
tions [60],[100].
Over the past several years, the number of ASAP programs has increased steadily. In
2000, to encourage wider participation in the ASAP, President Clinton announced that
ASAP would be a part of a national effort to reduce aviation accidents [101]. Currently,
73 operators have 169 programs covering pilots, mechanics, cabin crew members, and dis-
patchers [44]. Additionally, ground service personnel, air traffic controllers, and Technical
Operations (FAA-Air Traffic Organization) personnel may be included in the future [41].
Establishment of a Program
The ASAP program is based on a safety partnership that includes the FAA, a certificate
holder, and usually a third party representing employees, such as labor organization. Partic-
ipation from various employee groups, such as pilots, mechanics, cabin crew members, and
dispatchers is encouraged under the program [37]. Although the ASAP is company-oriented,
the programs must adhere to federal guidelines.
In order to establish an ASAP program, a certificate holder should develop a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MOU) including the certificate holder, applicable employee unions.
and the FAA, which outlines the program's purpose, terms, administrative procedures, and
reporting process. The employee unions can be a union of pilots, mechanics, cabin crew
members, and dispatchers; most of the current MOUs for ASAP are established with a
union of pilots [45].
The FAA Certificate Holding District Office (CHDO) and the certificate holder jointly
review the MOU to ensure that it satisfies FAA guidelines before it is signed by all parties.
The CHDO manager, with the authorization of the Director of Flight Standards Service
(AFS-1), signs the MOU on behalf of the FAA.
Certificate holders must initially develop a separate demonstration program for each
employee group. Its objective is to measure its effectiveness and ensure that it meets the
safety objective of the specific ASAP. The duration of the initial demonstration program
should be no longer than 18 months. At the conclusion of the initial demonstration program,
all parties review the program. After a demonstration program is reviewed and determined
to be successful by the parties to the agreement, it may be accepted as a continuing program,
subject to review and renewal every two years by the FAA. The Director of AFS-1 authorizes
the final acceptance of a program. Renewals of continuing programs may be accomplished
by the CHDO manager [37].
It should be noted that most ASAP MOUs include provisions for submitting events
reported under the ASAP to the ASRS. This is partly because the ASRS can provide a
reporter with eligibility for a waiver of the imposition of sanctions from FAA enforcement
action in the event that a report is excluded from the ASAP program [51]. In fact, at least
60 percent of ASRS reports received from airline employees are ASAP reports [45].
In the FAA, the Voluntary Safety Programs Branch (AFS-230) at the Headquarters
manages the ASAP. (The branch also manages the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program
(VDRP) and the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program, which will be
discussed in the subsequent sections.) The branch reviews program implementation and
collects data and feedback from ASAP participants.
Analysis
Under the ASAP, employees report safety violations to the certificate holder's ASAP man-
ager, who then forwards the report to the Event Review Committee (ERC). The ERC is
comprised of representatives from each party to the MOU. Usually a representative from
the FAA is a specifically qualified FAA inspector from the CHDO.
The ERC reviews and analyzes the submitted reports and determines whether they are
accepted into the ASAP. The ERC recommends any needed corrective actions for actual or
potential problems identified in the analysis. The ERC also works with the certificate holder
to develop appropriate corrective actions and conducts follow-up assessment to determine
whether they have been satisfactorily implemented. Here, corrective action may involve
joint or individual action by the parties to the ASAP MOU [37], [101].
There are some requirements regarding the ERC decision. When deciding whether a re-
port is accepted into the program and when deciding on corrective action recommendations
including any FAA administrative action, the ERC must reach a consensus of all represen-
tatives. Further, the FAA requires certificate holders to complete corrective actions that
are acceptable to all members of the ERC to resolve any safety deficiencies. Otherwise, the
FAA can terminate the participant's ASAP [37].
Confidentiality
Although under the ASRS, all information that can be used to derive the identity of the
reporter is removed from a report before it is entered into the database, only the employee's
name is redacted from a report entered into a database under the ASAP. One of the reason
is that the ASAP values the capacity to retain more specific information on individual
events for better analysis of the event. Another reason is that under ASAP an employee
must complete the corrective action to the satisfaction of all members of the ERC if the
ERC determines that the corrective action is required to resolve a safety issue [51].
A significant impediment to the sharing of ASAP information with the FAA is an avi-
ation industry's concern over public disclosure of the information, and, if disclosed, the
potential for it to be used for purposes other than safety enhancement [51].
Therefore, at present, all ASAP data reside in computers at certificate holders' offices
and the FAA cannot directly access the database [45], [51].
In order to address the concern and encourage persons to provide the information to
the FAA, the information received from ASAP is protected from public disclosure.
Section 40123 of 49 U.S.C. stipulates that voluntarily-provided safety and security re-
lated information is protected from disclosure if (1) the disclosure of the information would
inhibit the voluntary provision of that type of information and that the receipt of that
type of information aids in fulfilling the FAA's safety and security responsibilities; and (2)
withholding such information from disclosure would be consistent with the FAA's safety
and security responsibilities.
The section also stipulates that the FAA shall issue regulations to carry out the section,
and Part 193 of 14 CFR is the regulation which carries out the section.
Part 193 of 14 CFR stipulates that if the FAA issues an order designating information as
protected under 49 U.S.C. 40123, that information will not be disclosed under the Freedom
of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) or other laws, except as provided in Part 193 of 14 CFR
and in the order designating the information as protected.
The FAA has determined that without the disclosure protections, certificate holders will
not voluntarily release ASAP information from their premises to the FAA. Therefore, by
FAA Order 8000.82, the FAA designated the ASAP information as protected in accordance
with the provisions of 14 CFR Part 193. The FAA Order is also applicable to any other
government agencies that receive such information from the FAA.
By this order., much of the information acquired from the ASAP is protected, for ex-
ample, the name of the reporter, the identity of the certificate holder, and the statistical
analysis and trend information. In cases when the disclosure is necessary such as when the
FAA has to explain the need for changes in FAA policies, procedures, and regulations or
has to advise other people of the problem to take corrective actions, the FAA may disclose
de-identified (no operator or employee identity), summarized information derived from the
ASAP. The FAA may release the name of an airline or repair station that has an ASAP
that has been accepted by the FAA [51].
Immunity
Under the ASAP, safety issues are resolved through corrective actions rather than through
punishment or discipline. To encourage employees to voluntarily report safety issues even
though they may involve an alleged violation of 14 CFR, enforcement-related incentives
have been designed into the program. The program assures that lesser enforcement action
will be used to address certain alleged violations of the regulation [37].
FAA Advisory Circular AC 120-66B states that the following criteria must be met in
order for a report involving a possible violation to be covered under ASAP [37].
(1) The employee must submit a report in a timely manner. In order to be considered
timely, a report must be submitted either within a time period following the event
that is defined in the MOU, such as within 24 hours of the end of the duty day in
which the event occurred, or within 24 hours of the employee's having become aware
of possible noncompliance with 14 CFR.
(2) The alleged regulatory violation must be inadvertent, and must not appear to involve
an intentional disregard for safety.
(3) The reported event must not appear to involve criminal activity, substance abuse,
controlled substances, alcohol, or intentional falsification.
Sole source reports are the reports which first identified or described all evidence of the
event available to the FAA or the certificate holder. Sole-source reports that meet the
second and the third acceptance criteria will be accepted even if they are not submitted
in a timely manner [37]. Unlike the ASRS., the ASAP currently accepts reports related to
accidents [45].
The reported events that are excluded from the ASAP will be referred to the FAA for
possible enforcement action and/or re-examination under Subtitle VII "Aviation Programs"
of 49 U.S.C. Furthermore, the FAA may refer reports that appear to involve possible criminal
activity, substance abuse, controlled substances, alcohol, or intentional falsification to law
enforcement agencies, if applicable [37].
Employees submitting reports that are accepted may be subject to the FAA administra-
tive actions and the certificate holder's corrective actions depending on whether all evidence
of the event available to the FAA outside of ASAP are discovered by or otherwise described
on the reports (Sole source reports) or the information about the event in question is known
by individuals other than just the ASAP reporter (Non-sole source reports), as shown below
[37],[45],[70].
Sole source reports:
These reports will be closed by the FAA without administrative action. Similarly,
the certificate holder may not use the information obtained in this way to initiate
disciplinary action against the employee.
Non-sole source reports:
When there is sufficient evidence to support a violation of 14 CFR, these reports will be
closed by the FAA with administrative action. There are two types of administrative
actions: Warning Notice or a Letter of Correction. Both of them are expunged from
the FAA files after two years. When there is not sufficient evidence, these reports are
closed with a FAA Letter of No Action, which is expunged from the FAA files after
30 days.
Although the certificate holders may not use information obtained through the ASAP
report to take disciplinary actions against an employee, they may require corrective
actions including additional training for employees who the reports demonstrate lack
qualification.
The ERC representative from the FAA CHDO is empowered to complete ASAP inves-
tigations and is responsible for coordinating all corrective and administrative actions [371.
Since the ERC members have the authority to pardon violations of 14 CFR, the impartiality
of the ERC members must be ensured [45].
Publication of Safety Bulletins
Depending on the program, the ERC publishes newsletters or safety bulletins to participat-
ing employee groups. Unlike the ASRS, under the ASAP, the direct access to the database
is unavailable for the public.
Compilation of Data
At present, the FAA does not receive and does not anticipate receiving ASAP reports for
retention in the files or database of the FAA [51]. The FAA only has access to the ASAP
reports on a periodic basis during the ERC meetings.
Based on the information acquired from the ERC meetings, the CHDOs compile quar-
terly reports of safety enhancements achieved by ASAP program of each certificate holder
and submit them to the Voluntary Safety Programs Branch at the Headquarters. The branch
is supposed to determine whether the program is achieving safety objectives. However, it
has been pointed out that these quarterly reports do not provide sufficient details about
events or corrective actions. Furthermore, the FAA has not yet developed a database or a
method to identify safety trends at the national level.
The FAA is missing an opportunity to make use of these data for policy development
or to disseminate the collective data to FAA inspectors and other participants [45].
4.2.6 Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP)
While the ASRS and the ASAP are aimed at employees, the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting
Program (VDRP), established in 1990, is a voluntary reporting system which is mainly
aimed at organizations (companies' management) [61].
By forgoing civil penalty, the VDRP provides incentives for airlines, repair stations,
qualified fractional ownership programs, Production Approval Holders (PAHs), or other
eligible FAA-regulated entities (hereafter referred to as regulated entities) to voluntarily
identify, report, and correct instances of regulatory noncompliance. The FAA issues a
letter of correction to the regulated entities in lieu of civil penalty for covered instances of
noncompliance that are voluntarily disclosed to the FAA.
Because the VDRP identifies and corrects instances of regulatory noncompliance of
which the FAA may be otherwise unaware, the program offers a potential for enhancement
of safety. Receipt of this otherwise unavailable information would also provide the FAA with
an improved basis for modifying procedures, policies, and regulations to improve safety and
efficiency. Unlike the ASRS and the ASAP, the VDRP does not apply to violations by
individuals with a few exceptions [39].
Acceptance Criteria
The FAA accepts the voluntary disclosure when all of the following criteria are met:
" The regulated entity has notified the FAA of the apparent violation immediately after
detecting it and before the agency learned of it by other means.
" The apparent violation is inadvertent.
" The apparent violation does not indicate a lack, or reasonable question, of qualification
of the regulated entities.
" Immediate action, satisfactory to the FAA, was taken upon discovery to terminate
the conduct that resulted in the apparent violation.
" The regulated entity has developed or is developing a comprehensive fix and schedule
of implementation that is satisfactory to the FAA. The fix must include a follow-up
self-audit. in addition to any FAA audits.
The FAA ordinarily does not forgo legal enforcement action if the regulated entity
informs the FAA of the apparent violation during, or in anticipation of, an FAA investiga-
tion/inspection or in association with an accident or incident.
There are two exceptional cases to the above in which a voluntary disclosure can still
be accepted [39].
" The FAA has already learned of the violation from an ASAP report.
* The violation is discovered during a joint audit (inspection) between the regulated
entities and the FAA, to which the regulated entities voluntarily agreed.
Relationship with the ASAP
The ASAP provides protection to the employees whereas the VDRP provides protection to
the companies' management. In some cases, an ASAP report triggers a VDRP report by
a company's management. As described above, the VDRP report can still be accepted by
the FAA, even though the FAA has already learned of the violation from the ASAP report.
In other cases, an VDRP report triggers an ASAP report by an employee. If a company
files a report under the VDRP that identifies a possible regulatory violation by its employee,
the employee may receive a Letter of Investigation from the FAA. Therefore, it is advisable
for the company's management to notify and encourage the employee to submit an ASAP
report. If the employee files an ASAP report within the prescribed time frame of the
applicable ASAP MOU and all other conditions are met to be accepted, the violation will
be handled in accordance with the ASAP MOU. Such a report is considered as a non-sole
source report even if the information has been already provided to the FAA under the
VDRP. When an ASAP program is not available to the employees, it is advisable for them
to submit a report to the ASRS [41].
How the VDRP Works
Typically, the VDRP follows the following stages [39].
Stage I: Notification to the FAA of an apparent violation.
The regulated entity must notify the appropriate Principal Inspector of the FAA of the
apparent violation. The initial notification should be accomplished on a timely basis,
ordinarily within 24 hours of the discovery of the apparent violation. The notification
must contain items such as a brief description of the apparent violation, verification
of the cessation of noncompliance, and a brief description of the immediate action.
Stage II: FAA response to the regulated entity.
The Principal Inspector reviews the submission and judges if it meets the requirements
of acceptance. Once the Principal Inspector completes the review of the voluntary
disclosure submission, he/she makes a determination to accept the disclosure, return
it for editing, or find it invalid. For the disclosure by the airlines, the Office Manager
will review the Principal Inspector's determination.
Stage III: Written report of regulated entity's apparent violation.
The regulated entity should submit the written report of the apparent violation to the
Principal Inspector within 10 working-days from the date the disclosure was submitted
to the FAA. This report must contain a detailed description of the proposed fix,
outlining the planned corrective steps, the responsibilities for implementing those
corrective steps, and a time schedule for completion of the fix.
Stage IV: Written report review by the FAA.
The FAA works with the regulated entity to ensure that it has identified any root
causes and systematic issues which led to the apparent violation. In this stage, the
Principal Inspector is also tasked with completing a Risk Assessment Matrix to aid
in evaluating the significance of the event and the proposed comprehensive fix.
Stage V: Implementation of the comprehensive fix and FAA surveillance.
During the implementation period, the FAA and the regulated entity should con-
tinue to work together. The FAA monitors the implementation of the corrective steps
and may advise and assist the regulated entity. The FAA also assesses the pertinent
regulated entity's corrective efforts and top management's awareness of these efforts
throughout the implementation period. Upon determining that the implementation
of the comprehensive fix is satisfactory, the Principal Inspector issues a letter of cor-
rection. If, during this period, the FAA determines that the steps taken by the entity
are not those documented in the comprehensive fix and acceptable corrective action
by the regulated entity is not forthcoming, the letter of correction may be rescinded,
and appropriate legal enforcement action initiated.
Stage VI: Inspector signoff.
At the conclusion of the implementation period, the Principal Inspector will make
a final assessment. For the disclosure by the airlines, the concurrence of the Office
manager is also needed to close the case.
Confidentiality
The FAA believes that the regulated entities would be reluctant to participate in the VDRP
unless the FAA could assure that the information derived from the VDRP would not be
disclosed. Therefore, in the same way as the ASAP, the FAA designated by FAA Order
8000.89 the information received from VDRP as protected from public disclosure in accor-
dance with the provisions of 14 CFR Part 193. The order is also applicable to any other
government agencies that receive such information from the FAA.
This order protects the information such as that contained in an initial notification to
the FAA, that contained in a detailed written report, and the FAA generated documentation
and electronic information that is directly associated with an accepted VDRP submission.
In cases in which the disclosure is necessary, such as when the FAA has to explain
the need for changes in FAA policies, procedures, and regulations or has to advise other
people of the problem to address, the FAA may disclose summary information which has
de-identified the identity of the source of the information and the names of the certificate
holder, employees, and other persons as well as any other information that could be used to
ascertain the identity of the submitter. The FAA may also disclose de-identified aggregate
statistical information concerning VDRP submissions [52].
4.2.7 Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) Program
The Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program is a voluntary safety program
in which the airlines routinely collect and analyze the digital flight data gathered during
normal operations. Therefore. it is different in characteristics from the voluntary reporting
systems described so far, to which persons voluntarily report the events they saw or involved
in.
However, the FAA policy to implement the FOQA program by industry's voluntary
initiative offers the Civil Aviation Authorities in other states valuable insights for imple-
menting their policies in the future, therefore, the program is specifically discussed here.
Overview
As stated, the FOQA program is a voluntary safety program in which the airlines routinely
collect and analyze the digital flight data gathered during normal operations. The program
mainly aims at airlines that operate under Part 121 or Part 135, yet it may be applicable
to operators under other parts [38].
Although the FOQA program is a voluntary program, airlines that seek the protection
from the FAA's enforcement actions based on the FOQA data must gain approval of the
program from the FAA. Further, the FOQA rule requires airlines with an FAA-approved
FOQA program to inform the FAA of adverse safety trends revealed by their programs, as
well as corrective action undertaken. The rule also requires the airline to provide the FAA
with aggregate FOQA data in a form and manner acceptable to the FAA administrator.
The value of FOQA programs is the early identification of adverse safety trends by using
objective flight data as well as the application of corrective action and follow-up monitoring
to assure that unsafe conditions are effectively mitigated.
The corrective actions taken under the FOQA range from the revision of the aircraft
operating procedures, air traffic control procedures, flight crew training programs, and
maintenance procedures to the redesign of the aircraft and the airport facilities [38].
History
The FOQA program has its origin in the use of the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), which
is commonly referred to as the black box, as mandated by the U.S. Civil Aeronautics
Administration in 1958. The first FDRs captured only six parameters - time, airspeed.
heading, altitude, vertical acceleration, and time of radio transmission, but they were a
valuable tool for reconstructing what had occurred preceding an accident.
In 1962, British Airways started a program using data from FDRs to validate airwor-
thiness criteria. In the late 1960s, TWA began a program to monitor a limited number
of the parameters related to approaches and landings as FDRs received periodic mainte-
nance. Over the decades since then, technologies have advanced and enabled the collection
and processing of a wider range of data. With the rapid growth of data-collection and
data-processing capabilities, flight-data analysis have evolved rapidly [60].
FOQA-type programs were first established in Europe and Asia, and only within the
past few years some U.S. airlines have begun adopting such programs on a trial basis [60].
Figure 4-4 shows the number of airlines with flight data monitoring programs worldwide.
In 1995, the FAA initiated a FOQA demonstration project to promote the voluntary
implementation of the FOQA programs by U.S. airlines and to assess the costs, benefits,
and safety enhancements associated with such programs [60]. In 2001., the FAA issued a
final rule regarding FOQA programs (14 CFR 13.401)
FOQA as a Voluntary Program
By allowing airlines and pilots to share de-identified aggregate information with the FAA,
the FOQA programs enable the FAA to monitor national trends in aircraft operations and
target its resources to address operational risk issues. While it is a fact that the partnership
among the FAA, airlines and pilots plays a crucial role in the FOQA programs, the FOQA
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Figure 4-4: Number of airlines with flight data monitoring programs worldwide [112]
programs still premise that airlines have a primary responsibility for continuously moni-
toring and ensuring that their operations are safe and in compliance with their operating
standards and the regulations [38].
The FAA believes that the safety goals of the FOQA programs are better served if
the programs remain voluntary. Therefore, although Part I of Annex 6 to the Chicago
Convention requires as a Standard that operators of an aeroplane of a maximum certificated
take-off mass in excess of 27,000 kg establish and maintain a flight data analysis program as
part of their safety management system, the FAA has no plans to implement the Standard.
Hence, no airlines are required to have a FOQA program and no airlines that conduct a
FOQA program are required to obtain FAA approval of its program.
So far, the FAA has been able to achieve wide participation in the FOQA program by
major U.S. airlines on a voluntary basis. As of April 2004, there are 13 U.S. airlines with
FAA-approved FOQA programs [701.
Differences from Voluntary Reporting Systems
There is a fundamental difference in characteristics that distinguishes the FOQA programs
and other voluntary reporting systems such as the ASAP. The FOQA programs provide
precise quantitative data on how the aircraft actually performed during flights, and the
data can be used to help in evaluating objectively a wide range of safety-related issues. On
the other hand, the voluntary reporting systems rely on subjective reporting of unsafe events
perceived by pilots or other persons, yet provide insights into the causation of the events.
In other words, the FOQA data tells what happened to the aircraft whereas the voluntary
reporting systems are more likely to tell why something happened [60]. The FOQA and the
ASAP are complementary programs for airlines, and nearly all FOQA participating U.S.
airlines also participate in the ASAP [70].
Safety Benefits and Economical Benefits
Airlines have reported that they have used FOQA analysis to identify a variety of potential
safety problems and take corrective actions to resolve or mitigate them.
One airline found through its FOQA program that more exceedances occurred during
visual flying than during instrument flying. This finding prompted the airline's flight-
training managers to reconsider the relative emphasis given visual and instrument flying in
the airline's training programs.
Another airline confirmed that the incidence of descent rate exceedances during ap-
proaches was significantly higher at a particular runway at a U.S. airport than at other
runways. After investigating the problem, the airline concluded that the air traffic control
approach had been set too high, requiring pilots to descend more steeply than usual during
their final approach. When the airline shared its findings with the FAA management, the
approach was modified to correct this potential problem [60].
In addition, some U.S. airlines have used the FOQA data to better understand where
risks are more prominent than other locations. For example, they have used FOQA data to
identify every airport in the world to which they fly at which unstable approaches and/or
Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) warnings on approach have occurred with
frequency. They also have aggregated their FOQA data on the frequency and location of
the TCAS RA and documented a growing risk of a midair collision at certain locations [70].
The benefits of the FOQA programs are not limited to the aircraft operation. They
are also utilized for improvement of aircraft design or manufacturing process. For example,
the FOQA data has been used to document anomalies specific to particular makes, models,
and series of aircraft, and that information has been provided to manufacturers. The
manufacturers have used the data as a basis for developing advisories and/or engineering
solutions to those issues [70].
The FOQA data is also utilized for maintenance of aircraft and its engines. For example,
the FOQA programs will help airlines determine the necessity of maintenance and the level
of maintenance required when a hard landing occurred or an engine overheated. Prior to the
FOQA programs, airlines generally had to rely on pilots' judgment for the determination in
both cases. However, in the case of a hard landing, the FOQA programs can provide better
information on the amount of force the aircraft experienced during landing. Similarly,
in the case of an engine overheating, the FOQA programs can provide precise data on
exceedances in engine temperatures and the duration of overheating. This information
enables maintenance managers to make more informed decisions about whether the aircraft
needs to be inspected for structural damage or whether an engine needs to be overhauled
[60].
Finally, it should be pointed out that the FOQA programs can help airlines reduce
fuel consumption. For example, in a similar way to its use in improving flight safety, the
FOQA programs can identify flights with climb and descent profiles depicting higher fuel
consumption than necessary. With this information, the airlines can take corrective actions
such as the revision of Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) to achieve optimal fuel
consumption [57].
Cost-Benefit Study
As mentioned, in addition to enhancing operational safety, the FOQA programs enable
the airlines to save costs by avoiding unnecessary engine maintenance and reducing fuel
consumption. Therefore, the airlines can benefit financially from the implementation of a
FOQA program [60]. Table 4.3 summarizes one cost-benefit study of the FOQA programs.
Implementation and Operations Plan (I&O Plan)
Although the FOQA program is a voluntary program, airlines that seek the protection
from the FAA enforcement actions must obtain approval of their FOQA Implementation and
Operations Plan (I&O Plan) from the FAA. The I&O Plan specifies the technology, policies,
cFuel savings are based on estimates of one-half percent reduction in fuel consumption. Engine savings
are based on estimates of one percent reduction in engine maintenance costs. Safety savings are based on
hypothetical one percent reduction in the annual costs incurred from accidents. of which calculation is based
on the loss rate of two aircraft per million departures at a cost of $150 million for each loss. For other
assumptions, refer to [60].
Table 4.3: Estimated annual net savings from a FOQA program by fleet sizec [60]
15 aircraft 50 aircraft 100 aircraft
Equipment costs $95,500 $259,000 $492,000
Personal costs $385,000 $500,000 $775,000
Total annual costs $483,500 $759,000 $1,267,000
Fuel savings $145,800 $486,000 $972,000
Engine savings $300,000 $1,000,000 $2,000,000
Safety savings $49,500 $165,000 $330,000
Total annual savings $495,300 $1,651,000 $3,302,000
Net annual savings $11,800 $892,000 $2,035,000
procedures, and operational processes used by an airline for its program. In accordance with
the regulations, I&O Plans shall include:
" A description of the operator's plan for collecting and analyzing flight recoded data
from line operations on a routine basis, including identification of the data to be
collected.
" Procedures for taking corrective action that analysis of the data indicates is necessary
in the interest of safety.
" Procedures for providing the FAA with aggregate FOQA data.
" Procedures for informing the FAA as to any corrective action being undertaken.
At the FAA, the Voluntary Safety Programs Branch (AFS-230) is responsible for the
management of the FOQA program. The AFS-230 and the Principal Operations Instructor
(POI) assigned to the airline will jointly evaluate the I&O Plan based on the adequacy of
the proposed means and methods identified for collection and analysis of data, as well as
procedures for taking corrective actions. The joint evaluation by the AFS-230 and the POI
will allow the FAA to maintain standardization and continuity throughout the industry
while accommodating airline-specific organization and resource differences best understood
by the POI. Once the AFS-230 and the POI concur that the plan should be approved, the
airline will receive an approval letter with the signatures of the POI and the manager of
AFS-230.
While an ASAP is subject to review and renewal every two years by the FAA, once
an I&O Plan is approved by the FAA, the airline's FOQA program may continue for an
indefinite period, unless the airline elects to terminate the FOQA program or the FAA
withdraws its approval [38].
Program Management in an Airline
A typical FOQA program is managed and operated by a FOQA Program Manager, one or
more analysts, and a FOQA Monitoring Team (FMT). The FOQA Program Manager is
responsible for the overall management, administration, security, and maintenance of the
FOQA program. The FMT is a group comprised of representatives from the pilot group, if
applicable, and the airline. This group is responsible for reviewing and analyzing flight and
event data and identifying,, recommending, and monitoring corrective actions. Among the
FMT members, a gatekeeper, who is responsible for the security of the identified data, is
selected. The gatekeeper is the individual who can link FOQA data to an individual flight
or crewmember. The gatekeeper is typically a line captain designated by the airline's pilot
association [38].
Program Components
The primary components of a FOQA program include the following [38].
1. Airborne Data Recording Systems.
These systems acquire and capture the necessary in-flight information. They include
specific aircraft data input sources and the equipment to record and store the collected
data. Other airborne equipment can be used to process the collected data, display
the data to pilots during flight or on the ground, and transmit data to a Ground Data
Replay and Analysis System (GDRAS).
2. Ground Data Replay and Analysis System (GDRAS).
These systems are software applications designed to
* Transform airborne-recorded data into a usable form for analysis
" Process and scan selected flight data parameters
" Compare recorded or calculated values to predetermined norms using event al-
gorithms
e Generate reports for review
3. Air/Ground Data Transfers.
One of the most labor intensive and costly aspects of a FOQA program is determining
and implementing the process of getting the data from the aircraft onboard record-
ing system to the GDRAS for analysis. There are several methods for transferring
the data to the GDRAS. Two typical methods are a manual retrieval of the physical
storage media and a wireless data transmission, and the former will normally require
close coordination of the airline's maintenance control and line maintenance depart-
ments regarding scheduling of the retrieval so that it can be included in the regular
maintenance check.
How the FOQA Program Works
The FOQA program involves capturing, recording, transferring, and analyzing the flight
data and formulating and taking corrective actions.
Data Capture and Recording
Data originating from the sensors and systems throughout the aircraft are received by a
device called Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU). The FDAU formats the data for output
to the FDR or to a Quick Access Recorder (QAR).
The FDAU can also provide data and predefined reports to the cockpit printer, or di-
rectly to Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) for trans-
mittal to the ground, and can display data for flight crew [38].
By regulation, the FDR must record at least 88 parameters such as time, altitude,
airspeed, heading, and aircraft attitude. In addition, some FDRs can record the status of
more than 1,000 other in-flight characteristics that can aid in the accident investigation.
The FDR is designed to withstand the forces of a crash [107].
On the other hand, the QAR is designed to provide quick and easy access to a removable
medium on which flight information is recorded. QARs may also store data in solid-state
memory that is accessed through a download reader. QARs have now been developed to
record an expanded data frame, sometimes supporting over 2,000 parameters at much higher
sample rates than the FDR. The expanded data frame increases the resolution and accuracy
of the ground analysis programs. Sampling rate varies depending on the parameters, yet
most parameters are sampled once per second [38].
Data Transfer
Using one of several available transmission methods, data are periodically retrieved and
sent to the GDRAS. One way is a frequent manual retrieval and return of physical media to
and from a recorder on the aircraft in order to transfer the data to GDRAS. Retrieval could
take three to four days depending on the location of the aircraft and the number of multiple
outstations, and will be done every one to five days, depending on airline requirements. The
retrieval usually takes place during maintenance checks.
Another way is an automatic wireless transmission, which is done when the aircraft is
at the gate after landing. The transmission takes about 15 to 30 minutes and eliminates
the need for maintenance involvement [112].
Data Analysis
The GDRAS transforms the raw airborne data into an appropriate format for analysis and
generate reports and visualizations to assist personnel in analyzing the collected data. The
GDRAS also conducts the de-identification of pilot and specific flight information.
In terms of determining the root causes of systematic problems that need correction,
aggregate FOQA data of multiple flights on adverse safety trends have been proven to be
of greater value than detailed parameter data gathered during a single flight. Two types of
analysis techniques can be applied to FOQA data.
(a) Exceedance Analysis.
The GDRAS detects events that exceeds the certain predetermined values for a partic-
ular parameter. For example, a parameter might be the descent rate during approach.
Several levels of exceedance can be programmed for particular events based on the
airline's risk assessment to assist in focusing resources on implementing corrective
action on the highest perceived operational risk area.
This data can be trended over multiple flights to determine the number of exceedances
occurring per flight segment. The data can also be trended to determine in which
phases of flight, airports, or runways the exceedances occur.
The FMT, with an assistance from the FOQA analyst, investigates each exceedance
case provided to determine what occurred. An analyst will review the parameter
values surrounding the event and other information to determine if the exceedance
was valid. The FMT, through the gatekeeper, may choose to contact the crew to
gather further information. After investigating the situation to determine the cause
of the exceedance, the FMT will determine any necessary corrective action.
(b) Statistical Analysis.
Statistical analysis is a tool to look at the total performance of an airline's opera-
tion, and is used to create profiles of flight, maintenance, or engineering operational
procedures. A series of data distributions will show a picture of how all flights are
performing, and enable an airline to determine risk without focusing on a specific
event exceedance.
The FMT determines corrective action based on the investigation of a specific event
exceedance or the performance of all flights. The continued monitoring of trends will tell
the airline if the corrective action taken has been effective or whether additional measures
are needed [38],[60].
Information Sharing
The sharing of FOQA information between airlines can provide benefits to an airline's
overall safety program. This sharing can be accomplished through industry associations or
directly between airlines depending on the scope of the issue. Issues such as ATC or issues
specific to a particular aircraft type they have in common are examples of subjects that
can be shared between operators. Maintaining confidentiality of the information between
airlines is important in providing a cooperative environment.
In addition, the airline should establish regular briefings with the FAA Certificate Man-
agement Office (CMO) or the Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) to review the data
trend analysis and corrective action plans. Normally, the briefing takes place on the airline's
property and does not include the physical exchange of data [38]. As with the ASAP, quar-
terly reports of safety enhancements achieved by each certificate holder's FOQA program
are compiled and submitted to the Voluntary Safety Programs Branch at the Headquarters
[54].
Besides, the airlines are required by 14 CFR 13.401 to provide the FAA with aggregate
FOQA data. The means of compliance with this section is currently being developed, hence,
at present, the airlines are tentatively supposed to provide the FAA with at least quarterly
briefings on observed trends at the location the FAA will specify. For the purpose of these
briefings, the airlines may provide the aggregate data in oral, written, graphical or digital
format [38].
Immunity
As with voluntary reporting systems such as ASAP, there was a concern that the infor-
mation gathered and provided to the FAA under a FOQA program would be used for
enforcement actions. To address such a concern, the FAA issued the rule 14 CFR 13.401,
which stipulates that while the operator with a FAA-approved FOQA program provides the
FAA with aggregate FOQA data, the FAA will not use an airline's FOQA data or aggregate
FOQA data in an enforcement action against the operator or its employees. The section
also stipulates that a criminal acts or deliberate acts are exceptions for immunity from the
enforcement actions.
In addition to the concern that the FAA would use the FOQA information for enforce-
ment actions, there was another concern among pilots that the airline manger could use
the information to discipline the pilots. Therefore, the agreement between the management
and the pilot association is usually concluded and its copy is included in the I&O Plan.
If a pilot association agreement is not applicable to the airline, a corporate policy state-
ment should be included in the I&O Plan that establishes protective provisions to its pilots
against disciplinary action from the airline [38].
Confidentiality
In order to secure the confidentiality of the flight crew member, data that could be employed
to determine flight crewmember identity are removed from a view in the electronic record
as part of the initial processing of the airborne data. At the same time, in order to enable
follow-up inquiry with the specific flight crew associated with a particular FOQA event, a
gatekeeper of the FMT is provided with a secure means of determining identifying informa-
tion for a limited period of time. Such contact is usually limited to situations when further
insight into the circumstances surrounding an event is needed. To initiate a follow-up with
an individual pilot concerning FOQA events, the concurrence of the gatekeeper is required,
and the follow-up inquiries will normally be accomplished by the gatekeeper. De-identified
flight data stored in the GDRAS is periodically deleted. Furthermore, in general, prior to
leaving the airline premises, the information that could identify the submitting airline is
stripped from aggregate FOQA data which is provided to the FAA [38].
Not only that the information that could help in identifying pilots and airlines is removed
from the data before the data is provided to the FAA, the data is also protected from the
FOIA requests to the FAA. In the same way as the ASAP and VDRP, the FAA designated by
FAA Order 8000.81 the data received from the FOQA as protected from public disclosure
in accordance with the provisions of 14 CFR Part 193. As with the ASAP and VDRP
designation, the order permits the FAA to release de-identified and summarized information
to explain the rationale for policy or rulemaking [70].
4.3 Rulemaking Process
4.3.1 Legal Structures
Federal Aviation Act of 1958
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 is the top level public law that governs the activities of
the FAA. All FAA operating procedures must be in accordance with this Act. The Act may
be amended by Congress, however, if a compelling need for such an amendment exists.
Most of the FAA operations are covered under Title VI, "Safety Regulation of Civil
Aeronautics." Section 601 of this Title gives the FAA administrator the power and duty to
prescribe and revise the minimum standards and rules and regulations governing, among
other things, "the design, material, workmanship, construction, and performance of aircraft,
aircraft engines, and propellers as may be required in the interest of safety." Therein lies
the basis for the Federal Aviation Regulations [47].
Federal Aviation Regulations
Federal Aviation Regulationsd are issued by the FAA Administrator to implement the pro-
visions of the Federal Aviation Act. The regulations are part of Title 14 of the CFR. A wide
variety of activities are prescribed in detail, such as the aircraft registration, certification
of the aircraft, airworthiness standards, noise standards, certification of airmen, air traffic
rules, and airport design [47].
Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFARs)
Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFARs) are temporary rules that address a temporary
situation. For example, an SFAR is used to prohibit certain flights over a specific country
during a military conflict. In the CFR, SFARs are located at the most relevant CFR part.
An SFAR usually includes an expiration date, generally no more than 3 years from its
effective date. An SFAR must be renewed thorough the rulemaking process, or the SFAR
automatically ineffective on the expiration date. An SFAR is subject to all the requirements
and procedures of Federal rulemaking [49].
Advisory Circulars (ACs)
The FAA issues Advisory Circulars (ACs) to inform the public of non-regulatory material
of interest. Unless incorporated into a regulation by reference, the contents of an AC are
not binding on the public. Among other things, ACs are used to demonstrate a method
acceptable to the FAA, but which may not be the only method, for complying with a
related CFR. The ACs are developed by the FAA office having primary responsibility for
the subject of the AC [47].
4.3.2 Main Participants in Rulemaking Process
Administrator
The Administrator sets overall policy and direction for regulatory development activities
and approves all proposed and final rules [49].
dFederal Aviation Regulations are commonly abbreviated as "FARs." However, it is not appropriate
to use the acronym "FARs" to refer to the "Federal Aviation Regulations" in legal citation. In fact. the
acronym belongs to the "Federal Acquisition Regulations." which are used in procurement [49].
Office of the Chief Counsel
The Office of Chief Counsel (AGC) provides legal support for the FAA regulatory program.
The Chief Counsel is responsible for determining the legal adequacy of FAA's actions related
to rules and regulations and acting as a liaison between FAA and the Office of the General
Counsel of the DOT. The AGC provides an attorney for each rulemaking team [49].
Office of Rulemaking
The Office of Rulemaking (ARM) provides overall management for the FAA's regulatory
program and drafts rulemaking documents. The ARM provides a rulemaking analyst for
each rulemaking team [49].
Office of Aviation Policy and Plans
The Office of Aviation Policy and Plans (APO) provides economic analysis support for the
FAA's regulatory program and estimates the economic effects of proposed regulations. The
APO provides an economist for each rulemaking team [49].
Program Offices
Program offices initiate a rulemaking process that falls within its jurisdiction. Examples
of program offices which are frequently involved in rulemaking include the Office of Flight
Standards and the Office of Aircraft Certification. They provide a team leader and staff for
each rulemaking team [49].
Rulemaking Team
The rulemaking team usually consists of one or more representatives from a relevant program
office, a rulemaking analyst from the ARM, an attorney from the AGC, and an economist
from the APO [49].
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is part of the Executive Office of the Pres-
ident, and assists the President in overseeing the preparation of the federal budget and
supervises its administration in Executive Branch agencies [95].
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is an office within OMB.
OTRA reviews a proposed or final rule and its economic assessment before its publication if
it is considered "significant" [49].
Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST)
The Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) reviews a proposed or final rule and
its economic assessment if it is considered "significant," and forward them to OMB after
approval [49].
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC)
The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requires an agency to establish a formal
committee when it seeks a consensus recommendation from a group including more than
one person from outside the government.
The Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) is a formal advisory committee
consisting of aviation associations and industry, public interest groups, and interested indi-
viduals. Established in 1991, the ARAC provides information, advice, and recommendations
regarding FAA rulemaking activities. Through the ARAC, the FAA obtains information
and insight from those parties most affected by existing and proposed regulations.
In conducting its activities, the ARAC complies with the FACA and the direction of the
FAA. The FACA requires the FAA to review the ARAC charter every two years to determine
the need to continue the ARAC. The Secretary of Transportation and the General Services
Administration must approve each new ARAC charter [48], [49].
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC)
The FAA is authorized to establish Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) that is exempt
from the FACA requirements. The FAA establishes an ARC instead of assigning a task to
the ARAC for several reasons, such as when the issue area is not covered by the ARAC and
when the FAA wants to limit the membership [48].
4.3.3 Public Consultation Requirements
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) stipulates the rulemaking procedural require-
ments the Federal agencies must follow. In particular, Section 553 of the APA sets forth
the "informal rulemaking"e requirements, which apply to most legislative rulemaking [90].
Part 11 of 14 CFR stipulates the detailed requirements for the issuance, amendment,
and repeal of any regulation for which the FAA follows public rulemaking procedures under
the APA.
The FAA follows the APA procedure for these common types of rules: (1) Rules found
in the CFR, (2) Airworthiness Directives and (3) Airspace Designations. In general, the
FAA follows the same procedures stipulated in 14 CFR Part 11 for all types of rules.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
For informal rulemaking, Section 553 of the APA requires that "general notice of proposed
rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register." It also requires that the agency shall
give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission
of written data views or arguments" after the notice.
However, the APA does not specify a minimum period for comment. Executive Order
12866 provides that most rulemakings should include a comment period of not less than 60
days. Furthermore, DOT Order 2100.5 provides for a comment period of at least 60 days
on significantf regulations and at least 45 days for non-significant regulations unless the
rulemaking document states the reasons for a shorter time period.
The issuance of the NPRM needs approval from the Administrator. When the proposed
rule is significant, after the approval of the Administrator, the FAA must send the economic
assessment with an NPRM to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) for
approval. Occasionally, the OST also requests a informal review of the non-significant
proposed rules. The scheduled time frame for OST approval is 30 days.
After the OST approval, the OST forwards the economic assessment with an NPRM to
OIRA at OMB [49]. Executive Order 12866 requires OIRA to waive the review or notify
the agency of the results of its review within 90 calender days in general cases.
After all approval processes are completed, the NPRM is published in the Federal Reg-
ister. The preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis are included in the preamble to the
NPRM [49]. Particularly. DOT Order 2100.5 requires that Economic Assessment shall be
eThe process of "notice and comment" rulemaking is referred to as "informal rulemaking." When rules
are required by statute "to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing", the process is
referred as "formal rulemaking." The formal rulemaking is a trial type procedure and rarely used [124].
fThe definition of "significant" is explained in Subsection 4.3.4.
published, be it a Regulatory Analysis or a Regulatory Evaluation.
After the comment period closes, the FAA reviews and disposes of public comments.
Before the rulemaking team prepares the final rule, the disposition of comments are subject
to review by the Rulemaking Management Council, which is chaired by the Director of the
ARM. The disposition of comments are included in the preamble to the final rule.
Section 106 of 49 U.S.C. requires the FAA to issue a final rule or take other final action
not later than 16 months after the last day of the public comment period for an NPRM
[49].
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)
The FAA may issue an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) to obtain
information from the public that will assist the FAA in either developing an NPRM or
determining that rulemaking is not appropriate. An ANPRM tells the public that FAA is
considering rulemaking on a specific subject matter and requests written comments on the
appropriate scope of the rulemaking or on specific topics. Particularly, the FAA expects to
" Identify entities that may be affected;
* Identify unique procedures;
e Assess the issues and potential public impact; and
* Gather technical or economic data that do not exist within the FAA.
An advance notice of proposed rulemaking may or may not include the text of potential
changes to a regulation.
Section 106 of 49 U.S.C. requires the FAA to issue a final rule or take other final action
not later than 24 months after the date of publication of an ANPRM in the Federal Register
[49].
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM)
After the issuance of the NPRM, the FAA may issue a Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (SNPRM) if it -
* Needs more information on an issue.
* Decides to take a different approach.
* Considers following a commenter's suggestion that goes beyond the scope of the orig-
inal NPRM.
In some cases, the the FAA includes responses to comments received on the original
NPRM in the SNPRM. Section 106 of 49 U.S.C. requires the FAA to issue a final rule or
take other final action not later than 16 months after the date of publication of a SNPRM
in the Federal Register [49).
Final Rule
A final rule sets out new or revised requirements or removes requirements. The issuance of
a final rule needs approval from the Administrator.
When the final rule is significant, after the approval of the Administrator, the FAA
must send the economic assessment with a final rule to the OST at the DOT for approval.
Occasionally, the OST also requests a informal review of the non-significant final rules. The
scheduled time frame for OST approval is 30 days.
After the OST approval, the OST forwards the economic assessment with a final rule
to OIRA at OMB. In general cases, OIRA has 90 calender days to complete its review, but
if it has previously reviewed the supporting information and there has been no change in
the circumstances or facts pertaining to the rule, the review period is 45 days. After all
approval processes are completed, the final rule is published in the Federal Register. The
preamble to a final rule includes following:
" Effective date of the rule.
" Final Regulatory Impact Analysis.
* A summary of comments received on the NPRM when final rule was preceded by an
NPRM.
" The FAA's disposition of those comments [49].
Section 533 (d) of the APA requires the Federal agency to publish a final rule not less
than 30 days before its effective date. The FAA publishes all final rules in Federal Register.
Direct Final Rule
A direct final rule is a process used to expedite the issuance of rules without first issuing
an ANPRM or NPRM when the rules are not controversial [124].
Section 553(b)(3)(B) of the APA authorizes the Federal agencies to dispense with the
notice-and-comment requirements when the agencies, for good cause, finds that those pro-
cedures are "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." Whatever the
agency's basis for the claimed good cause, the agency must articulate its finding and a brief
statement of reasons in the rules issued. Use of the exception is subject to judicial review
[90].
The FAA uses a direct final rule when it has found the public comment procedures to
be "unnecessary" because it does not expect to receive adverse comments. For example,
the issuance of a minor rule or amendment in which the public is not particularly interested
corresponds to such a case.
The FAA publishes a direct final rule in the Federal Register with a statement that
unless adverse comment or a notice of intent to file an adverse comment is received within
a certain time period, the rule will become effective on a specified date: generally, 60 days
after the publication of the direct final rule. The FAA sets the comment period to end before
the effective date.
An adverse comment is a comment that explains why a rule would be inappropriate,
or would be ineffective or unacceptable without a change. It may challenge the rule's
underlying premise or approach.
If the FAA has not received an adverse comment or notice of intent to file an adverse
comment, it publishes a confirmation document in the Federal Register, generally within
15 days after the comment period closes. The confirmation document tells the public the
effective date of the direct final rule (14 CFR 11.31).
If the FAA has not received an adverse comment or notice of intent to file an adverse
comment, it publishes a Notice of Withdrawal in the Federal Register before the effective
date of the direct final rule. The document may withdraw the direct final rule in whole or
in part. The FAA may incorporate the commenter's recommendation into another direct
final rule, or it may publish an NPRM with a new comment period [49].
Final Rule with Request for Comments
A final rule with request for comment is a rule that the FAA issues a final rule with an
effective date that invites public comment on the rule. Section 533 (d) of the APA requires
the Federal agency to publish a final rule not less than 30 days before its effective date.
However, the section also allows the agency to avoid the requirement when it found a "good
cause" to do so. This discretionary exception enables the agency to take care of cases in
which the public interest requires the agency to act immediately or within a period less
than 30 days. For example, the FAA issues a final rule with request for comment when it
has learned from accident investigation that it has a need to issue or amend certain rules
without delay for the safety of flying public. Again, the FAA must provide a rationale for
its determination of using the exception in the rule, and it is subject to judicial review.
The FAA often sets the comment period to end after the effective date of the rule. Once
the comment period closes on the rule, the FAA reviews and disposes of the comments. The
FAA must publish a disposition of the comments in the Federal Register. In case the public
comments persuade that the FAA needs to change the rule, the FAA may issue a revised
final rule [49].
Notice of Withdrawal
The FAA issues a Notice of Withdrawal to withdraw an ANPRM, NPRM, SNPRM, or any
other type of proposal. The FAA also issues it to withdraw a direct final rule before it
becomes effective. Once a final rule becomes effective, however, the FAA cannot withdraw
it. The FAA can only undertake a new rulemaking to remove it.
The text of the notice includes a response to the extent necessary to show the FAA's
rationale for withdrawal of the proposal. The withdrawal of the proposal does not preclude
the FAA from issuing another notice on the subject matter in the future or committing
the FAA to any future course of action.The FAA publishes all Notice of Withdrawal in the
Federal Register [49].
4.3.4 Regulatory Impact Analysis Requirements
Economic Assessment
Executive Order 12866 sets forth regulatory philosophy and principles to which each Federal
Agency should adhere. They include requirements to regulate in the "most cost-effective
manner, to make "a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs," and to develop regulations that "impose the least burden on society" [124].
The Executive Order requires that the Federal Agency provide a Regulatory Analysis of
a "significant regulatory action" to OIRA at OMB for review. The Executive Order defines
"significant regulatory action" as any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that
may
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect
in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition,
jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local or tribal governments or
communities:
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned
by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan pro-
grams, or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's prior-
ities, or the principles set force in this Executive Order.
Additionally, the FAA is required by DOT Order 2100.5 to prepare and submit a Reg-
ulatory Analysis to the OST at the DOT for approval by the Secretary for regulations
that
(1) Will result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
(2) Will result in a major effect on the general economy in terms of costs, consumer prices,
or production;
(3) Will result in a major increase in costs or prices for individual industries, levels of
government, or geographic regions;
(4) Will have a substantial impact on the United States balance of trade; or
(5) The Secretary or head of the initiating office determines deserves such analysis.
For regulations that do not meet the above criteria, the FAA is required to prepare a
Regulatory Evaluation, which omits the requirement of economic analysis of policy alter-
natives from a full Regulatory Analysis requirement.
Although both the Executive Order and the DOT Order prescribes what kinds of as-
sessments must be included in the analysis, most of them are duplicative. Therefore, when
conducting a Regulatory Analysis of the proposed or final rule, the FAA includes the fol-
lowing items in it [49], [125]:
" A statement of the problem and the issues that make the rule significant;
" A description of the major alternatives the FAA considered for dealing with the prob-
lems;
" An analysis of the economic and any other relevant consequences of each of these
alternatives; and
* A detailed explanation of the reasons for choosing one alternative over the others;
When conducting a Regulatory Evaluation of the proposed or final rule, the FAA in-
cludes the following items in it [49]:
" An evaluation of the proposed regulations, quantifying its estimated cost to the private
sector, consumers, and Federal, State, and local governments; and
" The anticipated benefits and impacts of the rule.
If the expected impact is so minimal that the proposed or final rule does not warrant a
full evaluation, the DOT Order requires that a statement to that effect, including the basis
of the statement, must be included in the public consultation documents.
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
When a Federal agency is required by the APA to publish an NPRM, the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (Section 601 to 612 of 5 U.S.C.) requires the agency to prepare and publish a
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (RFA) if the rulemaking could "have a significant" economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities [124].
When conducting an RFA of proposed or final rule, the FAA includes the following items
in it [49]:
" The reasons why the FAA is considering the rulemaking action;
" The objectives of the rule;
" A description of and, if possible, an estimate of the number of small entities the rule
would apply to.
" A description of the reporting, recordkeeping, and other compliance requirements of
the rule;
" Identification of all Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the rule:
and
" A description of significant alternatives that would minimize the significant economic
impact of the rule on small entities.
If an RFA is not required, the Act requires that the agency must certify in the rulemaking
document that the rulemaking will not "have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The agency must provide a factual basis for any certification, not
just the reasons.
Additionally, Executive Order 13272 requires that Federal agencies must notify the
Small Business Administration's Office of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy (Advocacy) of
draft rules that may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities when the draft rule is submitted to OIRA under Executive Order 12866 or, if
submission to OIRA is not required, "at a reasonable time prior to publication of the rule.
Advocacy is authorized to submit comments on the draft rule, and agencies must give
"every appropriate consideration" to any Advocacy comments on a draft rule [124].
International Trade Impact Assessment
In accordance with the Trade Agreement Act of 1979, the FAA conducts an International
Trade Impact Assessment, which considers the effects of proposed or final rule on interna-
tional trade [49].
An International Trade Impact Assessment contains an assessment of whether -
" The rule would create unnecessary obstacles to U.S. foreign commerce;
" There are legitimate domestic objectives, such as safety, that are not considered un-
necessary obstacles; and
* International Standards exist that should be the basis for U.S. standards.
Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 requires that the Federal agency must prepare an
Unfunded Mandates Assessment, which considers the effect of proposed or final rule on
State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector, if the rule includes a Fed-
eral mandate resulting in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more in any one year.
Such an assessment contains a description of the -
" Authority under which the rule is being put into action;
" Costs and benefits to State, local, and tribal governments;
* Effect of the rule on the national economy; and
" FAA's consultation with elected representatives of the affected State, local, and tribal
governments, a summary of the comments and concerns presented by those groups,
and a summary of the FAA's evaluation of those comments and concerns [49].
Other Analysis Requirements
In addition to the requirements of regulatory impact analysis from economic perspective
described above, depending on proposed rules, the FAA may be required to conduct one or
more of the analysis and to prepare the statements such as
" Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
" National Environmental Policy Act Review
* Energy Impact Statement
. Federalism Statement
" Statement on Regulations Affecting Intrastate Aviation in Alaska
" International Compatibility Statement [49
4.3.5 Annual Regulatory Plan
Executive Order 12866 [126] requires agencies to participate in the Unified Regulatory
Agenda by periodically publishing on all regulations under development or review.
In particular, as part of the Unified Regulatory Agenda, the Executive Order requires
that each agency shall prepare a Regulatory Plan of the most important significant regula-
tory actions that the agency reasonably expects to issue in proposed or final form in that
fiscal year or thereafter, and shall forward it to OIRA by June of each year for review.
In addition, the Executive Order prescribes that the Regulatory Plan developed by the
agency shall be published annually in the October publication of the Unified Regulatory
Agenda.
At the same time, DOT Order -2100.5 [125] requires the FAA prepares a Semiannual
Regulations Report summarizing each proposed and each final regulations that the FAA
is considering for issuance and publication in the Federal Register during the succeeding
12 months or such longer period as may be anticipated. The Report is submitted to the
Department Regulations Council, which is chaired by the Deputy Secretary. The General
Counsel's Office at the Department consolidates the Regulations Reports submitted by the
agencies in the DOT, and prepares a semi-annual Department Regulations Agenda. This
agenda is incorporated into the Unified Regulatory Agenda [49].
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Chapter 5
United Kingdom
5.1 Organizations
In the U.K., civil aviation activities are governed by the two Civil Aviation Authorities:
the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA).
EASA is an agency of the European Union (EU), based in Cologne, Germany, whereas the
CAA is a public corporation of the U.K. As described below, the rulemaking and oversight
responsibility for aviation safety in the U.K. has been transferred from the CAA to EASA
since 2003.
5.1.1 Civil Aviation Authority: European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
EASA was established in 2003 by Regulation (EC) No. 1592/2002 of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of the European Union in order to establish and maintain a high
uniform level of safety and environmental protection in civil aviation in Europe. Currently,
27 EU Member States and 4 non-EU states are members of EASA [28].
The EASA Management Board, which brings together representatives of the Member
States and the European Commission, is responsible for defining the Agency's priorities,
establishing the budget, and monitoring the Agency's operation. The Management Board
also appoints the Executive Director.
The EASA Advisory Board assists the Management Board in its work. It is comprised
of organizations representing aviation personnel, manufacturers, commercial and general
aviation operators, maintenance industry training organizations, and air sports [27].
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The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) is an associated body of the European Civil
Aviation Conference (ECAC) representing the civil aviation authorities of a number of
European states. Since 1970, the JAA has developed and implemented common safety
regulatory standards and procedures in Europe. However, the functions which the JAA
once fulfilled has been transferred to EASA [87].
There is a difference between the JAA and EASA in establishing regulations common
to the Member States. The JAA has no delegation of legal powers; hence, Joint Aviation
Regulations (JAR), the regulations the JAA adopts, must be transposed to the national
legislation of the Member States to become legally binding. On the other hand, EASA
has legal regulatory authority within the EU through the enactment of its regulations by
the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the European Parlia-
ment.The enacted regulations are directly applicable to the Member States and replace the
national legislation [89].
Currently, EASA develops safety and environmental rules, and is undertaking the tasks
of type-certification of aircraft and components, as well as the approval of organizations
involved in design, manufacture and maintenance of aeronautical products. EASA also
monitors the implementation of standards through inspections in the Member States and
provides the necessary technical expertise, training and research.
The Agency's responsibilities are growing, and in the future this will include legally
binding rules for flight operations, the licensing of flight crews and the safety approval
of non-European airlines [33]. The Agency will also be responsible for safety regulations
regarding airports and air traffic management systems [28].
The National Aviation Authorities of the EASA Member States still continue to carry
out some operational tasks, such as certification of individual aircraft and licensing of pilots
[28].
5.1.2 Civil Aviation Authority: Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
The CAA was established by Parliament in 1972. The main Act of Parliament regulating
civil aviation in the U.K. is the Civil Aviation Act 1982, and the CAA regulates all aspects
of aviation in the U.K.. such as safety regulations, economic regulations, and consumer
regulations. The Civil Aviation Act 1982, the Airport Act 1986, and the Transport Act
2000 govern its constitution and functions.
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As a National Aviation Authority, the CAA still has a statutory authority to exercise
rulemaking and oversight responsibility for all aspects regarding aviation safety not being
adopted by EASA. For example, the CAA conducts the regulatory oversight of production
and maintenance organizations [115].
The U.K. Government requires that the costs of the CAA be met entirely from its charges
to those whom it regulates. Unlike many other States, there is no direct government funding
of the CAA's work.
The Chairman and the Board members are appointed by the Secretary of State for
Transport. The Chairman is responsible to the Secretary of State for the overall direction
and the management of the CAA within the policy framework set by the Secretary of State.
The Board is fully responsible for all of the activities of the CAA [121].
5.1.3 Investigation Authority: Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) is one of the three accident investigation
branches of the Department for Transport (DfT), each of the other two branches investigates
marine and railroad accidents. The authority for the AAIB to investigate accidents and
incidents originates from the Civil Aviation Act and the Civil Aviation (Investigation of
Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations.
Although the AAIB is a part of DfT and receives a budget from it, the branch is
functionally independent. The Chief Inspector of the AAIB directly reports to the Secretary
of State for Transport on any safety matters [123]. In the year 2008, the AAIB had 45 staff
members [59].
5.2 Reporting and Investigation Systems
In the U.K., other than an accident and serious incident reporting and investigation sys-
tem by the AAIB, the CAA has a mandatory reporting system of incidents and other
safety-related occurrences, called the Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) Scheme.
In addition, the U.K. has a separate Airprox reporting and investigation system managed
by the United Kingdom Airprox Board (UKAB), a specialized organization for Airprox
investigation.
As regards the voluntary reporting systems, there is the Confidential Human Factors
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Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP), which is managed by the CHIRP Charitable
Trust. The CAA also has its own confidential/voluntary reporting systems. However, they
differ in characteristics from other voluntary reporting systems, and are rarely used.
The EU Member States exchange the safety information with each other. This will also
be discussed in this section.
5.2.1 Accident and Serious Incident Reporting and Investigation System
European Union Council Directive 94/56/EC establishes the fundamental principles gov-
erning the investigation of civil aviation accidents and incidents.
Article 3 of the Directive defines the accident, incident, and serious incident as follows:
(a) 'accident' means an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which
takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of
flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which:
1. a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:
- being in the aircraft, or
- direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have be-
come detached from the aircraft, or
- direct exposure to jet blast,
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted
by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the
areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or
2. the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:
- adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics
of the aircraft, and
- would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected compo-
nent,
except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the en-
gine, its cowlings or accessories: or for damage limited to propellers, wing
tips, antennas, tyres, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the
aircraft skin;
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3. the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible;
(j) 'incident' means an occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation
of an aircraft which affects or would affect the safety of operation;
(k) 'serious incident' means an incident involving circumstances indicating that an acci-
dent nearly occurred.
The Directive prescribes a list of examples of serious incidents in the Annex. (Refer to
Appendix B, Section B.2, Subsection B.2.1.) Both the definitions of accident, incident and
serious incident and the list of examples of serious incidents follows those of Annex 13 to
the Chicago Convention.
The Directive stipulates that every accident or serious incident shall be the subject of
an investigation, yet it leaves the extent of investigations and the procedure to be followed
at the discretion of the investigative authority of each Member State (Article 4).
The Directive also stipulates that the investigation shall be conducted by the permanent
investigative authority independent from the national aviation authority (Article 6). Fur-
ther, it stipulates that when the investigation authority issues the accidents and incident
reports, the authority shall forward copies to the European Commission (Article 9).
In the U.K., the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regu-
lations 1996 defines accidents, incidents, and serious incidents in almost the same text as
the Directive (Refer to Appendix B, Section B.2, Subsection B.2.2.), and stipulates that
accidents and serious incidents shall be immediately reported to the AAIB. Then, the AAIB
immediately passes the details of reported accidents and serious incidents to the CAA [116].
In addition to accidents and serious incidents, the AAIB may carry out an investigation
into incidents other than serious incidents if the AAIB expects to draw air safety lessons
from the investigation (Regulation 8).
Investigation
The AAIB responds to the notification of an accident or a serious incident in accordance
with the following guidelines [122).
Major Aviation Disasters
The AAIB Chief Inspector appoints the Investigator-in-Charge (IiC) among the Prin-
cipal Inspectors to lead a team of Inspectors. Outside specialists may be called on.
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Other accidents or serious incidents involving commercial aircraft
The AAIB forms a small AAIB Field Investigation Team.
Fatal accidents involving light aircraft or microlight aircraft
The AAIB forms a small AAIB Field Investigation Team.
Non-fatal accidents involving light aircraft or microlight aircraft
The AAIB does not normally deploy a team of Inspectors. The Inspectors usually
investigate accidents through correspondence and telephone calls.
Accidents involving a glider, hang glider, or paraglider
The investigation of the fatal accidents in this category may be carried out by the
AAIB Inspectors who may visit the scene. The investigation team may be augmented
by a member of the relevant sporting association. The investigation of non-fatal
accidents may be carried out by the AAIB or relevant sporting association. The
AAIB Inspectors are unlikely to visit the scene.
Party System
The AAIB may call on outside specialists to assist in particular aspects of specific inves-
tigations. These personnel can be selected from the airline involved, the manufacturers of
aircraft, its engines or equipment, and other government agencies. The IiC will decide which
specialist working groups are required and will direct the groups [122].
Investigative Priority
The Regulations states that the AAIB Inspectors must perform their statutory duties in
cooperation with the authorities responsible for judicial inquiry (Regulation 9). To this
end, the AAIB makes every effort to establish and maintain a good liaison and cooperation
with the police throughout the technical investigation. Conflicts such as the one over access
to accident site, access to witnesses, and retention of evidence are resolved on-site through
explanation, cooperation and negotiation [122].
Final Report and Safety Recommendations
After the investigation, the AAIB publishes a report, and may issue safety recommendations
to relevant organizations., including the National Aviation Authorities. The organization
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that received the recommendations must give a written response to the Secretary of State
for Transport without delay (Regulation 13 and 14).
Such a response must contain the following:
(1) full details of the measures, if any, it has taken or proposes to take to implement
the recommendation and, in a case where it proposes to implement measures, the
timetable for securing that implementation; or
(2) a full explanation as to why the recommendation is not to be the subject of measures
to be taken to implement it.
5.2.2 Mandatory Occurrence Reporting (MOR) Scheme
Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2042/2003 stipulates that those who maintain the air-
craft, including the approved maintenance organizations, shall report any identified condi-
tion of an aircraft or component that hazards seriously the flight safety to the competent
authority, the State of Registry, the organization responsible for the type design or sup-
plemental type design, and, if applicable, the Member State of operator. When those who
maintain the aircraft are contracted by an owner or an operator to carry out the main-
tenance, they shall also report to the owner, operator, or the continuing airworthiness
management organization (Part-145, 145.A.60 and Part-M, M.A.202).
Second, Commission Regulation (EC) No.8/2008 stipulates that the commander or the
operator of an aircraft shall report to the authority of any incident that endangers or could
endangers the safety of operation (EU OPS 1, OPS 1.420).
Lastly, Commission Regulation (EC) No.1702/2003 stipulates that the holder of a Type
Certificate, restricted Type Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, European Technical
Standard Order authorisation, major repair design approval or any other relevant approval
shall report to EASA any failure, malfunctions, defect or other occurrence which has resulted
in or may result in an unsafe condition (Part 21, 21A.3).
Directive 2003/42/EC of European Parliament and Council of the European Union stip-
ulates the obligations of the Member States regarding the incident reporting system, and
it lists in its annex the examples of reportable occurrences related to operations, mainte-
nance, repair, and manufacturing. In addition, AMC 20-8 "Occurrence reporting" provides
guidance for the reporting requirements above.
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In accordance with the Directive, the CAA has a scheme called Mandatory Occurrence
Reporting (MOR) Scheme to collect the safety information, which was introduced in 1976
[117]. Article 142 of Air Navigation Order 2005 and the Air Navigation General Regu-
lations 2006 stipulate the scheme and CAP 382 "The Mandatory Occurrence Reporting
Scheme" [116] provides information and guidance. Under the MOR Scheme, any orga-
nization concerned with the operation, manufacture, repair, and maintenance of aircraft
and aircraft components, pilots, air traffic controllers. air traffic engineers, mechanics, and
ground-handling personnel are required to report the information on occurrences to the
CAA. They must comply with both the requirements of the MOR Scheme and the EASA
regulations, and in any case, the more restrictive requirements must be applied [117]. CAP
382 lists in its appendix the examples of reportable occurrences related to operations, main-
tenance, repair, and manufacture, which are based on the list of Directive 2003/42/EC.
(Refer to Appendix B, B.2, Subsection B.2.3.)
The number of reports submitted under the MOR Scheme is shown in Figure 5-1.
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Figure 5-1: Number of reports submitted under the MOR Scheme [119]
All reports received under the MOR Scheme are processed by the Safety Investigation
and Data Department (SIDD), the Safety Regulation Group (SRG) of the CAA. The SIDD
analyzes the report to establish trends and to determine corrective actions, and provides
the selected safety information to the industry on request. Reports are directed from the
SIDD to the appropriate departments within the CAA for any necessary follow-up action.
Every month, the SIDD publishes summaries of all occurrences for the industry and for the
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general aviation community [117].
The data of all reports collected under the MOR Scheme are stored in the database. The
details of the accident and serious incident passed by the AAIB are also included into the
database to maximize analytical and statistical benefits. The SIDD extracts the information
for dissemination within the CAA as well as to the aircraft industry and other interested
parties [1161.
The SIDD also exchanges the data with the Member States of the EU, as stipulated
by Article 6 of Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Article 142 of Air Navigation Order 2005, which will be discussed in Subsection 5.2.6 [117].
The use of MOR data as a part of the CAA Safety Risk Management Process
The CAA has developed the Safety Risk Management Process and continues to update it.
The CAA Risk Management Process consists of three levels in the form of pyramid.
At the highest level, the Accident Analysis Group (AAG) identifies the foremost risks
to large public transport aeroplanes through analysis of fatal accidents. Since such fatal
accidents are rare events in the U.K., the AAG conducts an analysis of fatal accidents
worldwide. During the analysis, each accident is assigned a primary causal factor, other
causal factors, circumstantial factors, and consequences [120]. Unlike other studies that
only reviewed accidents with sufficient information, the AAG analyzes all worldwide fatal
accidents in order to avoid bias in the analysis toward accidents that had occurred in nations
with more developed accident investigation processes [118].
At the next level, The High Risk Events Analysis Team (THREAT) analyzes non-
fatal accidents, serious incidents, and other high risk incidents collected under the MOR
Scheme, involving U.K.-registered or -operated public transport aeroplanes. THREAT was
established in 2007., and a number of generic observations on potential ongoing safety risks
yielded by the THREAT's initial analysis have been fed into the CAA safety planning
process.
At the lowest level, "Fishbone groups" analyzes the data collected under the MOR
Scheme on main risks identified from the AAG and THREAT. "Fishbone" refers to the
structured analysis method that these groups use to search for any safety weaknesses that
could contribute to the specified risk. In addition to the data stored in the MOR database,
the Fishbone groups make use of the data acquired from the Flight Data Monitoring [120].
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5.2.3 Airprox Reporting and Investigation System
The Airprox should be reported by pilots or air traffic controllers on a special form to the
United Kingdom Airprox Board (UKAB). In the U.K., the Airprox is defined as "a situation
in which, in the opinion of a pilot or an air traffic controller, the distance between aircraft
as well as their relative positions and speed, had been such that the safety of the aircraft
involved was or may have been compromised" [69].
The Airprox reporting to the UKAB is not mandatory. Although pilots and air traffic
controllers may well be required to submit an occurrence report under the MOR Scheme, the
reporter can decide whether to classify such a report as an Airprox [69]. The CAA ensures
that the report is incorporated into the MOR scheme, hence duplication of reporting is not
needed [116].
Airprox Board Constitution
The UKAB is an independent body formed in 1999. It is sponsored jointly and funded
equally by the CAA and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) of the U.K. The UKAB is comprised
of two main sections, a Secretariat and a Board. The role of the Secretariat is to conduct
investigations and to support the Board, whereas the role of the Board is to determine
probable causes of Airprox and to assess its degree of risk based on the investigation.
At present, the Secretariat is comprised of four Airprox Inspectors and two administra-
tors. Two Airprox Inspectors have civilian backgrounds, and the other two have military
backgrounds. One of the civilian inspectors has a background in air traffic control, and
the other in flight operations. The two inspectors with military backgrounds mirror this
arrangement.
The Board is similarly comprised of civilian and military members, with backgrounds
in air traffic control or flight operations. The majority of Board members are nominated
either by civilian organizations or the MOD. The Board members are expected to serve as
experts in their own right and not to represent any group or organization [69].
Investigation
The UKAB receives approximately 200 Airprox reports each year, about 90% of which
results in full investigation (the other 10% of reports is withdrawn by the reporter).
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The investigation is directed by the Airprox Inspectors. For the particularly serious
situations, the AAIB may also elect to conduct an investigation. In such cases, the UKAB
will work in parallel and in cooperation with the AAIB.
During the investigation, as with the NMAC investigation by the FAA, radar recordings,
communication data and other relevant data are investigated, and the cockpit crew members
and air traffic controllers involved are interviewed. Further investigation is carried out either
by staff from the SRG of the CAA and/or by their counterparts from the Ministry of Defence
(when a military aircraft is involved) and/or by Airprox Inspectors from the UKAB.
When the investigation phase is completed, a comprehensive report is presented to the
Board. The Board determines causal factors and assesses the degree of risk at a Board
meeting based on the report presented, and may make recommendations [69].
Ensuring impartiality is believed to be essential in the UKAB. Therefore, it is incumbent
on Board members always to attend Board Meetings so that the balance of Board member-
ship remains equally weighted among civil/military and pilot/air traffic controller. Expert
Advisors may be invited to the Board meetings by the Chairman to advise the Board on
specialist aspects of particular incidents [69]. The Board classifies the degree of risk into
four categories as shown in Table 5.1 [119].
Table 5.1: Airprox risk categories [119]
Category Name Definition
A Risk of collision An actual risk of collision existed.
B Safety not assured The safety of the aircraft was compromised.
C No risk of collision No risk of collision existed.
D Risk not determined Insufficient information was available to determine the
risk involved, or inconclusive or conflicting evidence
precluded such determination.
The number of Airprox investigated by the UKAB is shown in Figure 5-2. In particular,
the number of Airprox involving commercial aircraft and investigated by the UKAB is
shown in Figure 5-3.
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Figure 5-2: Number of Airprox investigated by the UKAB per yeara (Data Source: [119])
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Figure 5-3: Number of Airprox involving commercial aircraft and investigated by the UKAB
per year (Data Source: [119])
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aNo data is available on risk categories.
Final Report
The final report is compiled by adding the statement of causal factors and safety recom-
mendations if applicable, to the initial investigation report. The majority of the safety
recommendations by the UKAB are addressed either to the CAA, the MOD or jointly to
both. It is a well-established practice that the CAA and the MOD respond to the safety
recommendations [69].
In addition, the pilots and the air traffic controllers involved in the occurrence each
receive their own full copy of the final report. In order to encourage an open and honest
reporting environment, names of companies and individuals are not published in the reports
[113].
Twice yearly, the UKAB produces the AIRPROX Report Book, which collates the
Airprox occurrence reports and records the CAA's responses to the recommendations. It
also contains the statistical and trend analysis of the Airprox [116].
5.2.4 Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP)
The Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) is a voluntary,
confidential, and non-punitive incident reporting system, maintained by the CHIRP Char-
itable Trust.
CHIRP currently receives confidential incident reports from professionally licensed pi-
lots, air traffic controllers, licensed engineers, cabin crew members, and employees of ap-
proved maintenance organizations and design and production organizations within the air
transport industry in the U.K. The General Aviation programme is also available to all
General Aviation communities [23].
History
CHIRP was established in 1982 to identify and resolve a wide range of safety-related issues
in the U.K. air transport industry and to supplement the CAA's MOR Scheme.
In 1996, the programme was restructured and the CHIRP Charitable Trust, a charitable
company limited by guarantee, was established to maintain the programme. This corporate
structure was selected in order to assure the independence from all regulatory, managerial
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and employee-related interests [23], [98].
Program Management
The CAA is funding CHIRP, and a Board of Trustees holds management and fiscal re-
sponsibilities for the charity. Currently, the Board of Trustees is comprised of 14 members,
including the Chief Inspector of the AAIB and the Group Director of the CAA [98]. The
Board of Trustees together with 18 nominees from the principal air transport interests in-
cluding the CAA comprise the Air Transport Advisory Board. Separate General Aviation
Board and Cabin Crew Advisory Board have also been formed to assist with General Avi-
ation reports and cabin crew reports respectively. The composition of the Advisory Boards
is reviewed every three years to ensure that the membership is appropriate to the scope
of the programme. Advisory Board members act as individual expert advisors and not as
representatives of their sponsoring organizations.
The main roles of the Advisory Boards are to review the de-identified reports and to
suggest the most appropriate way to resolve specific issues. The Advisory Boards also advise
the Trustees on the performance of the programme.
In order to keep the programme effective, the annual performance reports are submitted
to the programme sponsors and circulated widely to operational management. Additionally,
the programme is subject to an independent review every five years. The review is conducted
by members of the Advisory Boards and other industry specialists including the staff of the
CAA. The terms of reference for the review should be agreed with the CAA [98].
Reports
The number of reports submitted to CHIRP by year is shown in Figure 5-4.
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Figure 5-4: Number of reports submitted to CHIRP [98]
Confidentiality
On receiving reports, CHIRP validates them as far as possible. Anonymous reports are
not normally acted upon as they cannot be validated. No personal details are retained
from reports received. After ensuring that the report contains all relevant information, all
personal details are returned to the reporter with an acknowledgment letter. Each report is
allocated a unique reference identification so that the reporter can contact the CHIRP office
for additional information using this reference identification. After the return of personal
details, CHIRP is no longer able to contact the reporter.
By this means, the confidentiality of the reporter is assured. Only after all means of
identifying the individual reporter are removed from reports, is information provided to
the Advisory Boards. When appropriate, report information is also discussed with relevant
agencies with the aim of finding a resolution. Again, only de-identified data are used in
discussions with the third party organizations [23].
The de-identified data are recorded in a secure database for analysis of key topics and
trends. They are made available to other safety systems and professional bodies [23]. Since
the CHIRP Charitable Trust is not a government agency, it is not covered by the Freedom
of Information Act in the U.K. [72].
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Immunity
The CHIRP reports are handled on a strictly confidential basis, but it is possible that an
incident reported to CHIRP may also be reported independently to the CAA by a third
party.
In preparing for such a case, Aeronautical Information Circular P17/2009 [114] assures
that the CAA will not "institute proceedings in respect of unpremeditated or inadvertent
breaches of the law that are the subject of a CHIRP report and which come to its attention
from such a third party report, except in cases involving dereliction of duty amounting to
gross negligence."
Publication of Safety Bulletins
CHIRP publishes and distributes a quarterly newsletter Air Transport FEEDBACK to
all commercially licensed pilots, air traffic controllers, and engineering personnel. The
FEEDBACK covers the summary statistics and selected topics from de-identified reports,
and suggestions for avoiding recurrences.
To cabin crew members, a separate quarterly Cabin Crew FEEDBACK is available.
In addition, a quarterly General Aviation FEEDBACK containing reports of particular
interest to light aircraft operations or leisure flying is distributed to the General Aviation
communities. Before publishing each FEEDBACK, the relevant Advisory Board reviews the
final draft [23].
Access to the Database
Unlike the ASRS of the U.S., the CHIRP database is confidential and is not made available
to the public for secondary analysis [18].
5.2.5 Confidential/Voluntary Reporting Systems of the CAA
The CAA has its own confidential reporting system and voluntary reporting system. How-
ever, both systems are managed as a part of the MOR Scheme, and differ in characteristics
from other voluntary reporting systems, including CHIRP, as discussed below. These re-
porting systems are little used at present [98], therefore, this thesis does not treat them as
targets of comparative analysis.
116
Confidential Reporting System of the CAA
Under the MOR Scheme, if the scheme requires the submission of a report, but a reporter
considers that it is essential that his/her identity not be revealed, the reporter can submit
a report with clear annotation "CONFIDENTIAL" directly to the Safety Investigation and
Data Department(SIDD), the Safety Regulation Group (SRG) of the CAA.
The request will be respected and the reporter will be contacted personally, either by
the Head of SIDD or his deputy. A database entry will be made based on the de-identified
report and will only be accessible by restricted users. The original report will eventually be
destroyed.
However, the CAA cannot guarantee confidentiality when an occurrence is reported
separately by another party or where Article 142 (17) of Air Navigation Order 2005 applies
in respect to gross negligence. Reporters must also accept that effective investigation may
be inhibited [116].
Voluntary Reporting System of the CAA
The voluntary reporting system of the CAA encourages reporting by persons or organiza-
tions across the whole spectrum of U.K. civil aviation operations, who are not required to
report in accordance with the requirements of Air Navigation Order 2005.
The reporting criteria is the same as that of the MOR Scheme. Therefore, the CAA's
organization and procedures for processing and recording reports do not substantially dif-
ferentiate between voluntary and mandatory reports.
The voluntary reports, if published, will be published in a limited format which removes
information and data which is likely to identify the reporter, as stipulated by Air Navigation
Order 2005 [116].
5.2.6 Exchange of Information between EU Member States
The number of safety-related occurrences in individual states may not be sufficient to give
an early indication of potentially serious hazards or to identify meaningful trends. Therefore,
the EU Member States, including the U.K., have been exchanging the safety information
with each other since 2005.
Directive 2003/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council stipulates that a
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competent authority in Member States shall store information on safety-related occurrences
including accidents and serious incidents in their database. The Directive also stipulates
that the Member States shall participate in the exchange of the information by making
available all information stored in their databases to the competent authorities of the other
Member States and the Commission, and the Commission shall adopt measures for the
dissemination of information to interested parties.
In accordance with Directive 2003/42/EC, Commission Regulation No.1321/2007 lays
down implementing rules for the exchange of information. This regulation obliges the
Commission to set up and manage a central repository to store all information received from
the Member States. In addition, Commission Regulation 1330/2007 lays down implementing
rules for the dissemination of the information to interested parties. In the U.K., Article 142
of Air Navigation Order 2005 stipulates the requirements above.
To assist the authorities in the EU in implementing the legislation, the European Co-
ordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS), a co-operative
network of European Transport Authorities and Accident Investigation Bodies, was set
up. ECCAIRS is being managed by the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European
Commission.
What hinders the exchange of safety information between states the most is the in-
compatibility of the data storage formats. To overcome this obstacle, the JRC developed a
software framework called ECCAIRS Reporting System. Since 1998, it has been distributed
to authorities in the EU and other interested parties and has been used as a standard and
flexible tool to collect, exchange, and analyze aviation safety information.
The ECCAIRS Reporting System is now becoming a de-facto standard beyond the EU.
In 2004, ICAO adopted it to implement the new ADREP System. In addition, it was
also adopted in many countries such as Brazil and South Korea. In 2007, a bi-directional
data link between the EU and China was developed in co-operation with the Chinese Civil
Aviation Administration [34].
5.3 Rulemaking Process
As described in Section 5.1, the rulemaking responsibility for aspects regarding aviation
safety in the U.K. has been transferred from the CAA to EASA since 2003, and a broad
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scope of rules will be covered by EASA's regulatory system in the future. Therefore, this
thesis will discuss the rulemaking process in EASA rather than discussing that in the CAA
of the U.K.
5.3.1 Legal Structures
Regulation (EC) No.216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of the European Union
Regulation (EC) No.216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union sets common rules in the field of civil aviation. The Regulation defines the
scope of powers transferred from the Member States to the European Union, and is referred
to as Basic Regulation.
Historically, Regulation (EC) No.1592/2002 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of the European Union, which was adopted in July 2002, established EASA and
gave the Agency responsibility for the airworthiness and environmental certification of all
aeronautical products, parts and appliances designed, manufactured, maintained, or used
by persons under the regulatory oversight of EU Member States. This includes all post-
certification activities, such as the approval of changes to, and repairs of, aeronautical
products and their components, as well as the issuing of airworthiness directives. Further-
more. EASA was charged with the oversight of EU organizations involved in the design of
aeronautical products., parts and appliances as well as of non-EU organizations involved in
the manufacture or maintenance of such products. In these domains, EASA has taken over
the certification tasks that had been under the responsibility of Member States.
Regulation No.216/2008, which was adopted in February 2008, repealed Regulation
(EC) No.1592/2002 and extended the scope of Community competence to air operations,
flight crew licenses and aircraft used by third country operators into, within or out of the
Community and gave the Agency additional operational responsibilities.
EASA is currently developing the related implementing rules on these additional com-
petences, and EASA will exercise these competences once they become applicable.
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Regulation (EC) No.2042/2003 of the Commission of the European Communi-
ties
Regulation (EC) No.2042/2003 of the Commission of the European Communities defines
Implementing Rules for the Basic Regulation. It is on the continuing airworthiness of
aircraft and related products, parts and appliances, and on the approval of organizations
and personnel involved in these tasks. Details are stipulated in its Annexes, as shown in
Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Annexes of the Regulation (EC) No.2042/2003
Annex Part Contents
Annex I Part-M Continuing Airworthiness Requirements
Annex II Part-145 Maintenance Organisations Approvals
Annex III Part-66 Certifying Staff
Annex IV Part-147 Training Organisations Requirements
Regulation (EC) No.1702/2003 of the Commission of the European Communi-
ties
Regulation (EC) No.1702/2003 of the Commission of the European Communities also de-
fines Implementing Rules for the Basic Regulation. It is for the airworthiness and environ-
mental certification of aircraft, and related products, parts and appliances, as well as for
the certification of design and production organizations. Details are stipulated in Part 21
of its Annex.
The Basic Regulation and its Implementing Rules are legally binding and called "Hard
Law." EASA does not have a legal authority to amend the Basic Regulation and its Imple-
menting Rules. Instead, EASA prepares a draft of legislation and submits it as an opinion
to the European Commission. It is further processed either by the European Parliament,
the Council of the European Union, or the European Commission before the legislation is
enacted.
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Certification Specifications (CS)
EASA develops the Certification Specifications (CS) for the application of the Basic Regu-
lation and its Implementing Rules. They are used in the certification process, and include
the Airworthiness Codes and the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC).
Airworthiness Codes are issued as standard means to show compliance of products,
parts and appliances with the essential requirements for airworthiness of aircraft laid down
in Annex I to the Basic Regulation. Such codes are sufficiently detailed and specific to
indicate to applicants the conditions under which certificates will be issued.
The CS does not constitute mandatory requirements and is simply the technical inter-
pretation of the regulations.
Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC)
The Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) illustrates means by which a requirement
contained in the Basic Regulation, its Implementing Rules, and Airworthiness Codes, can
be met by applicants.
The AMCs are not the only means for applicants to demonstrate compliance, and are
not legally binding. The applicant can always choose to demonstrate compliance by other
means. However, an applicant correctly implementing an AMC issued by EASA is assured
of acceptance of compliance.
In addition to EASA, the National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) may also issue their
own national AMCs, based or not on those issued by EASA. In such cases, EASA monitors
that the NAAs manage the issuance process in a correct manner, and checks that these
national AMCs actually provide for compliance with the applicable requirements.
Guidance Material (GM)
The Guidance Material (GM) is a non-binding material issued by EASA that illustrates
the meaning of the Implementing Rules or Certification Specifications. The GM does not
provide presumption of compliance when used in the certification process. While the regu-
lations are referred to as "Hard Law," the CS, AMC, and GM, all of which are not legally
binding, are referred to as "Soft Law" [30]., [31].
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5.3.2 Main Participants in Rulemaking Process
Executive Director
The Executive Director sets overall policy and direction for regulatory development activi-
ties. He/she approves the Rulemaking Programme and all final rules, including an opinion
to the European Commission concerning regulations, the CS, AMC, and GM [32].
Rulemaking Directorate
The Rulemaking Directorate manages overall rulemaking activities. Publication of Notice
of Proposed Amendment (NPA) and Comment Response Document (CRD) and the compo-
sition of Rulemaking Group and Review Group need approval by the Rulemaking Director
[32].
Operational Directorates
Operational Directorates evaluate a proposal for rulemaking and determine whether they
are accepted into the Rulemaking Programme. They are consulted on a draft of NPA, CRD,
and final rule before publication. They nominate candidates for a Rulemaking Group [32].
Safety Standards Consultative Committee (SSCC)
The Safety Standards Consultative Committee (SSCC) is comprised of representatives from
organizations and trade associations representing industries, professions and end user groups
concerned. The tasks of the SSCC include providing EASA with advice on the content,
priorities and execution of the Rulemaking Programme. The SSCC nominates candidates
for a Rulemaking Group [32].
Advisory Group of National Authorities (AGNA)
The Advisory Group of National Authorities (AGNA) is comprised of one person per Mem-
ber State, who represents those National Aviation Authorities. In addition to the tasks
assigned to the SSCC, the AGNA fulfills a task of providing EASA with opinions when
EASA receives major objections from the NAAs in Member States in the Notice of Pro-
posed Amendment (NPA). The AGNA also nominates candidates for a Rulemaking Group
[32].
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Rulemaking Group
EASA may make use of outside resources for rulemaking except for the development of the
GM. which EASA develops solely with its own staff. The Rulemaking Director invites the
SSCC and the AGNA to nominate candidates. In addition to the Operational Directorates,
foreign regulatory authorities such as the FAA are also consulted to nominate candidates if
a task has common interest. The group size should not exceed six persons in normal cases,
and members of Rulemaking Group are appointed by the Rulemaking Director [32].
Review Group
EASA Management Board Decision 08-2007 [29] requires that comments received in the
Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) are also reviewed by appropriately qualified experts
not directly involved in the drafting of the proposed rule. Its purposes are to improve the
quality of agency measures and to ensure fair and appropriate treatment of all comments
received.
A Review Group is composed of the Rulemaking Group and two additional members.
One must be a person involved in standardization inspections in the domain affected by the
proposed rule. The other person must be chosen to ensure that opposing views are duly
represented in the review of comments and the drafting of the final rule.
The Agency invites the SSCC and AGNA to provide their opinion on the Review Group
composition. The Review Group composition is then approved by the Rulemaking Director
[32].
5.3.3 Public Consultation Requirements
EASA Management Board Decision 08-2007 [29] prescribes that public consultation is re-
quired for the development of rules, which cover the opinions concerning the scope and
content of the Basic Regulation and its Implementing Rules, the CS, AMC, and GM.
Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA)
EASA must publish a Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) for each rulemaking. In addi-
tion to the proposed rule, it must include a full RIA and details of significant or contentious
issues identified during the drafting process. As regards the GM, it is sufficient that the
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NPA contains a justification and the proposed new or amended material.
Prior to drafting an NPA, Terms of Reference (ToR) is developed by the Rulemak-
ing Officer in accordance with the Rulemaking Programme. The ToR is approved by the
Rulemaking Director through consultation with the AGNA and the SSCC.
The NPA is drafted in accordance with the corresponding ToR, and a full RIA is also
developed in parallel. In those cases where the NPA contains provisions to be applied by
Member States, its copies must be transmitted to national authorities.
After approval by the Rulemaking Director, the NPA is published for consultation.
Generally, the consultation period is three months.
The review of comments is done by a Review Group. As regards the GM, a review of
comments is done by the EASA staff or a rulemaking group, without the need for review
by experts not involved in drafting. The received comments and the agency's responses and
dispositions are consolidated into a CRD.
If the comments received from the NAAs in Member States indicate major objections to
the proposed rule, EASA must consult the AGNA to discuss the rule further. In those cases
when the disagreement still remains after the consultation with the AGNA, the results of
this consultation and the impact and consequences of the agency's decision must be included
in a CRD.
After approval by the Rulemaking Director, EASA publishes the CRD. In general, EASA
publishes the CRD within three months of the expiry of the consultation period. When a
text revised based on the results of NPA differs significantly from the original one, a further
consultation round must be considered [32].
Advanced Notice of Proposed Amendment (A-NPA)
EASA may issue an Advanced Notice of Proposed Amendment (A-NPA) when it needs a
broader discussion of new concepts or further information or data prior to the drafting of
an NPA. In addition to an explanatory note, the A-NPA must contain either an outline of
a proposed rule or various options to address an issue with explanation for each.
EASA determines the length of the consultation period for each case. The publication
of the A-NPA does not necessarily mean EASA will proceed to an NPA after that [29).
Final Rule
The adoption and the publication of the final rule needs approval by the Executive Director.
In order to allow sufficient time for consultees to respond its contents, Decision 08-2007
prescribes that EASA shall issue its decision in respect to all the rules except the GM, no
earlier than two months following the date of publication of the CRD.
5.3.4 Regulatory Impact Analysis Requirements
Decision 08-2007, in its Article 3 and 5, prescribes that the Regulatory Impact Assessment
(RIA) is required for the opinions concerning the scope and content of the Basic Regulation
and its Implementing Rules and the Certification Specifications.
In EASA, the RIA is conducted in pace with the public consultation, and the required
level of the RIA is different for the Annual Rulemaking Programme and the NPA. First, the
Decision 08-2007 prescribes that the Annual Rulemaking Programme shall be supported by
a preliminary RIA of each of the rules envisaged. A preliminary RIA evaluates the pros and
cons of undertaking a rulemaking action. Such evaluation must be sufficient to demonstrate
that serious consideration has been given to a range of possible options. In addition to the
"do nothing" option, all other options must be considered, in particular non-regulatory
options such as developing economic or procedural incentives to encourage industries to
take particular approaches.
Second, Decision 08-2007 prescribes that each NPA shall include a "full" RIA. It requires
quantifying, as much as is feasible, impacts on all categories of affected persons for each
options identified in a preliminary RIA. Generally, a full RIA includes the following [32]:
Purpose and intended effect
The item describes an issue to be addressed and a perceived importance of the issue,
and includes a brief statement of the objectives of the NPA.
Options
The item describes all options to deal with the issue and identifies a preferred option
among them.
Sectors concerned
The item identifies the sectors of the civil aviation community including authorities
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within the regulated domain, which will be affected. If appropriate, the number of
organizations, persons, and aircraft, which will be affected should also be evaluated.
Only those sectors that are directly affected need to be considered.
Impacts
The item evaluates all the possible impacts resulting from the considered option on
all concerned sectors. The methodology used and any underlying assumptions must
be explained. The impacts must be evaluated for each category listed below.
Safety
All safety impacts of the considered option must be identified and, wherever
possible, quantified. The evaluation must include an identification of hazards
and a classification of risks taking into account the probability of occurrences
and the severity of effects.
Economic
All economic impacts of the considered option must be identified and, wherever
possible, quantified. If it is impossible to quantify the economic impacts, the
evaluation must describe how the concerned sectors are affected by the different
options.
Environmental
Any significant environmental impact must be identified.
Social
Any positive or negative social impacts must be identified. such as on employ-
ment, working hours, working conditions, movement of personnel and health.
Other aviation requirements outside EASA scope
When the proposal may have an impact on other aviation requirements outside
the scope of EASA, such as security, Air Traffic Management, and airports, the
relevant regulatory bodies must be consulted.
Foreign comparable regulatory requirements
When the proposal may have an impact on the competitiveness of European
industry or create conflict with foreign regulatory requirements, a comparison
with such foreign requirements must be made and the quantitative consequences
of differences must be assessed.
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In addition to the impacts described above, the equity and fairness issues must also
be identified. That is, an option may be undesirable which is likely to have the
largest positive impacts but impose negative impacts on specific concerned sectors.
The distribution of positive and negative impacts among the various concerned sectors
must therefore be analyzed in detail.
Summary and final assessment
In summary, for each option being evaluated, the positive and negative impacts must
be compared, and which sectors and persons are affected by these impacts and analysis
of fairness and equity issues must be stated. Lastly, a final assessment must be made
and a preferred option must be recommended.
5.3.5 Annual Rulemaking Programme
Decision 08-2007 requires that EASA shall establish an Annual Rulemaking Programme in
consultation with the SSCC and AGNA. As stated, the programme must be supported by a
preliminary RIA of each of the rules envisaged, and the priorities must be set for each task,
taking account of the preliminary RIA and the agency's resources. All rulemaking activities
must be initiated in accordance with these priorities. The SSCC and AGNA advise EASA
on the priority of items, the scope and content of the items, timing, and working methods.
During the development process, EASA also consults with the Civil Aviation Authorities
in third countries such as the FAA and Transport Canada, with which EASA has signed
an arrangement for cooperation in rulemaking. The authorities exchange their views on
respective rulemaking intentions, priorities and possible contentious issues. They identify
tasks of common interest that need to be co-ordinated and determine how they will be
executed.
The Annual Rulemaking Programme is verified by the Rulemaking Director and ap-
proved by the Executive Director. Once approved, the programme is made available to the
public [32].
127
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
128
Chapter 6
Australia
6.1 Organizations
6.1.1 Civil Aviation Authority: Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA)
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) was established in 1995 as an independent
statutory authority, which conducts the safety regulations of civil aviation in Australia.
[17].
The objectives, strategies and policies to be followed by CASA are decided by the Board,
whose members are appointed by the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional De-
velopment and Local Government. The Chief Executive Officer, who manages CASA, is
responsible to the Minister [14].
6.1.2 Investigation Authority: Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is an independent Commonwealth Gov-
ernment Statutory Agency, and conducts the investigations of aviation, marine, and rail
road accidents and incidents. It also administers aviation voluntary reporting systems.
The ATSB was established by the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act),
and entirely separate from transport policy makers, industry operators, and from transport
regulators such as CASA. The ATSB is managed by a Commission, which is constituted by a
full-time Commissioner and two part-time Commissioners. The Minster for Infrastructure,
Transport, Regional Development and Local Government appoints them. The Minister
may appoint additional part-time Commissioners where their expertise is required for a
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significant investigation. The ATSB has approximately 110 staff members, including about
60 aviation, marine and rail safety investigators [12].
6.2 Reporting and Investigation Systems
In Australia, other than an accident and incident reporting and investigation system by
the ATSB, CASA has the Service Difficulty Reporting System. As regards the voluntary
reporting systems, the ATSB has two systems: REPCON and the Aviation Self Reporting
Scheme (ASRS).
6.2.1 Accident and Incident Reporting and Investigation System
The Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act) defines an accident including avia-
tion, marine, and railroad accidents as follows (Section 3).
"Accident means an investigable matter involving a transport vehicle where:
(a) a person dies or suffers serious injury as a result of an occurrence associated with the
operation of the vehicle; or
(b) the vehicle is destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of an occurrence associated
with the operation of the vehicle; or
(c) any property is destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of an occurrence associated
with the operation of the vehicle."
The TSI Act does not define incidents and serious incidents. Instead, the Act defines
the "Transport Safety Matters" which include occurrences from fatal accidents to minor
incidents. (Refer to Appendix B, Section B.3, Subsection B.3.1.)
The Transport Safety Matters are classified into "Immediately Reportable Matters" and
"Routine Reportable Matters," and reporting requirements are different for each of them.
If a responsible person has knowledge of an Immediately Reportable Matter, the person
must report it to the ATSB as soon as is reasonably practicable. and give a written report
within 72 hours (except otherwise specified by the ATSB) (TSI Act. Section 18 and 19).
On the other hand, a responsible person is not required to report a Routine Reportable
Matter immediately; instead, the person must give a written report within 72 hours (except
otherwise specified by the ATSB) to the ATSB (TSI Act, Section 19).
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The lists of Immediately Reportable Matters and Routine Reportable Matters are pre-
scribed in the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003, and are different for air
transport operations and other operations (Regulation 2.3 and 2.4) (Refer to Appendix B,
Section B.3, Subsection B.3.2).
Airprox is defined as "an occurrence in which 2 or more aircraft come into such close
proximity that a threat to the safety of the aircraft exist or may exist, in airspace where the
aircraft are not subject to an air traffic separation standard or where separation is a pilot
responsibility" (Regulation 2.2). It should be noted that Airprox are immediately reportable
matters for air transport operations and routine reportable matters for other operations.
The ATSB may investigate any transport safety matters, yet it investigates them selec-
tively. Accidents and serious incidents, as defined by Annex 13, have priority for investiga-
tion, yet not all of them are investigated. The aim is to concentrate the limited resources
on those investigations considered most likely to enhance aviation safety [8].
Categories of Investigation Level
On receiving an initial notification, the ATSB will decide what actions to take. The initia-
tion of formal investigation can only be made at or above Team Leader level after discussion
and agreement with the Deputy Director and Executive Director. Each investigation will be
categorized on a Level 1 to 5 in order of priority. For example, accidents involving aircraft
without fatalities and serious incidents, where the potential safety lessons do not justify the
commitment of investigative resources after an initial review, are classified as Level 5 and
only basic data will be filed for statistical purposes [13].
Following the initial assessment of occurrence and the allocation of investigation level, a
decision will be made whether or not to conduct on-site investigation. Other actions taken
by the ATSB may be a request for more information from an owner, employer or other party
or an entry of accident or incident details into the ATSB's Safety Investigation Information
Management System (SIIMS). The data entered into the database is used for future safety
research and analysis [7]. [8], [13].
Subsequently. the investigation may be upgraded or downgraded. The decision to up-
grade and commit extra resources or to downgrade must be made at Deputy Director level
after discussion with the Executive Director. Any decision to discontinue must be endorsed
by the Executive Director [13].
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A guidance on the categorization of transport safety matters is provided by the ATSB.
(Refer to Appendix C.) It is intended to serve as a suggested starting point based on initial
notification [13].
Level 5 Investigations
Recently, the ATSB has decided to gather additional factual information on all aviation
accidents and serious incidents which were categorized in the initial decision as Level 5,
with exception of high risk personal recreation or sports aviation or experimental aircraft
operations. The aim is to address the risk posed by having to make decisions on whether
to conduct an investigation within a short time frame based on preliminary information
only. The additional information gathered enables a more informed decision. In addition,
it is expected that further publicly available information on accidents and serious incidents
would increase safety awareness in the industry and enable improved research activities and
analysis of safety trends [11].
The ATSB established a small team to manage and process these factual investiga-
tions, the Level 5 Investigation Team. The primary objective of the teams is to undertake
limited-scope fact-gathering investigations. The team compiles a short summary report,
whieh contains the information on the circumstances surrounding the occurrence and what
safety action may have been taken or identified as a result of the occurrence. The summary
report will be collated and released to the public on a periodic basis. The implementation
of the Level 5 Investigations just commenced in December 2009, and it will take some time
for it to be fully adopted [11].
CASA will be provided with copies of all ATSB occurrence reports available. Database
records are available for all occurrences regardless of categorization and will be provided on
request [4].
Final Report and Safety Recommendations
After the investigation, the ATSB publishes a report and may issue safety recommendations
to the relevant organizations. The organization that received the recommendations must
give a written response to the ATSB within 90 days (TSI Act, Section 25 and 25A).
Such a response must contain
. whether it accepts the recommendation (in whole or in part); and
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" if it accepts the recommendation (in whole or in part), details of any action that it
proposes to take to give effect to the recommendation; and
" if it does not accept the recommendation (in whole or in part), the reasons why it
does not accept the recommendation (in whole or in part).
Investigative Priority
If an aircraft accident investigation involves other police inquiries, the investigators of the
ATSB will assist where possible, within the constraints of the legislation, provided this does
not compromise their own investigation. If early evidence suggests the accident was the
result of unlawful interference, the police normally directs the investigation and the ATSB
does not investigate the accident [6].
6.2.2 Service Difficulty Reporting System
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 stipulates that those who own, operate, or maintain
the aircraft or aircraft components shall report major defects discovered to CASA, and
when those who detected the defects do not own aircraft or aircraft components, they shall
report to the owner. Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 51-1(1) [15] lists the
examples of the major defects to be reported to CASA. (Refer to Appendix B, Section B.3,
Subsection B.3.5.)
Additionally, the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 stipulates that the holder of
a Type Certificate, a Supplemental Type Certificate, an Australian Parts Manufacturer
Approval, or an Australian Technical Standard Order authorisation, or the licensee of a type
certificate or supplemental type certificate must report to CASA any failure, malfunction, or
defect of aircraft, aircraft components or parts or manufacturing process that has resulted,
or that has left its quality control and that could resulted in the occurrences listed in the
regulation (For the list of the occurrences, refer to Appendix B, Section B.3, Subsection
B.3.4). The Airworthiness Standards Branch has the primary responsibility for the system.
CAAP 51-1(1) describes the aim of the Service Difficulty Reporting (SDR) System as
follows.
(a) permit timely airworthiness control action in the Australian aircraft fleet;
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(b) assist in long term improvement in design, manufacturing and maintenance standards;
and
(c) permit the assessment of risk levels in the Australian aircraft fleet.
CASA will
" Assess each report for airworthiness safety implications, both in itself and in relation
to previous similar reports.
* Forward reports regarding Australian type certificated products to the relevant cer-
tificated holder and monitor these reports and the associated actions.
* When the defect or deficiency is found in the product of other countries, advise the
overseas civil aviation authorities and the organizations who have a responsibility
for the airworthiness of the product such as the holder of Type Certificate and the
Australian Parts Manufacturing Approval.
* When appropriate, takes action such as the introduction or amendment of regulations
or issue mandatory maintenance instructions such as Airworthiness Directives.
CASA also uses the information obtained through the SDR system as a basis for safety
information such as the Airworthiness Bulletins, CAAPs, Advisory Circulars, and Flight
Safety Australia articles [16].
The data obtained through the SDR system is entered into a computer database system.
From this database, information may be obtained to provide reliability statistics and trend
monitoring of aircraft, engines, propellers, systems, and components. CASA shares this
information with the FAA and Transport Canada [15].
CASA publishes monthly and yearly summaries on the Internet. Archived records are
also available from the Maintenance Standards Branch SDR Unit [15].
6.2.3 REPCON
REPCON is a voluntary confidential reporting system established in 1988, which mainly
aims at reports not indicating contraventions of safety regulations. REPCON is managed
by the ATSB.
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The establishment of REPCON is based on Section 20A of the TSI Act, and the Air
Navigation (Confidential Reporting) Regulations 2006 stipulates the scheme in detail.
The regulations prescribe the primary purpose of the scheme as follows:
(a) to provide a confidential reporting scheme for reportable safety concerns; and
(b) to use the reports made under the scheme to identify unsafe procedures, practices or
conditions; and
(c) to provide information to the aviation industry about an identified unsafe procedure,
practice or condition to facilitate safety awareness and safety action and improvements
by other persons and organisations.
As the secondary purpose of the scheme, providing information, arising from reports., about
aviation security concerns to an appropriate person or organisation to facilitate security
awareness is stated in the regulations.
Reportable Matters
REPCON is not limited to persons in aviation community, but it allows any persons who
observe or become aware of an aviation safety concern to report it to the ATSB. In addition
to incidents and circumstances that affect the safety of air navigation and non-compliance
with the safety regulations, the Air Navigation (Confidential Reporting) Regulations 2006
list the examples of the reportable unsafe practices, procedures, or conditions which may
be reported as follows:
(i) poor training, behaviour or attitude displayed by an aircraft operator, airport operator
or air traffic control service provider; or
(ii) insufficient qualifications or experience of employees of the aircraft operator, airport
operator or air traffic control service provider; or
(iii) scheduling or rostering that contributes to the fatigue of employees of the aircraft
operator, airport operator or air traffic control service provider; or
(iv) an aircraft operator, airport operator or air traffic control service provider bypassing
safety procedures because of operational or commercial pressures; or
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(v) inadequate airport facilities for safe operations; or
(vi) unsafe passenger, baggage or cargo management; or
(vii) inadequate traffic or weather information;
Following matters are not reportable under REPCON:
(a) acts of unlawful interference with an aircraft
(b) reports of conduct that represents a serious and imminent threat to a person's health
or life
(c) industrial relations
(d) conduct that may constitute an offense against the law punishable by a maximum
penalty of life or more than two years imprisonment
If a report relates to an act of unlawful interference, the ATSB informs the Office of
Transport Security in the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development
and Local Government of the report and may send the report or the information from
the report to the Office (the Air Navigation (Confidential Reporting) Regulations 2006,
Regulation 16).
Confidentiality
In order to secure the confidentiality of reporters, the regulations stipulates that the ATSB
may not disclose information from a report unless all personal information has been removed
with some exceptions such as when the report relates to an act of unlawful interference.
In practice, when received reports, REPCON staff assess them for clarity, completeness
and significance for aviation safety. As a general rule, REPCON does not accept anonymous
reports because REPCON staff cannot contact a reporter to verify the report or to seek
additional information. In addition, the staff must be convinced that the reporter's moti-
vation for reporting is aviation safety promotion, and that the reporter is not attempting
to damage a rival or pursue an industrial agenda [9] .
Once satisfied that the report is as complete as possible, the staff enter the de-identified
contents of the report into the REPCON database, which allocates the report a unique
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identification number. The report is returned to the the reporter or destroyed (the Air
Navigation (Confidential Reporting) Regulations 2006, Regulation 11(4)).
Immunity
Under REPCON, non-compliance with the Civil Aviation Act 1988, the Civil Aviation
Orders, the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (CAR) or the Civil Aviation Safety Regula-
tions 1998 (CASR) is also reportable. However, REPCON does not provide immunity from
enforcement actions. Instead, another voluntary reporting system named Aviation Self Re-
porting Scheme (ASRS), which will be discussed in the next section, provides immunity. A
reporter seeking protection from administrative enforcement action by CASA should con-
sider reporting to the ASRS and whether they meet its criteria. REPCON is a broader
scheme designed to capture a wide range of aviation safety concerns from a larger pool of
potential reporters than ASRS [9].
Publication of Information Bulletin and Provision of De-identified Data to
CASA
REPCON may use the de-identified version of the report to issue an information brief or
alert bulletin to a person or responsible organization to take actions in response to the
safety concern. Additionally, the de-identified report may be passed on to CASA to make
the organization aware of unsafe practices, procedures, or conditions [9].
6.2.4 Aviation Self Reporting Scheme (ASRS)
The Aviation Self Reporting Scheme (ASPRS) is a system for voluntary and confidential
reporting of contraventions of the regulations and commenced in 2004. As with REPCON,
the ASRS is managed by the ATSB.
The Civil Aviation Act 1988 as amended by the Civil Aviation Amendment Act 2003
and the CASR as amended by the Civil Aviation Safety Amendment Regulations stipulate
the ASRS. The CASR prescribes the purposes of the scheme as follows:
(a) to enable holders of civil aviation authorisations to voluntarily report reportable con-
traventions without administrative action being taken against them; and
(b) to strengthen the foundation of aviation human factors safety research; and
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(c) to identify deficiencies and problems in the Australian aviation safety system; and
(d) to provide data for planning and improvements to the Australian aviation safety
system.
Reportable Matters
The holders of civil aviation authorisation such as pilots, mechanics and flight radio tele-
phone operators who have committed a contravention of the CAR or the CASR can report
to the ATSB.
The following are not reportable under ASRS (CASR, Regulation 13.325):
1. a contravention that is deliberate;
2. a contravention that is fraudulent;
3. a contravention that causes or contributes to an accident or to a serious incident
(whether before or after the cause contravention is reported.)
4. a contravention of a regulation that is prescribed [under the CASR].
The CASR also lists the contraventions of the CAR which are not reportable such as
the offenses relating to licenses, certificates and authorities and the detention of aircraft.
If a report relates to an act of unlawful interference, the ATSB must send the report to
the Office of Transport Security in the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional
Development and Local Government (CASR, Regulation 13.355).
Immunity
The ASRS assures protection from administrative action for the contravention of regula-
tions reported. However, to claim such protection, an authorisation holder must make a
written report of the reportable contravention not rater than 10 days after the reportable
contravention.
If the ATSB accepts a report, the ATSB gives a receipt to the authorisation holder.
The authorisation holder must keep the receipt to claim protection from the administrative
action. The ASRS is not intended to be a whistle-blowing scheme and the protection will
only apply to the person who reports the contravention. Further, it is not the intention of
the ASRS to protect an authorisation holder from prosecution action [109].
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The authorisation holder can claim the protection from CASA exercising a power to
vary, suspend or cancel their civil aviation authorisation if the authorisation holder pro-
duces the receipt provided to them by the ATSB to CASA to show that the authorisation
holder reported the contravention to the ATSB within 10 days after the contravention and
before the holder was given the show cause notice for the proposed decision. To claim the
protection, the authorisation holder must produce the receipt to CASA before CASA varies,
suspends or cancels the authorisation.
Similarly, when an infringement notice is issued, the authorisation holder is not required
to pay the penalty specified in the infringement notice and the notice is withdrawn if
the authorisation holder produces the receipt provided to them by the ATSB to CASA
to show that the holder reported the contravention to the ATSB within 10 days after
the contravention and before the holder was given the infringement notice. To claim the
protection, the authorisation holder must produce the receipt to CASA before the due date
for payment of the penalty specified in the infringement notice.
The holders of a civil aviation authorisation may make a report as often as they wish,
but they will be able to claim protection from administrative action only once every five
years (Civil Aviation Act 1988).
The report, receipt or any other evidence of the fact that a report of a reportable con-
travention was made by the authorisation holder are not admissible as evidence in criminal
proceedings against the reporter (Civil Aviation Act 1988).
Confidentiality
The regulations stipulate that the ATSB must not keep a copy of a report made under the
ASRS but return the report to the reporter with a receipt number.
Before returning a report, the ATSB stores the information in the files or databases
primary kept for the ASRS. The regulations also stipulate that when storing the information,
the ATSB must ensure that the information that identifies the authorisation holder who
made the report or any person referred to in the report is not included to the extent
practicable.
The ATSB may disclose the de-identified information without the consent of the reporter
but only if the information is to be used for the ASRS purposes mentioned above (CASR).
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Publication of Information Bulletin and Provision of De-identified Data to
CASA
As with REPCON, the ATSB issues information briefs or alert bulletins. The ATSB pub-
lishes details of reviews of the information contained in reports including the identification
of potential hazards, with other trend data.
In addition, de-identified data based on the ASRS reports will from time to time be
provided to CASA for the purposes of aviation safety [10].
6.3 Rulemaking Process
6.3.1 Legal Structures
Civil Aviation Act 1988
The Civil Aviation Act 1988 establishes CASA with functions relating to civil aviation, in
particular the safety of civil aviation and for related purposes. Section 98 of the Act gives
the Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia the power to make regulations
generally in relation to the safety of air navigation. Generally, the Act does not contain
detailed rules governing aviation safety. These matters are mainly left to regulations that
are made under the Act.
The Act falls under the responsibility of the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport,
Regional Development and Local Government. Amendments to the Act require the approval
of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister, the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional
Development and Local Government, and CASA. They must be passed by both Houses of
Parliament and assented to by the Governor-General [17].
Airspace Act 2007
The Airspace Act 2007 gives CASA the power to administer and manage Australian-
administered airspace. The Act also requires the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Re-
gional Development and Local Government to make an "Australian Airspace Policy State-
ment" outlining the administration and management of Australian-administered airspace
[17].
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Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (CAR) and Civil Aviation Safety Regulations
1998 (CASR)
The Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (CAR) and the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998
(CASR) are regulations made under the Civil Aviation Act 1988.
These regulations provide the general regulatory controls over air navigation safety.
The regulations set out in some detail the safety standards that are required in relation to
airworthiness of aircraft, licenses and ratings of operating crew and maintenance personnel,
air traffic control, rules of air, dangerous goods and many other safety issues.
The CAR and the CASR are referred to as delegated legislation. Delegated legislation
is a generic title given to instruments signed by the Governor-General, a Minister, or an
official empowered by an Act, and issued under that Act. The Parliament does not debate
delegated legislation and does not vote to accept or reject it, before it is made effective.
The CAR and the CASR are drafted by the Office of Legislative Drafting and Publish-
ing (OLDP) in the Attorney-General's Department (AGD), with legal drafting instructions
by CASA. The policy content of the CAR and the CASR must be cleared with the De-
partment of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government and
legal clearance must be obtained from the OLDP. The regulations are formally made by
the Governor-General in Executive Council (EXCO) on advice from the Minister for Infras-
tructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government.
The CAR and the CASR are disallowable instruments for the purposes of the Legislative
Instrument Act (LIA) 2003, and these regulations, once made, must be tabled in Parliament,
and are subject to disallowance [17].
Civil Aviation Orders (CAOs)
The Civil Aviation Orders (CAOs) set out CASA's directions and instructions in matters of
complex detail. They typically contain technical details and requirements that complement
the requirements set out in the regulations.
The CAOs also come within the definition of delegated legislation. However, they are
generally made under the authority of the regulations rather than the Civil Aviation Act
itself. They can only be made provided that the regulations authorize CASA to issue the
CAO on that particular matter. The CAOs are signed and issued by the Director of Aviation
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Safety of CASA.
The CAOs are also disallowable legislative instruments for the purposes of the LIA 2003,
and must be tabled in Parliament and are subject to disallowance [17].
Manual of Standards (MOS)
A Manual of Standards (MOS) is comprised of detailed technical material prescribed by
CASA, and of uniform specifications and standard application, determined to be necessary
for the safety of air navigation.
The CASR authorizes CASA to issue standards/technical specifications in a MOS in
relation to detailed technical matters as referenced in the associated regulation. The relevant
CASA Group General Manager (GGM) is responsible for the technical policy content of a
MOS. As with the CAOs, a MOS is signed and issued by the Director of Aviation Safety
of CASA.
A MOS is also a disallowable legislative instrument for the purposes of the LIA 2003,
and must be tabled in Parliament and is subject to disallowance [17].
Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC)
The Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) is an advisory material issued by CASA,
which serves as means by which the requirements contained in the CASR and associated
with a certificate, license, permission, approval or other authorization can be met by the
applicant.
The AMC sets out one or more acceptable methods of demonstrating compliance with a
specific regulation, and is not legally binding. Applicants are free to put forward alternative
methods of compliance. However, if an applicant follows the relevant AMC, the applicant
is assured of satisfying the associated regulatory requirements.
The publication of an AMC or amendment to it must be approved by the relevant CASA
GGM responsible for the technical policy and activity the AMC relates to. The AMCs are
not disallowable legislative instruments for the purposes of the LIA 2003 [17].
Other Advisory Publications
In addition to the AMCs, CASA issues other advisory publications to explain the intent of
the legislation and provide additional information on the reasons for the legislation and how
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to apply it. The advisory publications are issued under various names, including, Civil Avi-
ation Advisory Publications (CAAPs), Advisory Circulars (ACs), and Guidance Materials
(GMs).
The publication of new CAAPs, ACs and GMs, or amendments to them, is approved
by the relevant CASA GGM after consultation with the aviation industry or community.
These various publications are not disallowable legislative instruments [17].
Regulatory Reform
CASA is currently undertaking a programme of regulatory reform to validate, update and
consolidate its regulatory requirements for aviation safety. Regulatory requirements cur-
rently contained in the CAR and the CAOs are progressively being published in the new
CASR.
The MOSs, the AMCs, the GMs, and the ACs are new legislations, which are cur-
rently being phased in and being maintained whereas the CAOs and the CAAPs are old
legislations, which are currently being phased out [17].
6.3.2 Main Participants in Rulemaking Process
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) sets overall policy and direction for regulatory devel-
opment activities. He/she approves a proposed CAR and CASR and forwards them to the
Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, and
Executive Council for approval and making. He/she also approves the CAOs and the MOSs
[17].
Planning and Governance Office (PAGO)
The Planning and Governance Office (PAGO) oversees CASA's regulatory development
program, and coordinates and facilitates major regulatory projects. The Regulatory Devel-
opment Management Branch (RDMB) coordinates and manages CASA's regulatory devel-
opment activities. The roles of the RDMB include publishing consultation documents and
preparing Regulatory Impact Statements (RISs) [17].
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Legal Services Group (LSG)
The Legal Service Group (LSG) provides legal support for all legal issues in CASA. The
LSG also drafts all new or amended CAOs, MOSs and other legislative instruments issued
by CASA [17].
Operational Groups
Operational groups initiate a rulemaking process that falls within their jurisdiction. They
provide a team leader and staff for a Project Team. Examples of operational groups include
the Air Transport Operations Group (ATOG) and Airspace and Aerodrome Regulation
Group (AAR). Group General Managers (GGMs) usually serve as Project Sponsors and
approve regulatory and other documentation for public consultation and final publication
[17].
Project Team
The Project Team usually consists of CASA staff designated by a Project Sponsor and in-
dustry subject matter experts nominated by the Standards Consultative Committee (SCC)
and approved by a Project Sponsor. Generally, the number of team members does not
exceed six [17].
Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR)
The Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) is a division within the Department of
Finance and Deregulation. The OBPR has been assigned a central role in improving the
quality of regulation by administering Australian Government's best practice regulation
requirements.
For example, the OBPR examines the adequacy of Regulatory Impact Statements (RISs)
prepared by agencies. It also promotes the government-wide consultation principles and
provide guidance on consultation in the policy development process [17].
Office of Legal Drafting and Publishing (OLDP)
The Office of Legal Drafting and Publishing (OLDP) is an office within the Attorney-
General's Department. It is responsible for drafting regulations and for giving advice about
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drafting and interpreting legislative instruments across Government. The OLDP drafts all
of the new or amended CAR and CASR [17].
Standards Consultative Committee (SCC)
The Standards Consultative Committee (SCC) serves as the principal consultative body
used by CASA to provide advice and recommendations to CASA on regulatory issues and
proposals and associated documentation.
The SCC is composed of approximately 40 Australian industry bodies and operates
through six subcommittees that broadly represent the various functional sectors of the
aviation industry.
The principal roles of the SCC are:
" To provide advice to CASA on regulatory proposals and issues identified in DPs,
NPRMs, NPCs and in draft CAAPs, ACs, AMCs and GMs.
* To assist CASA in identifying regulatory implementation issues and coordinating im-
plementation activities.
" To provide advice to CASA on other aviation safety issues that have regulatory im-
plications.
" To nominate industry subject matter experts to participate in regulatory development
project teams.
" To Assist CASA in assigning priorities amongst regulatory development projects.
" To assist CASA to determine the impact, costs and benefits of regulatory proposals.
Project Team consults with the SCC regarding all regulatory and non-regulatory proposals
before they are published for industry and public comment [17].
Regulatory Advisory Panel (RAP)
The Regulatory Advisory Panel (RAP) conducts an independent review and provides advice
to the CEO on a proposed CASR Part and, where applicable, the associated MOS., prior
to submission of the regulations to the CEO and publication of the Notice of Final Rule
Making (NFRM) in relation to that Part.
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The RAP is not intended to review the content of the particular CASR Part. Rather, it
reviews whether proper procedures were followed during a development process of the new
CASR Part, and whether industry views were fully considered [17].
6.3.3 Public Consultation Requirements
In 2006, the Australian Government adopted a government-wide policy on consultation,
which sets out "best practice" principles to be followed by all agencies when developing
regulations. This policy contains seven principles for best practice consultation: Continuity,
Targeting, Appropriate Timeliness, Accessibility, Transparency, Consistency and Flexibility,
and Evaluation and Reviewa [5].
CASA is responsible under Section 9 and 16 of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 for "promot-
ing full and effective consultation and communication with all interested parties on aviation
safety issues," and must, in performing its functions and exercising its powers, where ap-
propriate, "consult with government, commercial, industrial, consumer and other relevant
bodies and organisations." CASA conducts public consultations for the development or
amendment of the CAR, the CASR, the CAOs, the MOSs, and the associated advisory
publications [17].
Discussion Paper (DP)
CASA may issue a Discussion Paper (DP), which sets out issues and possible solutions, to
seek a preliminary public comment as to whether CASA should proceed with new legislation
or should initiate a change to existing legislation. In particular, CASA is required to issue
a DP for matters of major significance.
The concept for initial consultation by way of a DP needs an approval from the Project
Sponsor. The DP is pre-released to the SCC and relevant subcommittees for comments,
before it is published for broader industry and public comments.
The Project Leader is responsible for reviewing comments. An evaluation of the DP
comments may determine whether or not CASA will proceed with the proposal.
Where CASA intends to proceed with the proposal, the consolidation of the comments,
CASA's responses, and the disposition actions are folded into the subsequent NPRM as an
Annex [17].
aFor details, refer to Appendix D.
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Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM)
A Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) is necessary for a proposal for new and amended
regulatory policies affecting the CAR, the CASR, and the CAOs. The development of an
NPRM for formal consultation purposes must be authorized by the Project Sponsor.
In most cases, the NPRM describes the proposed policy intent and outcomes rather than
detailing the specific regulations. If possible, it should include other options considered.
together with identification of the broad constraints that might make options unviable and
a cost-benefit analysis of each option.
Normally, drafts of related advisory material are developed simultaneously with the new
or amended regulations. They are incorporated into an Annex to the NPRM.
In addition, in cases when the CASR Part is newly developed and the technical speci-
fications and standards identified as applicable to the CASR Part are to be mandated by
way of a MOS, the MOS is also developed simultaneously. In such a case, a proposed draft
MOS will be incorporated into an Annex to the NPRM.
An NPRM is pre-released to the SCC and relevant subcommittees for comments, before
it is published for broader industry and public comments. The Project Sponsor gives a final
approval for publishing the NPRM.
Currently, regulatory development policy allows eight weeks for the comment period of
the NPRM. After the comment period closes, the Project Team consolidates all comments
and prepares a Summary of Responses (SOR) that describes the comments received and how
they were disposed of. This will be published in a Notice of Final Rule Making (NFRM).
After the final policy has been established with the authorization by the Project Sponsor,
final drafting instructions will be sent to the OLDP. The drafted regulations will then also be
made available to the aviation industry and public for further comments prior to finalization
of the regulations.
In cases when an existing MOS is amended, all proposed amendments must be made
available to the public. The public consultation on proposed amendments to the MOS takes
the form of a Notice of Proposed Change (NPC) and follows a process similar to that for
NPRMs. As for advisory materials, they are published in draft form for comments before
they are finalized [17].
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Notice of Final Rule Making (NFRM)
At the conclusion of the consultation process, the Notice of Final Rule Making (NFRM) is
published. The NFRM closes the consultation on the particular proposal.
The NFRM includes the final regulation and an SOR. It may be accompanied by a final
relevant MOS and all advisory materials, if any. If necessary, an RIS is finalized after the
draft NFRM is prepared.
As with an NPRM, an NFRM is pre-released to the SCC and relevant subcommittees
for comments, before it is published for broader industry and public comment. In addition,
when a new CASR Part is being developed, a RAP is convened to conduct an independent
review of the final regulations. The RAP is not intended to conduct a general review of
technical or policy content relating to the particular CASR Part. Rather, the RAP reviews
whether Government and CASA policies for regulatory development were followed in the
development process. The Project Sponsor gives the final approval for publishing the NFR.M.
In cases when an existing MOS is amended, the final MOS is published in the form of
a Notice of Final Change (NFC), and its publication follows a process similar to that for
NFRMs [17].
6.3.4 Regulatory Impact Analysis Requirements
The Australian Government has adopted a three-tiered system for assessing all regulatory
and quasi-regulatory proposalsb [5].
As for the legislations related to CASA, proposals to amend the Civil Aviation Act 1998,
the CAR, and the CASR and regulatory changes passed through as Civil Aviation Orders
are subject to this requirement [17].
To determine which level of analysis is appropriate, a preliminary assessment must be
undertaken for all proposals.
For proposals that will have no or low impacts on business and individuals or the
economy (including no or low compliance costs), no additional regulatory analysis or
documentation is required.
bThe Best Practice Regulation Handbook of the Australian Government [5] explains "Quasi-regulations"
as follows: "Quasi-regulation includes a wide range of rules or arrangements where governments influence
businesses and individuals to comply, but which do not form part of explicit government regulation. Broadly.
whenever the Government takes action that puts pressure on businesses to act in a particular way. the
Government action may be quasi-regulatory."
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" For proposals that are likely to involve medium business compliance costs, a full
(quantitative) assessment of the compliance cost implications must be carried out
using the Business Cost Calculator (BCC) or an approved equivalent.
" For proposals that are likely to have a significant impact on business and individuals
or the economy (whether in the form of compliance costs or other impacts), a more
detailed analysis must be undertaken and documented in a Regulation Impact State-
ment (RIS). If the impacts include medium or significant business compliance costs,
the RIS should include a full (quantitative) assessment of these costs using the BCC
or an approved equivalent.
Figure 6-1 shows the three-tiered system.
TIER 3 TIER 3RIS required - analysing costs,
benefits and risks of alternative
Significant ................... approaches, including
impacts compliance costs, if applicable.
TIER 2
Medium
compliance costs but.................BCC used to estimate
minor overall impact compliance costs.
TIER I Use BCC Quickscan or
No or low impact determine if any compliance costs.
Also determine if any competition
impacts.
Figure 6-1: Three-tiered system of Regulatory Impact Analysis in the Australian Govern-
ment [17]
Below are descriptions of the assessments conducted in a preliminary assessment [5], [17].
Business Compliance Costs Assessment
As the first step of the preliminary assessment, Business Compliance Costs Assessment
identifies whether the proposal will impose compliance costs on business. Compliance costs
are defined as the direct costs to businesses of performing the various tasks associated with
complying with government regulations.
In the assessment, whether the proposal involves any of nine categories of compliance
tasks are examined. These nine categories are: (1) Notification, (2) Education, (3) Per-
mission, (4) Purchase Cost, (5) Record Keeping, (6) Enforcement, (7) Publication and
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Documentation, (8) Procedural, and (9) Other. If the proposal involves any of the nine
categories, then, whether the impact on business is low, medium, or significant is assessed.
In general, compliance costs to business would be low when only a few businesses are
affected and the costs are negligible or trivial. Proposals that have a broad impact (that
is. affect a large number of businesses), or involve a cost per business that is not negligible
(in relation to the size of businesses involved), would not be considered to generate low
compliance cost impacts.
Assessment of Other Impacts on Business and Individuals or the Economy
As the second step of the preliminary assessment, the assessment of whether the pro-
posal will have any other potential impacts on business and individuals or the economy is
conducted.
"Other impacts" capture the range of impacts a proposal may have that may not be
classified as a compliance cost. They include financial and non-financial impacts, direct
and indirect impacts, and market and non-market impacts, and they may be positive or
negative. For example, questions that need to be answered in the assessment include the fol-
lowing: (1) Whether the proposal will potentially affect the number and range of businesses
in an industry. (2) Whether the proposal will potentially change the ability of businesses
to compete. and (3) Whether the proposal will potentially alter the incentives for business
to compete.
Below are descriptions of the BCC Report and the RIS [5], [17].
BCC Report
The BCC Report contains a full assessment of the compliance cost of policy options. The
BCC is an IT-based tool designed to assist policy officers in estimating business compliance
costs of various policy options.
Based on the information on the policy options entered by policy officers, the BCC
provides a range of reports about compliance costs, including compliance costs by task,
compliance costs by cost categories, a summary report of total compliance costs, and a
summary of supporting evidence. The BCC Report is an executive summary of these
reports.
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While there is no formal requirement to publicly release the BCC Reports, the govern-
ment agencies and departments are strongly encouraged to do so. Where there are likely
to be significant compliance costs, the quantification of these costs will form part of the RIS.
Regulation Impact Statement (RIS)
An RIS is a document which formalizes and provides evidence of the key steps taken in
accordance with the Government's best practice regulation principles. It includes an as-
sessment of the costs and benefits of each option, followed by a recommendation supporting
the most effective and efficient option. An RIS should be prepared following consultation
with affected parties, and it ensures that all relevant information is documented, and that
the decision-making processes are made explicit and transparent.
An RIS has seven elements which set out:
(1) The problem or issues that give rise to the need for action;
(2) The desired objectives;
(3) The regulatory and/or non-regulatory options that may constitute viable means for
achieving the desired objectives;
(4) An assessment of impact (costs, benefits and, where relevant, levels of risk) on con-
sumers, business, government, and the community of each option;
(5) A consultation statement;
(6) A recommended option; and
(7) A strategy to implement and review the preferred option.
There are a number of additional elements that may be required in an RIS, depending
on the nature of the proposal. While there is no formal requirement to publicly release the
RIS, government agencies and departments are strongly encouraged to do so.
The Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) has outlined the following key steps to
be followed for an RIA to meet the government requirements [5]., [171. Figure 6-2 shows the
key steps.
Step 1: Analyze the problem
The first step is to examine the problem to be addressed. identify the Government's
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STEP 1
Analyse
the problem
STEP 2
Undertake a
preliminary
assessment
STEP 3
Consult with
the OBPR
Figure 6-2: Steps for Regulation Impact Analysis in the Australian Government [17]
objectives, and consider all feasible options (non-regulatory and regulatory) to achieve
the objectives. If only non-regulatory options are considered, no further regulatory
analysis is required.
Step 2: Undertake an assessment
The second step is a preliminary assessment to identify whether the proposal will
have any business compliance costs and whether it will have any impacts on business
and individuals or the economy. If the preliminary assessment indicates the proposal
will have no or low compliance costs and no or low other impacts on business and
individuals or the economy, no further regulatory analysis is required.
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Step 3: Consult with the OBPR
Once the preliminary assessment indicates that there may be medium or significant
compliance costs or medium or significant other impacts on business and individuals,
or the economy, the OBPR should be consulted through the Regulatory Impact An-
alyst. The OBPR determines whether a BCC Report and/or an RIS is required as
follows:
" The proposal is likely to have no/low impacts and no further analysis is required;
" The proposal is likely to have medium compliance costs and a quantitative as-
sessment of compliance costs should be prepared using the BCC or an approved
equivalent; or
" The proposal is likely to have significant impacts on business and individuals, or
the economy, and an RIS should be prepared, which may be required to include
a quantitative assessment of business compliance costs.
The Australian Government has decided that, in the absence of exceptional circum-
stances as agreed by the Prime Minister, a regulatory proposal which falls within the
last two cases listed above cannot proceed to the Cabinet or other decision makers
unless it has complied with the regulatory impact analysis requirements [5], [17].
6.3.5 Annual Regulatory Plan
The Australian Government requires all agencies, including CASA, to prepare and publish
an Annual Regulatory Plan to provide stakeholders with an early indication of potential
regulatory changes. Proposals requiring further analysis such as a BCC Report or RIS
and reviews of regulations should be included in the plan. The plan contains information
about recent changes to existing legislation and planned regulatory activities, including
a description of the issue, information about consultation opportunities, and an expected
timetable [5], [17].
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Chapter 7
Japan
7.1 Organizations
7.1.1 Civil Aviation Authority: Civil Aviation Bureau of Japan (JCAB)
The Civil Aviation Bureau of Japan (JCAB) is one of the 13 bureaus of the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), which oversights the civil aviation
activities in Japan. The authority of the MLIT on civil aviation derives mainly from the
Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and
the Civil Aeronautics Act.
The bureau conducts various functions related to civil aviation, such as negotiation for
air agreements with foreign countries, formulation of airport policies, and promulgation
of the safety regulations. The bureau consists of four departments., and the Engineering
Department is mainly responsible for the safety regulations of aircraft and its operations.
7.1.2 Investigation Authority: Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB)
The Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) is one of the external organ of the MLIT, and
conducts investigations of aircraft, marine and railway accidents and serious incidents. The
authority of the Board derives from the Act for the Establishment of the Japan Transport
Safety Board. The Board consists of the chairperson and 12 members, who shall be ap-
pointed by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism with the consent
of both Houses of the Diet. The Minister may appoint part-time Expert Advisors.
Historically, the aircraft accident investigation had been conducted by Aircraft Accident
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Investigation Division within the Ministry of Transport in Japan. For serious accidents for
which the division lacked enough resources to conduct the investigation, an ad-hoc investi-
gation team comprised of the staff from the Civil Aviation Bureau, the staff from airlines
and academic experts was formed for each accident. In 1974, Aircraft Accident Investigation
Division was abolished, and the Aircraft Accidents Investigation Commission (AAIC) was
established as a permanent council within the Ministry. In 2000, railway accident investi-
gation was also mandated by the Diet to the AAIC, and the name of the commission was
changed to the Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission (ARAIC).
In 2008, the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) was newly established as an external
organ of the MLIT by the integration of the ARAIC and the Japan Marine Accident Inquiry
Agency (JMAIA)At the same time, the power of the JTSB was enhanced compared with the
power the ARAIC had. For example, the ARAIC was only able to make recommendations
to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, whereas the JTSB is also
able to make recommendations to other organizations involved and is able to request reports
from them [83]. In the year 2008, the JTSB had 181 staff members [59].
7.2 Reporting and Investigation Systems
In Japan, other than an accident and serious incident reporting and investigation system
by the JTSB, the JCAB has a mandatory incident reporting system as well as a mandatory
Service Difficulty Reporting System. As regards the voluntary reporting systems, there is
the Aviation Safety Information Network (ASI-NET), which is managed by a third party
organization.
7.2.1 Accident and Serious Incident Reporting and Investigation System
Article 76 of Civil Aeronautics Act stipulates that the pilot in command or the operator of
the Aircraft shall report to the Minister of Land, Infrastructure. Transport and Tourism in
the event of any of the following accidents.
(i) Crash, collision, or fire of aircraft
(ii) Injury or death of any person, or destruction of any object caused by aircraft
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(iii) Death (except those specified in Ordinances of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure.
Transport and Tourism) or disappearance of any person on board the aircraft
(iv) Contact with other aircraft
(v) Other accidents relating to aircraft specified in Ordinances of the Ministry of Land.
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
The Ordinance for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act specifies the exception of death
in item (iii) as follows:
(i) Death from natural causes
(ii) Death from self-infliction or infliction by other persons
(iii) Death of those hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew
The Ordinance specifies the other accidents relating to aircraft in item (v) as the events
where aircraft during flight sustains damage which would require major repair, except when
the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories, propellers, wing tips, an-
tennas, tires, brakes, or fairings (Article 165-3).
Article 76-2 of the Act stipulates that the pilot in command or the operators of the
aircraft shall report the serious incidents to the Minister, and the Ordinance lists the types of
serious incidents to be reported. (Refer to Appendix B, Section B.4, Subsection B.4.1.) The
Near Midair Collision (NMAC), which is defined as "an event when the pilot in command
has recognized during flight that there was a danger of collision or contact with any other
aircraft" is included in Article 76-2.
The Act for Establishment of the Japan Transport Safety Board, which stipulates the
mandate of the JTSB and the procedures to be followed in the investigations, stipulates that
the Minister shall report to the JTSB when the Minister receives a report of an accident or
a serious incident.
In accordance with the Act for Establishment of the Japan Transport Safety Board,
the Board investigates all the accidents and serious incidents reported by the Minister.
The JTSB does not have such a party system as the NTSB has. and the JCAB does not
participate in the investigation process unless the JTSB requests the assistance from the
Minister.
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Investigative Priority
The Act does not stipulate the priority of the JTSB in the accident investigation over other
government agencies such as the police. The police can enter the scene of accident and
conduct an independent investigation. Therefore, a conflict between the JTSB and the
police can arise during an investigation.
In order to avoid such a conflict, the Ministry of Transport and the National Police
Agency (NPA) signed a memorandum in 1972, and the AAIC and the NPA set the related
detailed rules in 1975. According to the memorandum, when the AAIC enters the scene
of the accident, the office of the aircraft operator. or any other places deemed necessary,
examines the aircraft wreckage or related materials, or interrogates the person involved,
unless such an action does not interfere with the investigation by the police, the AAIC
must consult the police beforehand and must perform such an action to the extent that it
does not interfere with the investigation by the police [62].
In addition, according to the detailed rules, it is the police that preserves the scene of
the accident in principle. When both the AAIC and the police need to take custody of the
aircraft wreckage or related materials, the policy takes custody of it based on the Code of
Criminal Procedure. As for electric devices such as an FDR or a Cockpit Voice Recorder
for which prompt analysis is needed, the police will entrust the analysis to the ARAIC as
soon as the police takes custody of it [62].
In 2008, after the establishment of the JTSB, the MLIT and the NPA confirmed the
validity of the memorandum of 1972 and signed a new memorandum, which states that
neither agency has priority over the other. In the same year, the JTSB and the NPA set
the new detailed rules on investigation, which are substantially the same as the rules set in
1975 [91].
Final Report and Safety Recommendations
After the investigation, the JTSB submits a report to the Minister and publishes it (Article
25). The JTSB may issue safety recommendations to the Minister and other relevant
organizations. The Minister shall report the corrective actions which have been taken to
the Board, and the organizations shall also do so if requested (Article 26 and 27).
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7.2.2 Incident Reporting and Investigation System
Article 111-4 of the Civil Aeronautics Act stipulates that domestic air carriers shall, when
an occurrence which affects normal flight operations of aircraft takes place, report the
occurrence to the Minister. Article 221-2 of the Ordinance lists the types of the incidents to
be reported. (Refer to Appendix B, Section B.4, Subsection B.4. 1.) This article was added to
the Act in October 2006, intended to supplement the accident and serious incident reporting
to the JTSB.
Advisory Circular No.6-001 [75) and No.6-002 [76] impose additional reporting require-
ments. In accordance with the requirements of Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention, Ad-
visory Circular 6-001 imposes on the operators of aeroplanes over 5,700 kg and helicopters
over 3,175 kg maximum certificated takeoff mass the reporting requirements of the occur-
rences listed in the circular to the JCAB and to the organizations responsible for aircraft or
aircraft components design. (For the list of the occurrences, refer to Appendix B, Section
B.4, Subsection B.4.2.)
On the other hand, Advisory Circular No.6-002 requires the operators of aircraft, the
organizations or those engaged in the repair or maintenance of the aircraft, aircraft com-
ponents, equipment., parts, and emergency equipments to report the occurrences listed in
the circular. (For the list of the occurrences, refer to Appendix B, Section B.4, Subsection
B.4.3.) Some occurrences listed in Article 221-2 of the Ordinance and the Advisory Circulars
are duplicative, yet a dual reporting is not necessary [761.
The operators can submit reports required by the Ordinance and Advisory Circular
No.6-001 through the Internet to the Aviation Safety Information Management and Service
(ASIMS) system installed in the JCAB. The descriptions that can be used to identify the
individuals are removed from the reports. The reporters can access the de-identified reports
including the one submitted in accordance with Advisory Circular 6-002 and other safety
information posted in the ASIMS system [78].
For reference, the number of reports submitted in compliance with Article 111-4 of the
Civil Aeronautics Act was 740 in the fiscal year 2007 and 856 in the fiscal year 2008 [79),[80).
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Analysis
The JCAB conducts a statistical analysis on reports, particularly the ones submitted by
the requirements of the Ordinance, and a detailed analysis of reports on the occurrence
which it judges can significantly affect the safety of operations of aircraft. The JCAB also
monitors the corrective actions for these reports taken by the operators.
Further, the JCAB established the Aviation Safety Information Analysis Committee,
which is comprised of academic experts, experts from a broad range of aviation community
and representatives from the JCAB. The committee analyzes the selected reports in detail,
up to the root causes of occurrences including the organizational backgrounds that are
deemed to have contributed the occurrences, and considers the measures to prevent the
recurrence. The measures are later reflected in policies of the JCAB [80].
7.2.3 Aviation Safety Information Network (ASI-NET)
Aviation Safety Information Network (ASI-NET) is a confidential voluntary reporting sys-
tem. The ASI-NET was established in order to collect the incident information in an
integrated fashion, which had been done separately by some airlines, and to share the
information among the airlines [2].
The ASI-NET has two separate networks: one for large aircraft for scheduled operation
and one for Small Aircraft. The ASI-NET for Large Aircraft started to operate in 1999,
and the ASI-NET for Small Aircraft started in 2004 [2]. At present, 19 airlines are partici-
pating in the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft, and 50 organizations other than the airlines are
participating in the ASI-NET for Small Aircraft [3].
Management
The management organization of the ASI-NET comprises of the Management Office, the
Steering Committee, and the Working Groups. The Management Office was established at
the Association of Air Transport Engineering and Research (ATEC). The ATEC is a non-
profit foundation established in 1989 with financial contributions from major airlines and is
under the supervision of the MLIT. The role of the ATEC is to contribute to development
of safe and efficient air transportation through research and educational activities [1].
Two corporate aggregates. the Japan Aircraft Pilot Association (JAPA) and the All
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Japan Air Transport and Service Association, and a government research organization, the
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), collaborate with the Management Office [2].
The Steering Committee determines the overall policy on the management of the ASI-
NET and deliberates and approves the recommendations or requests to relevant organi-
zations drafted by the Working Groups. The Steering Committee has about 10 members
and is comprised of aviation experts, human factor experts, legal experts, representatives
from the pilot associations, and persons in charge of safety from the airlines. Neutrality and
independence from the JCAB are assured for the Steering Committee.
The Working Groups analyze reports, draft the recommendation or request to relevant
organizations. There are two separate working groups for the ASI-NET. The Working Group
for the ASI-NET for the Large Aircraft has about 10 members and is comprised of pilots
and ground personnel in charge of safety in participating airlines. The Working Group for
the ASI-NET for Small Aircraft has about seven members and is comprised of pilots from
the All Japan Air Transport and Service Association and the JAPA as well as researchers
from the JAXA [2].
Reports
In the ASI-NET, individuals cannot report to the network directly. In the ASI-NET for
Large Aircraft, pilots and flight engineers of participating airlines can report to the net-
work through the internal reporting system of their company. In the ASI-NET for Small
Aircraft, employees or constituent members of the participating organizations can report
to the network through their organizations. Those who do not belong to the participating
organizations of the network can report to the network through the JAPA [2].
The number of reports submitted to the ASI-NET by year is shown in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Number of reports submitted to the ASI-NET (Data Source: [2])
System (Network)
ASI-NET for Large Aircraft
ASI-NET for Small Aircraft
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In addition to the incident information not required to be reported by statute, the ASI-
NET for Large Aircraft also collects the information required to be reported by statute if it
is related to human error or believed to be worth sharing. However, reports of violation of
regulations that are deliberate or reports that accuse other people are not accepted under
both ASI-NET networks [2].
Analysis
The Working Groups analyze the reports, identify the causes, and discuss the measures to
be taken. The reports are de-identified before the Working Groups analyzes them.
Based on the analysis, the Working Groups draft the recommendations or requests
to the JCAB, airlines, the JAPA, and other organizations responsible for aviation safety.
The Steering Committee deliberates the proposal from the Working Groups and gives final
approval for publication. From 2001 to 2008, the ASI-NET proposed 10 recommendations
or requests [2].
Confidentiality and Data Protection
For the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft, each airline validates reports, selects the data to enter
the database, de-identifies reports, and enters the selected data into the database. For the
ASI-NET for Small Aircraft, on receiving reports, the Management Office of the ASI-NET
validates its content. The office contacts the reporters or the organizations they belong to,
if applicable. After the validation of the content, the office removes the information that
could lead to the identification of the reporters, and enters the data into the database with
the approval of its Working Group [2].
Since the ATEC is not a government agency, the Freedom of Information Act in Japan
does not apply to it. Further, the JCAB has expressed in writing its policy regarding the
ASI-NET as follows:
* The JCAB will not directly access the information which has been provided to the
ASI-NET nor demand the information from the administrator of the ASI-NET.
* Even if the JCAB happens to know the information which has been provided to the
ASI-NET in some way, the JCAB will not take administrative actionsa based solely on
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the information nor demand that information from the administrator of the ASI-NET
with an aim of taking administrative actions [2].
The second item listed above can be interpreted to mean that immunity from the ad-
ministrative actions is not guaranteed to the reporter in case there is sufficient evidence
indicating the violations of the regulations. In addition, criminal acts are outside the scope
of its protection [2].
Database Utilization
Participating organizations in the ASI-NET can access the database and the utilization
of data is left at their discretion. Some companies disseminate the information to the
employees via each company's media. The database is not available to the general public
[2].
Publication of Safety Bulletin
The ASI-NET for Large Aircraft does not publish the safety bulletin. Only the ASI-NET
for Small Aircraft publishes the safety bulletin called FEEDBACK with an approval from
its Working Group [2].
7.3 Rulemaking Process
7.3.1 Legal Structures
Civil Aeronautics Act
The Civil Aeronautics Act, enacted in 1952, stipulates most of activities related to civil
aviation such as aircraft registration. certification of the aircraft. certification of airmen, air
traffic rules, and airport design. The Act also includes the commercial regulations, such as
the provisions on the conditions of carriage established by the air carrier. Detailed rules
are mainly left to the Ordinance for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act.
The Act falls under the responsibility of the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport
and Tourism. The bills to amend the Act are normally drafted by the JCAB and are
submitted to the Diet by the Prime Minister on behalf of the Cabinet. Before being brought
a"Administrative actions" used here include the suspension and revocation of the certification
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to the Cabinet Meetings for decisions, the bills must clear the legal examination by the
Cabinet Legislation Bureau. The bills must be passed by both Houses of Diet, and the new
law are promulgated by the Emperor [74].
Cabinet Order for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act
The Cabinet Order for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act sets the rules to enforce the
Act or designates the coverage of the Act. The Cabinet Order is enacted by the Cabinet
on the basis of authorization by the Act.
Drafts to amend the Order must clear the legal examination by the Cabinet Legisla-
tion Bureau before being brought to Cabinet Meetings for decisions. After enacted by the
Cabinet, the Cabinet Orders are promulgated by the Emperor [74].
Ordinance for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act
The Ordinance for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act is issued by the Minister on the ba-
sis of authorization by the Act and for the purpose of implementing the Act. The Ordinance
also sets the rules to enforce the Act or designates the coverage of the Act.
Public Notices
The Public Notices are issued by the Minister to notify the public of various decisions, such
as the coverage of the Act or the Ordinance. As with the Act, Cabinet Order, and the
Ordinance, the Public Notices are published in the Official Gazette.
Advisory Circulars (ACs)
The Advisory Circulars (ACs) are non-binding materials issued by the JCAB that illustrate
the meaning of the Act and the Ordinance and demonstrate acceptable methods of com-
pliance with these legislations. The AC is developed by the JCAB office having primary
responsibility for the subject of the AC.
7.3.2 Main Participants in Rulemaking Process
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Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism sets the overall policy and
direction for regulatory development activities and approves bills and drafts of Cabinet Or-
ders to be brought to Cabinet Meetings. He/she also issues Ordinances and Public Notices.
Minister's Secretariat manages regulatory activities across the Ministry and provides legal
support.
General Affairs Division of the JCAB
The General Affairs Division of the JCAB manages regulatory activities across the bureau
and provides legal support. It serves as a liaison between the bureau and the Minister's
Secretariat.
Operational Divisions
Operational divisions initiate a rulemaking process that falls within their jurisdiction. They
provide a team leader and staff for a Project Team.
Project Team
The Project Team consists of staff provided by the relevant Operating Divisions. When
deemed necessary, industry experts are invited to participate in the Project Team.
Cabinet Legislation Bureau
The Cabinet Legislation Bureau provides legal support for the Cabinet. It examines the
bills drafted by the Ministries, drafts of Cabinet Orders, and drafts of treaties. It also
gives opinions on legal issues to the Cabinet. The bills to amend the Civil Aeronautics Act
and the drafts to amend the Cabinet Order for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act are
examined before being brought to the Cabinet Meetings for decisions [74].
7.3.3 Public Consultation Requirements
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sets out common rules concerning procedures
for dispositions, administrative guidance and notifications, and procedures for rulemaking,
which the Administrative Agencies must follow.
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Among the rules related to the JCAB, the following are subject to public consultation
requirements of the APA: the Cabinet Order for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act and
the Ordinance for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act as well as the Public Notices which
set out the requirements for administrative dispositions and the Advisory Circulars which
set out review standards for applications seeking permissions or approvals, administrative
disposition standards, and Administrative Guidance guidelines.
Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM)
The APA stipulates that when the Cabinet or Administrative Organs establishes orders,
regulations, review standards, disposition standards, and public Guidance guidelines, it
shall publish the proposal together with its related materials.
The consultation period must be 30 days or more except when there are some compelling
grounds. In such a case, the grounds must be shown at the same time as the publication of
the NPRM. After the consultation period closes, the JCAB consolidates received comments,
determines how they are disposed of, and prepares a summary of responses.
Final Rule
After the preparation of a summary of responses, the JCAB publishes the final rule. In
particular, the JCAB publishes the amendment to the Cabinet Order and the Ordinance
and the new or amendment to Public Notices in the Official Gazette. The APA stipulates
that the Cabinet or Administrative Organs shall publish a summary of responses at the
same time as the publication of the final rule.
Direct Final Rule
The APA stipulates that the NPRM procedure can be dispensed with in such cases as
when there is an urgent need to establish rules for public interest and when merely a minor
technical amendment is involved. In such cases, the Administrative Organs shall publish
the grounds for it at the same time as the publication of the final rule.
Notice of Withdrawal
The APA stipulates that the Cabinet or Administrative Organs must publish a notice
promptly when it determines to withdraw a proposal even though an NPRM was issued.
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7.3.4 Regulatory Impact Analysis Requirements
The Government Policy Evaluation Act stipulates that the Administrative Organs shall
carry out the ex-ante evaluation when they set policies that meet the following criteria.
(1) It is expected that administrative act pursuant to the policy has considerable impact
on the lives of people and/or society and the economy, or a large amount of expense
is incurred before the aims of the policy are achieved.
(2) It is established knowledge that the methods for acquiring information on the Effects
of Policy and other methodologies required for the conduct of Ex-ante Evaluation
have been developed.
The Cabinet Order for Enforcement of the Government Policy Evaluation Act sets
the scope of the policies that are subject to the evaluation. Specifically. the policies that
intend to newly develop, abolish, or modify the regulation by the establishment, revision or
abolition of Acts or Cabinet Orders are included in the scope. With respect to policies that
are not covered by the Government Policy Evaluation Act, the Administrative Organs are
also encouraged to conduct an evaluation.
After a policy evaluation, the Administrative Organs shall prepare, publish, and forward
a report to the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications. The report should include:
Purpose, contents and necessity of the regulation
Other options
Whenever possible, other options including non-regulatory one should be presented.
Analysis of cost and benefit of the regulation
The cost and benefit of the regulation should be quantified whenever possible. Partic-
ularly, the analysis of the cost of the proposal should include the estimated compliance
cost of businesses and administrative cost, together with the bearer of the cost. The
impacts on competition conditions for businesses or the impacts on the environment
should also be taken into account. If applicable, the analysis of the cost and benefit
of other options should also be included.
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Result of the evaluation
Result of the deliberations of advisory councils or opinions of knowledgeable persons
When there is a result of the deliberations of advisory councils or opinions of knowl-
edgeable persons regarding the result of the analysis, they should also be included.
Related information on such things as the references or the data used in the evaluation
should also be included.
Time and conditions of policy review
The time and conditions when a review will be conducted to determine whether the
established policy is appropriate in light of socioeconomic circumstances should be
included [81].
In cases in which the development, revision or abolition of regulations is based on an
act, the Administrative Organs should publish a report before the bill to amend the act
is brought to the Cabinet Meetings for decisions. In cases when it is based on an Cabinet
order or other subordinate legislations, they should include a report in the NPRM of the
proposed regulation [81].
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Chapter 8
Comparisons
This chapter conducts a comparative analysis of the feedback systems of the four states.
In previous chapters, the reporting and investigation systems in each state were described.
In addition, as one sort of corrective actions which are taken responding to the safety risk
identified, the rulemaking processes in each Civil Aviation Authority were also described.
Accordingly, this chapter is divided into two sections; in the first section, a comparative
analysis of the reporting and investigation systems is presented. In the second section, a
comparative analysis of the rulemaking process is presented.
8.1 Reporting and Investigation Systems
This section presents a comparison of the reporting and investigation systems in each state.
First of all, this section describes that there are no substantial differences of the structure
of the reporting and investigation system and the definition of the accident which must be
reported to the Investigation Authority in each state.
Next, this section discusses a number of differences identified in the reporting and inves-
tigation systems. The thesis identified that there are differences in the threshold of incidents
and other safety-related occurrences which must be reported to the Investigation Authority
and Civil Aviation Authority. This thesis also identified that there are differences in the air
proximity hazard reporting and investigation system in each state. The differences identi-
fied include a scope of air proximity hazard occurrences to be reported and investigated.
whether reporting is mandatory or voluntary, and to whom the occurrences are reported.
In addition, this section discusses differences in voluntary reporting systems in each
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state. Several differences were identified regarding the voluntary reporting systems, and
each difference is presented in order. Furthermore, this section discusses the exchange of
safety information between states.
Lastly, this thesis also identified a difference of how establishment of flight data analysis
programs by airlines has been implemented in each state. This section concludes with a
discussion of the policy implications which the difference has.
8.1.1 Structures of Reporting and Investigation Systems
As regards the structures of reporting and investigation systems in each state, it was found
that there are no substantial differences among the four states. That is, in accordance with
Annex 8 and Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention, all of the four states have the accident
and serious incident reporting and investigation system of the Investigation Authority as
well as the incident reporting and investigation systems of Civil Aviation Authority.
In addition, although Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention leaves the establishment of
voluntary reporting systems at contracting states' discretion, the four states have at least
one voluntary reporting systems as shown in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1: Voluntary reporting systems in each state
State Voluntary Reporting System
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
U.S. Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP)
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP)
U.K. Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP)
REPCON
Australia
Aviation Self Reporting Scheme (ASRS)
Japan Aviation Safety Information Network (ASI-NET)
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8.1.2 Definitions of Accidents which must be Reported to the Investiga-
tion Authority
A comparison of the definitions of the accidents which must be reported to the Investigation
Authority in each state was conducted. The regulations which define the accidents in each
state are summarized in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2: Regulations which define the accidents
State Regulations
U.S. 49 CFR Part 830 (Section 830.2)
EU Council Directive 94/56/EC (Article 3)
U.K.
Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1997 (Regulation 2-1)
Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (Section 3 and Section 23)
Australia
Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003 (Regulation 2.3 and 2.4)
Civil Aeronautics Act (Article 76)
Japan
Ordinance for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act (Article 165-3)
Through a comparison of the regulations in Table 8.2, it was observed that there are
no substantial differences among the definitions of the accidents in each state, all of which
basically follow the definition by ICAO (Refer to Subsection 3.2.1). That is, the accident is
defined as an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft, in which a person is
fatally or serious injured, the aircraft receives substantial damage, or the aircraft is missing
or completely inaccessible.
8.1.3 Threshold of Incidents which must be Reported to the Investigation
Authority
A comparison of the threshold of incidents which must be reported to the Investigation
Authority in each state was conducted. The regulations which define the incidents or list
the examples of the incidents which must be reported to the Investigation Authority in each
state are summarized in Table 8.3.
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Table 8.3: Regulations which define the incidents or list the examples of the incidents which
must be reported to the Investigation Authority
State IRegulations
U.S. 49 CFR Part 830 (Section 830.5)
EU Council Directive 94/56/EC (Article 3 and Annex)
U.K.
Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 1997 (Regulation 2-1)
Australia Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003 (Regulation 2.3 and 2.4)
Civil Aeronautics Act (Article 76-2)
Japan
Ordinance for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act (Article 166-4)
Through a comparison of the regulations in Table 8.3, two unique characteristics of
Australia were observed.
1. The incidents which are required to be reported to the Investigation Authority are
divided into two categories: the incidents which are required to be reported immedi-
ately ("Immediately Reportable Matters"), and the incidents which are not required
to be reported immediately but are required to be reported within 72 hours ("Routine
Reportable Matters").
2. Routine Reportable Matters for air transport operation include the incidents which
are not considered serious incidents defined by ICAO, that is, "an incident involving
circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred."
On the other hand, in the other three states, all reportable incidents must be reported
immediately and are considered serious incidents defined by ICAO.
A rough comparison of the Immediately Reportable Matters and Routine Reportable
Matters with the accidents defined by ICAO and the list of examples of serious incidents
provided by ICAO is shown in Table 8.4.
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Table 8.4: A rough comparison of the Immediately Reportable Matters and Routine Re-
portable Matters in Australia with the accidents defined by ICAO and the list of examples
of serious incidents provided by ICAO
Air Transport Operations Other Operations
Immediately Reportable Matters Accidents and Serious Incidents Accidents
Routine Reportable Matters Other Incidents Serious Incidents
The incidents of air transport operations which are required to be reported to the
Investigation Authority as "Routine Reportable Matters" in Australia but are not required
to be reported to the Investigation Authorities in the other states include:
" Misinterpretation by a flight crew member of information or instructions;
" Breakdown of coordination, being an occurrence in which traffic related information
flow within the air traffic service system is late. incorrect, incomplete, or absent;
" Failure or inadequacy of an air traffic control service or navigation facility; and
* An occurrence arising from incorrect loading of passengers, baggage or cargo.
These incidents are covered by mandatory reporting systems of the Civil Aviation Au-
thorities or voluntary reporting systems in the other states.
An accident of air transport aircraft can become a major accident involving a large
number of fatalities. The case of Australia suggests that the incidents reportable to the
Investigation Authority can be flexibly set taking account of two things: (1) the likelihood
that safety lessons to prevent major accidents can be expected from the investigation and
(2) the amount of available resources of the Investigation Authority and the Civil Aviation
Authority.
8.1.4 Threshold of Incidents and Other Safety-related Occurrences which
must be Reported to the Civil Aviation Authority
A comparison of the the incidents and other safety-related occurrences which must be
reported to the Civil Aviation Authority in each state was conducted. The regulations
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which define the incidents and other safety-related occurrences which must be reported to
the Civil Aviation Authority or which list the examples of those in each state are summarized
in Table 8.5.
Table 8.5: Regulations which define the incidents and other safety-related occurrences which
must be reported to the Civil Aviation Authority or which list the examples of those
State C Regulations
14 CFR Part 21(Sec 21.3)
14 CFR Part 121(See 121.703)
U.S. 14 CFR Part 125 (Sec 125.409)
14 CFR Part 135 (Sec 135.415)
14 CFR Part 145 (Sec 145.221)
U.K. CAP 382 "MOR Scheme" (Annex)
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Regulation 21.003)
Australia Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (Regulation 51A)
Civil Aviation Advisory Publication 51-1 (1) (Section 1 and Appendix A)
Civil Aeronautics Act (Article 111-4)
Ordinance for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act (Article 221-2)
Japan
Advisory Circular No. 6-001 (Section 3-1)
Advisory Circular No. 6-002 (Section 3)
Based on the comparison of these regulations, it was observed that the MOR Scheme in
the U.K. requires that incidents and other safety-related occurrences in a relatively broader
scope be reported than mandatory reporting systems of the Civil Aviation Authorities in
the other states.
In all of the four states. reportable occurrences include incidents such as fire, smoke.
leakage of fuel, and engine shutdown during flight, cracks or corrosion, or other failures.
malfunctions. or defects in an aircraft, which has endangered or may endanger the safe
operation of the aircraft.
Reportable occurrences under the MOR Scheme in the U.K. which are not covered
by the mandatory reporting systems of the Civil Aviation Authorities but are covered by
the voluntary reporting systems in the other states include occurrences related to human
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errors during operation or deficiencies of procedures which could affect the safety of aircraft
operations. For example:
" Breakdown in communication between flight crew.
" Incorrect programming of, or erroneous entries into, equipment used for navigation or
performance calculations, or use of incorrect data.
* Loss of position awareness relative to actual position or to other aircraft.
" Inadequacy of any procedures designed to be used in an emergency, including when
being used for maintenance, training or test purposes.
* Misleading, incorrect or insufficient maintenance data or procedures that could lead
to maintenance errors.
The data of the number of reports submitted suggests that the MOR Scheme in the U.K.
covers a broader scope of incidents and other safety-related occurrences than mandatory
reporting systems of the Civil Aviation Authorities in the other states. Table 8.6 shows a
comparison of the number of reports submitted under the MOR Scheme of the U.K. and
the number of reports submitted in accordance with Article 111-4 of Civil Aeronautics Act
of Japan per year. In order to take into account a difference in the size of aviation activities.
numbers normalized by the flight hours of public transport are also shown.
Table 8.6: Comparison of the number of reports submittedb (Data Source: [79], [80], [821,
[119])
Number of Reports Flight Hours of Public
State System I(a)/ (b) - 105
per Year (a) Transport per Year (b)
U.K. MOR Scheme 12.000 2,700.000
Article 111-4 of
Japan 800 1.500.000
Civil Aeronautics Act
Since there are other mandatory reporting systems of the JCAB, which are prescribed
by Advisory Circular No. 6-001 and No. 6-002, making a simple comparison is misleading.
bNumber of reports per year and flight hours of per year are rough numbers.
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However, the difference in the number of reports submitted under the MOR Scheme of the
U.K. and in accordance with Article 111-4 of Civil Aeronautics Act of Japan is still big.
Setting a threshold of severity of reportable occurrences under the mandatory report-
ing systems needs careful consideration. Unlike in the voluntary reporting systems, it can
be assumed that all reportable occurrences are actually reported in mandatory reporting
systems. This ensures that the acquired data can be used for trend analysis. However,
compared to the voluntary reporting systems., the mandatory reporting systems are less
likely to identify unknown hazards because the reportable occurrences are more precisely
defined. In fact, Tamuz [99] reported a case in which the precise definitions of reportable
occurrences actually hindered reporting of the occurrence which indicated the safety risk.
As described above, mandatory reporting systems and voluntary reporting systems have
advantages and disadvantages, and they supplement each other. Therefore, the threshold
of severity of reportable occurrences under the mandatory reporting systems should be set
taking account of the advantages and disadvantages of both systems as well as the available
resources of the Civil Aviation Authorities to analyze the reports.
8.1.5 Comparison of Air Proximity Hazard Reporting and Investigation
Systems
The thesis found that, unlike other incidents, there are notable differences in the air prox-
imity hazard reporting and investigation in the four states. The differences are a scope
of air proximity hazard occurrences to be reported and investigated, whether reporting is
mandatory or voluntary, and to whom the occurrences are reported.
As regards the scope of air proximity hazard occurrences to be reported and investi-
gated, from the definitions of the air proximity hazard occurrences (Airprox or Near Midair
Collisions (NMACs)) which are to be reported in each state., it can be expected that the
U.K. and Australia collect a broader scope of these occurrences than the U.S. and Japan. In
addition, since only NMACs considered to be serious incidents must be reported in Japan,
it can also be expected that the U.S. collects a broader scope of NMACs than Japan. Fur-
thermore, it should be noted that the U.K. investigates a broader scope of the reported
Airprox than Australia.
Particularly, the most important finding in this subsection is that some Airprox actually
investigated and judged to have compromised the safety of the aircraft in the U.K. would
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not have been reported and investigated if they had happened in the U.S. or Japan.
Table 8.7 shows a summary of the air proximity hazard reporting and investigation
systems in the four states.
Table 8.7: Air Proximity Hazard Reporting and Investigation System
State Occurrence to be Reported [_Reporting Investigative Organization
U.S. NMAC Voluntary FAA Civil Aviation Authority
Mandatory CAA Civil Aviation Authority
U.K. Airprox Independent organization
Voluntary UKAB
specialized in Airprox investigation
Australia Airprox Mandatory ATSB Investigation Authority
NMAC
Japan Mandatory JTSB Investigation Authority
(only Serious Incident)
In the U.S., the NMAC reporting to the FAA is voluntary and all NMACs reported to
the FAA are thoroughly investigated by the FAA. In the U.K., the Airprox must be reported
to the CAA as one kind of incidents under the MOR Scheme. However, they can also be
voluntarily reported to the UKAB, a specialized organization for Airprox investigation, and
all Airprox reported to the UKAB are thoroughly investigated by the UKAB.
On the other hand, in Australia, all Airprox must be reported to the ATSB as im-
mediately reportable matters for air transport operations and routine reportable matters
for other operations. However, as with other transport safety matters, Airprox which are
considered to be serious incidents. as defined by Annex 13, have priority for investigation.
Lastly, in Japan, only NMACs where accidents nearly occurred must be reported to the
JTSB as a serious incident and all reported NMACs are investigated by the JTSB.
Table 8.8 summarizes the definitions of the Airprox/Near Midair Collision (NMAC) of
each state. The Airprox and NMAC are not exactly the same. An NMAC is also an Airprox
whereas an Airprox is not necessarily an NMAC [111].
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Table 8.8: Definitions of Airprox/Near Midair Collision (NMAC)
State Occurrence Definition
U.S. NMAC An incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of
collision occurs as a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft. or a
report is received from a pilot or a flight crew member that a collision hazard existed
between two or more aircraft [401.
U.K. Airprox A situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or an air traffic controller. the distance
between aircraft as well as their relative positions and speed. had been such that the
safety of the aircraft involved was or may have been compromised [69].
Australia Airprox An occurrence in which 2 or more aircraft come into such close proximity that a
threat to the safety of the aircraft exist or may exist, in airspace where the aircraft
are not subject to an air traffic separation standard or where separation is a pilot
responsibility (Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003).
Japan NMAC [An event] when [the pilot in command] has recognized during flight that there was
a danger of collision or contact with any other aircraft (Civil Aeronautics Act).
Table 8.9 shows a comparison of the numbers of Airprox/NMACs involving commer-
cial air transport and investigated by the FAA, the UKAB, and the JTSB. It supports
the argument that the U.K. and Australia collect a broader scope of the midair collision
hazard occurrences than the U.S. and Japan, and the U.S. collects a broader scope of these
occurrences than Japan.
Table 8.9: Comparison of
portd (Data Source: [22],
the numbers of Airprox/NMACs involving commercial air trans-
[82], [86], [94], [119])
Risk Year Average Average Number of I
Category 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 (a) Departures per year (b)
FAA - 48 53 55 44 42 24 24 41.4 10.811,094 0.38
A 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.4 0.04
B 14 7 12 7 7 6 5 8.3 0.72
UKAB C 65 70 54 67 78 68 60 66.0 1.151.143 5.73
D 4 4 0 4 1 0 0 1.9 0.16
Total 83 82 66 79 87 74 65 76.6 6.65
JTSB[ 3 0 3 ] o o o.9 798.212 1 0.11
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If it is assumed that there is little difference in the rates of air proximity hazard oc-
currences in these three states (this assumption is considered reasonable because there is
little difference in accident rates in these three statese), Table 8.9 indicates that the UKAB
actually collects the broadest scope of occurrences, followed by the FAA. It should also
be noted that Table 8.9 indicates that some Airprox investigated and assigned a risk "B"
(Safety not assured) by the UKAB would not have been reported and investigated if they
had happened in the U.S. or Japan.
According to Boeing, the midair collision/NMAC ranks fifth as an accident category in
terms of total number of fatalities, as shown in Figure 8-1f.
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Figure 8-1: Fatalities by a cause of fatal accidents - worldwide commercial jet fleet 1998-2007
[19]
Since subjectivity is inherent in the risk of midair collision perceived by pilots and
air traffic controllers [46], a system like the one in the U.K., where a broader scope of
occurrences are reported and thoroughly investigated, may identify unknown hazards that
could lead to more serious events.
dThe FAA data includes only the data of Part 121 Operators. No data was available in each risk category
assigned by the FAA. The JTSB data excludes the NMACs investigated as accidents. For the definition of
the risk category assigned by the UKAB. refer to Table 5.1 in Subsection 5.2.3.
eFor the accident rates of the four states. refer to Appendix A.
fBased on the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT)
Aviation Occurrence Categories.
179
8.1.6 Comparison of Voluntary Reporting Systems
Through a comparison of the voluntary reporting systems in the four states, several differ-
ences were observed. First, this thesis identified that only the VDRP of the U.S is aimed
at organizations, whereas the other voluntary reporting systems are aimed at individuals.
Next, this thesis identified that the voluntary reporting systems whose targets are indi-
viduals can be classified into three types. This thesis also identified that the management
organizations of the voluntary reporting systems can be classified into three categories. In
addition, this thesis identified that there is a difference in terms of whether or not limited
immunity from enforcement actions by the CAA is provided. Data will be presented which
indicates that limited immunity does indeed encourage voluntary reporting. This thesis
also identified that there is a difference in terms of persons covered by the systems, the
processing of security reports, and the degree of database utilization.
Target of Reporting Systems (Organizations or Individuals)
Among the voluntary reporting systems studied, only the VDRP of the U.S. is aimed
at organizations (companies' management), not individuals. The possibility was pointed
out that a company's management can suppress the release of information by company's
employees to the CAA for fear of enforcement actions against the company's management by
the CAA [62]. The VDRP of the U.S provides limited immunity from enforcement actions
against organizations, and it expects that organizations are encouraged to report safety-
related occurrences which involve the violations of regulations, and the organizations, in
turn, further encourage their employees to report these occurrences. In fact, as discussed
in Subsection 4.2.6, when an ASAP program is also available to employees, an ASAP report
triggers a VDRP report and a VDRP report triggers an ASAP report. As with the case of
the VDRP and the ASAP, the combinations of a system which aims at organizations and a
company-specific system which aims at employees may work synergistically in encouraging
reporting.
System Types
It was identified that the voluntary reporting systems whose targets are individuals can
be classified into three types. The three types are: (1) Non-company-specific Type, (2)
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Company-specific Type, and (3) Inter-company Information Sharing and Analysis Type.
Table 8.10 shows a type of each voluntary reporting system whose targets are individuals.
Table 8.10: System types
State Reporting System Type
ASRS Non-company-specific
U.S.
ASAP Company-specific
U.K. CHIRP Non-company-specific
REPCON Non-company-specific
Australia
ASRS Non-company-specific
Japan ASI-NET Inter-company Information Sharing and Analysis
The characteristics of the system of each type are as follows:
Non-company-specific Type
This type of systems collect and analyze reports at a national level. This type of systems
allow persons to report directly to the system without passing through internal reporting
systems of the companies to which persons belong. As stated in Section 2.5. a concern that
information may be used for companies' management for punitive purposes can impede
reporting. Therefore, more honest reporting can be expected in this type of systems when
reported events involve errors of reporter because reporters do not have to fear of disciplinary
actions for their errors from companies' management.
Another advantage of this type of systems is that they normally allow anyone in aviation
community to submit reports. In the other types of systems, the persons who can report
is limited. For example, in the ASAP of the U.S., the persons who can report to the
program is usually limited to the employees whose union signed the MOU of the program.
In the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft of Japan, the persons who can report to the system is
limited to the pilot and flight engineers of participating airlines. Other professional groups
of participating airlines or those who belong to other airlines cannot submit reports to the
system.
Therefore, by collecting reports from a broad scope of aviation community, this type
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of systems enable the identification of hazards related to persons to whom the systems
of the other types are unavailable. One example of the persons to whom the other types
of systems are currently unavailable but who play an important role in assuring safety of
aircraft operations are ground service personnel.
In addition, Tamuz [100] pointed out another advantage of this type of systems that
they are able to identify patterns in rare events by aggregating data at a national level.
Furthermore, if collected information is shared as is done in the ASRS of the U.S.,
companies can even make use of the information for safety purposes by themselves. In fact,
for nine years from 1998 to 2006, 120 Search Requests were made from airlines and 37 were
made from aircraft manufacturers to the ASRS of the U.S. [1031.
However, there is one disadvantage in this type of systems. In this type of systems, not
only information that helps in identifying a reporter, but also information that helps in
identifying a company to which the reporter belongs is usually de-identified. Therefore, it
is difficult to identify hazards which are specific to a company and take corrective actions
with the company [100]. Examples of such hazards which are specific to a company in-
clude improper procedures of operations or maintenance of aircraft, confusing directions in
manuals, unbalanced workload allocations, insufficient training, and lack of communication
between management and front-line personnel.
Company-specific Type
In this type of systems, a specific voluntary reporting program is established for each com-
pany based on the agreement between the management organization of the systems and
the company. Since reports are collected and analyzed at each program level, this type of
systems are able to identify hazards specific to a company, which is difficult in the Non-
company-specific type of systems. In addition, in this type of systems, the management
organization of the systems can take corrective actions in collaboration with the company.
For example., in the ASAP, representatives from pilot unions in the ERC can urge pilots to
take remedial training, representatives from a company management can initiate changes
of company procedures, and representatives from the FAA can influence regulatory changes
[100].
In fact. as stated in Chapter 1, many airlines have their own internal reporting systems
[68]. However, the company-specific type of systems have an advantage over airlines' own
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internal reporting systems. That is, in the company-specific type of systems, by providing
limited immunity from enforcement actions by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the
CAA and the companies' management can collect reports involving possible violations of
regulations which might otherwise not be submitted. To obtain this advantage to full extent,
limited immunity from disciplinary action by the companies' management should also be
provided.
The benefits of this types of systems can be augmented if the data obtained by each
program established for a company are compiled and analyzed at the national level, and
results of the analysis are shared with the participating companies. Such a central compi-
lation and analysis of the data enables the identification of patterns in rare events, as the
Non-company specific type of systems do.
As stated in Subsection 4.2.5, the FAA currently lacks a centralized system that ana-
lyzes the ASAP data to identify unknown hazards at a national level. In order to address
the problem, the FAA is currently working to expand functionalities of the Aviation Safety
Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS), a centralized system developed to store, ana-
lyze and share the safety related information, to include the information acquired through
ASAP. The work will be completed by the end of calendar year 2010 [45].
Inter-company Information Sharing and Analysis Type
This type of systems share the safety information with participating companies, and the
management organizations of the systems analyze reports collected through the participat-
ing companies on behalf of them. In this type of systems, persons cannot report to the
systems directly; instead, they report to the systems through the companies they belong
to.
This type of systems can identify hazards which occur rarely if a sufficiently large number
of companies participate in the systems. Furthermore, this type of systems can also identify
hazards specific to a company if the information that helps in identifying the company to
which the reporter belongs is not removed at the analysis stage.
In this type of the systems., the participating companies can directly access the cen-
tralized database and use the data for their own purpose. In fact, as will be mentioned
in Subsection 8.1.7, without participating in such a system, some companies are exchang-
ing information among them by using compatible software designed to collect and analyze
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safety data such as BASIS. However, this type of systems are different from such a simple
information exchange in that the management organizations of the systems analyze reports
on behalf of the participating companies. Therefore, the systems are beneficial from the
companies' standpoint in that they can make use of outside expertise.
One concern on this type of systems is that since reports are submitted only through a
company's internal reporting system, not all reports may be shared with the systems. In
the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft, reports are screened and filtered by an airline before they
are shared with the system. This practice saves a need of validation of reports by a manage-
ment organization of the system, but involves a concern that reports which are worthwhile
to be shared from a safety perspective are also filtered out by a company for some other
reasons. Limited immunity from disciplinary action by the companies' management should
be provided to encourage reporting.
One observation in the above discussion of the three types of systems is that they are not
exclusive. That is, the states can establish different types of systems at the same time, as
the U.S. has both a Non-company-specific Type of system (ASRS) and a Company-specific
Type of system (ASAP). In addition, as discussed in the above, each type of system has
advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, by establishing different types of systems, the
state can expect that they supplement each other.
Management of Systems
It was identified that the management organizations of the voluntary reporting systems
studied can be classified into three categories: (1) Civil Aviation Authority, (2) Investigation
Authority or other government agencies, and (3) Third-party organization. As will be
discussed below, each category of the management organization has suitable types of systems
described above. Table 8.11 shows a management organization of each voluntary reporting
system studied.
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Table 8.11: Management of voluntary reporting systems
State Reporting System Management Organization
ASRS NASA Research Agency
U.S. ASAP FAA Civil Aviation Authority
VDRP FAA Civil Aviation Authority
U.K. CHIRP CHIRP Charitable Trust Charitable Trust
REPCON ATSB Investigation Authority
Australia
ASRS ATSB Investigation Authority
Japan ASI-NET ATEC Non-profit Foundation
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
The ASAP and the VDRP of the U.S. are managed by the CAA. The CAA has authority
to enforce safety regulations and can determine whether corrective actions which are taken
by a company responding to reports involving violations of regulations are sufficient or
not. Therefore, the CAA is more suitable for Company-specific Type of systems than the
other two types of systems. In the Company-specific Type of systems, the CAA can take
corrective actions and conduct follow-up monitoring, together with a company.
The CAA has the authority to take enforcement actions against the violations of the
regulations, and hence, it is most likely to impede reporting. Therefore, limited immunity
from enforcement actions against the violations of regulations should be provided. Since the
Freedom of Information Act9 applies to the CAA, the data it acquires should be protected
from public disclosure.
Investigation Authority or other government agencies
REPCON and the ASRS of Australia are managed by the Investigation Authority, and
the ASRS of the U.S. is administered by a research agency. The Investigation Authority or
other government agencies are more suitable for Non-company-specific Type of systems and
Inter-company Information Sharing and Analysis Type of systems than Company-specific
5 All four contracting states studied have the Freedom of Information Act.
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Type of systems because they don't have authority to determine whether corrective actions
taken are sufficient or not. Since they have no authority to take enforcement actions against
the violations of the regulations, they are less likely to impede reporting than the CAA.
At the same time, as government agencies, they are well positioned to issue safety alerts
to relevant organizations, including the CAA. They may also issue safety recommendations
which have some legal authority as the Investigation Authorities can issue safety recom-
mendations after accident or serious investigations.
In addition, as with the ATSB in the cases of REPCON and the ASRS of Australia,
these agencies may be delegated a power to provide the de-identified data to the CAA for
safety purposes. It is also an advantage that of these agencies that they can utilize exper-
tise on investigation of safety-related occurrences, data analysis, or human factors. Since
the Freedom of Information Act applies to these agencies, the data they acquire should be
protected from public disclosure.
Third-party organization
CHIRP of the U.K. and the ASI-NET of Japan are managed by the third-party organi-
zations. Third-party organizations are suitable for Non-company-specific Type of systems
and Inter-company Information Sharing and Analysis Type of systems because they don't
have authority to determine whether corrective actions taken are sufficient or not. Since
third-party organizations are not government agencies, they are the least likely to impede
reporting.
However, by comparison with government agencies, third-party organizations are less
well positioned to issue safety alerts to relevant organizations. In addition, it is difficult for
the CAA to learn unsafe practices, procedures, or conditions, or to utilize the information
for policy-making unless they provide the CAA with the information acquired in the system.
Since they are not government agencies, the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to
them, and hence., the protection of data from the public is not needed.
Limited Immunity from Enforcement Actions by the CAA
It was identified that there is a difference in terms of whether or not limited immunity from
enforcement actions by the CAA against reported violations of regulations is provided in
each system. This is shown in Table 8.12.
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Table 8.12: Limited immunity provided in each voluntary reporting system
State Reporting System Limited Immunity Provided?
ASRS Yes
U.S ASAP Yes
VDRP Yes
U.K. CHIRP Yes
REPCON No
Australia
ASRS Yes
Japan ASI-NET No
A summary of limited immunity from enforcement actions by the CAA provided in vol-
untary reporting systems in each state is as follows. In voluntary systems of the U.S. and the
U.K., if a person files a report and the report meets the criteria, immunity from enforcement
actions against the violations of regulations is provided. In voluntary reporting systems of
Australia, although the limited immunity is not provided in REPCON, it is provided in
the ASRS, another voluntary reporting system managed by the same organization (i.e. the
ATSB). Persons seeking protection from enforcement actions by CASA can submit reports
to the ASRS instead of REPCON. Therefore, if the two systems are considered together, it
can be said that limited immunity is provided in voluntary reporting systems in Australia.
On the other hand, under the ASI-NET of Japan, it is assured only that the JCAB
will not seek information provided to the system nor take enforcement actions based solely
on that information. That is, immunity from enforcement actions is not guaranteed to the
reporter in case there is sufficient evidence indicating the violations of the regulations.
As stated in Section 2.5, it is considered that a concern among people that reported
information may be used for enforcement actions deters reporting. Data indicates that the
possibility that whether limited immunity from enforcement actions is provided or not does
indeed influence the number of reports submitted. Table 8.13 shows a comparison of the
number of reports submitted to the ASRS of the U.S. and to the ASI-NET of Japan per
year. In order to take account of a difference in the size of aviation activities, numbers
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normalized by the flight hours of public transport are also shown in the table.
Table 8.13: Comparison of the number of reports submitted' (Data Source: [2], [82], [94],
[103])
Reporting System Number of Reports Flight Hours of Public
State (a)/(b) - 105
(Report Source) per Year (a) Transport per Year (b)
ASRS reports from flight crew of airlines 26,500 118.7
U.S. 22,200,000
ASRS reports from General Aviation 7.500 33.9
ASI-NET for Large Aircraft 75 5.0Japan 1.500,000
ASI-NET for Small Aircraft 15 1.0
From the table, it can be seen that there is a notable difference in the number of reports
submitted. The difference may be influenced by whether limited immunity is provided or
not.
It can also be seen that a difference between the number of ASRS reports from General
Aviation and the number of reports submitted to the ASI-NET for Small Aircraft is bigger
than the difference between the number of ASR.S reports from airlines and the number of
reports submitted to the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft. This may be because in the ASI-NET
for Large Aircraft, employees are encouraged to report to the airlines' internal reporting
system anyway.
Other conceivable contributing factors to the difference between the number of reports
submitted to the ASRS of the U.S. and to the ASI-NET of Japan other than limited
immunity include:
Awareness of systems
The ASRS, established in 1976, has more than 30 years of history, whereas the ASI-
NET for Large Aircraft was established in 1999 and the ASI-NET for Small Aircraft
was established in 2004. In addition, people in the U.S. might be more educated to
report through the company's training program. For example, the Air Line Pilots
Association (ALPA) encourages its members to file ASRS reports. Instructions in the
'Number of reports per year and flight hours per year are rough numbers. Flight hours of the U.S. is
calculated as the sum of the flight hours of Part 121 Operators plus those of Part 135 Operators.
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use of ASRS reporting forms is routinely included in the training of General Aviation
pilots [100]. For a variety of reasons, people are more aware of the ASRS than they
are of the ASI-NET.
Screening and filtering by a company
In the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft, reports submitted to a airlines' internal reporting
system are screened and filtered by the airline before they are shared with the system.
This practice may have reduced the number of reports shared with the system.
Cultural Difference
It has been pointed out that national culture, together with professional culture and
organizational culture, influences how information is shared [711.
In the above argument, the possibility that limited immunity from enforcement actions
is actually encouraging reporting is pointed out. However, it should also be remembered
that a proper balance should be sought between affording limited immunity and exercising
enforcement power in order to enhance overall safety.
If limited immunity is not provided and enforcement actions are strictly applied to
every violation of regulation, events involving possible violations of regulations may be not
reported and unsafe practices, procedures, or conditions can be left as they are. However,
exercising enforcement power also promotes compliance with regulations.
For example, the limited immunity may create a moral hazard and the compliance with
regulations may be undermined. In fact, an independent review team of the ASAP con-
vened by the Secretary of Transportation pointed out a concern that the FAA's acceptance
of repetitive reports of the same problem would undermine incentives for compliance with
regulations [45]. Therefore, a limit on frequency of providing limited immunity from enforce-
ment actions against the violations of regulations committed by the same person should be
set, as the ASRS of the U.S. and REPCON of Australia set the limit at once in five years.
Persons Covered by Reporting Systems
The ASRS of the U.S., CHIRP of the U.K., and REPCON of Australia cover most or
all professional groups (e.g. pilots, flight engineers, air traffic controllers, cabin crew, and
mechanics). However, the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft of Japan covers only pilots and flight
engineers of participating airlines.
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The extension of coverage of the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft of Japan may enable
identification of hazards in other areas of aviation activity. For example, as can be seen in
Figure 5-4 in Subsection 5.2.4, CHIRP collects as many reports from cabin crew as from
flight crew, about 150 reports annually.
Cabin crew also play an important role to assure safety of aircraft operation. For
example, for every flight, cabin crew are required to set the doors in a mode that ensures
that emergency slides are automatically unfolded when the doors are opened. There was
once an occurrence in Japan that cabin crew forgot to set the door in that mode due to
a lack of communication and the aircraft departed in that state [73]. Therefore, it can be
expected that these kinds of safety-related occurrences will be reported to the ASI-NET for
Large Aircraft if the coverage is extended to include cabin crew.
Security Reports
Among the voluntary reporting systems studied, only REPCON of Australia clearly states,
by regulation, that to provide information about aviation security concerns to appropriate
person or organization is one of its purposes. Additionally, in practice, the ASRS of the
U.S. has been receiving increasing numbers of reports describing security-related occurrences
since the September 11 attacks in 2001 [24]. Other voluntary reporting systems may have
been receiving reports regarding security as well.
Currently, in all voluntary reporting systems studied, reports regarding safety and the
ones regarding security are being dealt with under a single system. However, a study
of reports of the ASRS of the U.S. regarding security suggests that these reports have
an extremely sensitive nature, and hence, may require different methods of analysis and
evaluation [24]. Therefore, an establishment of a new system which deals with the security
reports may be appropriate. Particularly when a current voluntary reporting system is
managed by a third-party organization, as CHIRP of the U.K and the ASI-NET of Japan,
an establishment of a new system managed by the government agencies may be appropriate.
There is another reason why an establishment of a new system deals with the security
reports may be appropriate. The reason is that, in some voluntary reporting systems, groups
of personnel involved directly with the security process are not covered. Even if they are
covered, they are less educated about the voluntary reporting systems compared to pilots.,
air traffic controllers, mechanics and other groups of personnels who are the main target of
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the voluntary reporting systems [24].
In fact, NASA is proposing a Security Incident Reporting System (SIRS) as a part of
a new program called the Aviation Safety and Security Program (AvSSP). Although the
proposed SIRS would be a replication of the ASRS model with all of the essential criteria
of the original model, the SIRS will probably provide alternative processing features that
include more extensive protections [24].
Although it is difficult to prove the benefits of voluntary reporting systems in accident
prevention, in the ASRS of the U.S., several cases have been actually reported in which
corrective actions were taken proactively by the organizations which had received alerts
from the ASRS [103].
Therefore, establishing a voluntary reporting system of security information which is
separate from the voluntary reporting system of safety information may help in preventing
future criminal acts such as an unlawful seizure of an aircraft or destruction of aircraft.
Degree of Database Utilization
Among the reporting systems studied, the ASRS of the U.S. is noteworthy in terms of
database utilization. It has a well-established system to respond to the database search
requests from outside.
In particular, the utilization of the ASRS database by the government organizations such
as the FAA and Congress for purposes such as rulemaking and airspace design shows that
the data provided to the voluntary reporting system can also be useful for the identification
of hazards which are likely to come into existence when some changes are introduced into
the current aviation system.
Furthermore, it is only the ASRS of the U.S. that currently permits the public to access
the database. Giving the public access to the database enables the outside researchers to
use the data, and their research can lead to further understanding on themes such as human
factors, which may eventually enhance aviation safety.
If a voluntary reporting system gives the public access to the database, information in the
reports including company's name should be thoroughly de-identified as done in the ASRS
to prevent inappropriate and misleading comparisons of companies. which could adversely
and incorrectly affect public confidence in a particular company. In fact, before the FAA
issued the regulation that assures the protection of the FOQA data collected from airlines
191
from public disclosure, the study conducted by the Flight Safety Foundation recognized
that the data must be de-identified so that the data cannot be linked with a specific airline
in order to prevent inappropriate and misleading comparisons of airlines [26].
8.1.7 Exchange of Safety Information between States
As discussed in Subsection 5.2.6, the EU Member States, including the U.K., are exchanging
safety information with each other, a purpose of which is to collect sufficient data to identify
hazards or meaningful trends. On the other hand, it appears that the U.S., Australia, and
Japan are not exchanging the safety information with other states.
In order to exchange information between organizations in the EU Member States, the
compatible software was necessary. To this end, the ECCAIRS Reporting System was
developed.
In fact, without the agreements between the states, the aviation industry is also ex-
changing safety information across borders. A typical example of the safety information
exchange between the organization in the aviation industry is the one between organiza-
tions using the common software tool named British Airways Safety Information System
(BASIS).
BASIS is a software tool designed to help airlines assess and manage the risks associated
with flight operations. BASIS was originally developed to gather and analyze pilot incident
reports internally at British Airways. Yet, BASIS has been expanded and marketed to other
organizations over time, and is currently being used by over 100 organizations, including
airlines, pilot unions, and aircraft manufacturers to manage the risks associated with flight
operations.
One of the strengths of BASIS is its compatibility for an industry-wide data exchange.
A separate BASIS module allows participants to share dis-identified data with other BASIS
users via a secure Internet database [18].
BASIS is also used by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) for its Safety
Trend Evaluation, Analysis and Data Exchange System (STEADES). STEADES is cur-
rently collecting incident data from nearly 100 airlines worldwide. IATA issues regular re-
ports, which review safety events, present analysis in the form of trend charts, and provide
overviews of emerging safety concerns [65], [68].
In addition, the development of the Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN),
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which aims at sharing safety information from airlines, manufacturers, and other aviation
organizations worldwide, is currently in progress on the aviation industry's initiative with
the support from government organizations.
As mentioned in Subsection 5.2.6, a bi-directional data link between the EU and China
has been developed to exchange safety information. Considering this fact, geographic re-
lationships are not considered to pose an impediment. The exchange of safety information
between states is worth considering for the responsible authorities in other states which are
currently not so doing.
8.1.8 Implementation of International Standards by Industry's Voluntary
Initiative
The thesis identified that there is a difference how the Civil Aviation Authorities have
implemented the ICAO Standard on the establishment of a flight data analysis program by
airlines. In 2005, ICAO adopted a Standard which require the establishment of a flight data
analysis program by airlines operating aeroplanes of a maximum certificated take-off mass
in excess of 27,000 kg.
In accordance with the Standard, EASA has mandated the flight data analysis program
(EASA OPS-1, OPS 1.037). The JCAB has also mandated it (Civil Aeronautics Act, Article
61 and Ordinance for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Act, Article 149) [77].
On the other hand, as discussed in Subsection 4.2.7, the FAA has not issued regulations
to require U.S. airlines to establish such programs]. Instead, the FAA leaves it at the air-
lines' discretion, and by providing airlines and their employees with limited immunity from
enforcement actions against the violations of regulations, the FAA acquires the flight data
from the airlines in return.
The FAA policy on the FOQA program offers the Civil Aviation Authorities in other
states valuable insights for implementing the Standards adopted by ICAO. Considering
that the FAA has been able to achieve wide participation in the FOQA program by major
U.S. airlines on a voluntary basis, this kind of policy, which practically implements the
Standards adopted by ICAO by encouraging the industry's voluntary initiative. may be
applied to other Standards which will be adopted in the future.
iAs regards Australia. the author could not find out whether or not CASA mandated the establishment
of a flight data analysis program by airlines.
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8.2 Rulemaking Process
The public consultation requirements and the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) require-
ments are two essential requirements which government agencies must fulfill when they
make rules. The comparison of these two requirements which the Civil Aviation Authori-
ties (the FAA of the U.S., EASA of the EU, CASA of Australia, and the JCAB of Japan)
must fulfill in rulemaking was conducted.
8.2.1 Comparison of Public Consultation Requirements
Public consultation concerning proposed rules aims at ensuring transparency and fairness
in rulemaking. It also aims at avoiding establishment of regulations that are inappropriate
to the circumstances, poorly adhered to, or unnecessary [17].
It was observed that there are no substantial differences in the public consultation
requirements for rulemaking among the four Civil Aviation Authorities. All of the Civil
Aviation Authorities are required to publish proposed rules together with related materials
for consultation. In addition, all of the Civil Aviation Authorities are required to publish
the comments received in the consultation and the disposition of them.
One difference is that drafts to amend the Basic Regulation and its Implementing Rules
are brought to public consultation in the form of opinions before being submitted to the
legislative bodies in the EU, whereas bills to amend the Civil Aeronautics Act are not subject
to public consultation requirements in Japan. However, considering that consultations with
stakeholders are conducted in practice before the bills to amend the Civil Aeronautics Act
are brought to the Cabinet for decisions, it is considered that this difference is of little
significance.
Another difference is that only EASA of the EU, by the Management Board Decision
08-2007, assures that comments received in public consultation are also reviewed by those
not directly involved in the drafting of the proposed rule. This practice is intended to ensure
that all received comments are treated fairly.
Table 8.14 shows the appellation of public consultation documents prepared by each
Civil Aviation Authority. In the table, some fields are left blank, yet it is merely because
the documents are not officially prescribed by laws or regulations or not given specific
appellations, and no laws or regulations prohibit the publication of the documents. In fact,
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the JCAB of Japan publishes the documents to seek public opinions on specific topics on
which the JCAB is considering rulemaking, which corresponds to ANPRM, A-NPA, and
DP published by the other Civil Aviation Authorities.
Table 8.14: Appellation of the public consultation documents in each Civil Aviation Au-
thority
FAA (the U.S.) EASA (the EU) CASA (Australia) JCAB (Japan)
ANPRM A-NPA DP
NPRM NPA NPRM/NPC NPRM
SNPRM
Final Rule Final Rule NFRM/NFC Final Rule
8.2.2 Comparison of Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) Requirements
By systematically assessing the potential impacts of new regulations, the RIA aims at
improving the objectivity of the regulatory development process and at avoiding making
rules which are too costly to comply with [81].
As with the public consultation requirements, it was observed that there are no substan-
tial differences in the RIA requirements among the four Civil Aviation Authorities. In all
of the four Civil Aviation Authorities, the RIA includes the economic analysis of costs and
benefits of the proposed rule as well as its impacts on areas such as business environment.
society, and environment. Furthermore, in addition to the analysis of the proposed rule, the
identification and the analysis of the possible alternative policies are also required.
Compared to the other Civil Aviation Authorities, the FAA of the U.S. is required to
conduct a relatively large number of analyses such as the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
and the Unfunded Mandates Assessment, which reflects the social circumstances specific to
the U.S.
As regards the publication of the results of the RIA, the FAA of the U.S. and EASA
of the EU are required to publish the results for consultation. CASA of Australia and the
JCAB of Japan, although not formally required, generally publish the results as well.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
9.1 Summary of Results
This thesis examined the aviation safety information feedback systems in four contracting
states of the Chicago Convention, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia
and Japan. By conducting a comparative analysis of the feedback systems in each state,
this thesis aimed at offering insights for responsible authorities in the contracting states to
improve their own feedback systems.
As part of the feedback systems, this thesis examined reporting and investigation systems
in each state. More specifically, this thesis examined mandatory reporting systems of the
Investigation Authority and Civil Aviation Authority as well as voluntary reporting systems.
In addition, as one sort of corrective actions which are taken responding to the safety
risk identified through investigation, this thesis examined the rulemaking process in four
Civil Aviation Authorities. In examining the rulemaking process. this thesis focused on
the two essential requirements in rulemaking: the public consultation requirements and
Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) requirements.
This thesis identified similarities as well as differences in the feedback systems among
the four states, which are described in detail in Chapter 8. Particularly, as regards the
mandatory reporting systems and voluntary reporting systems, this thesis, as expected,
identified a relatively larger number of differences in voluntary reporting systems, whose
establishment ICAO leaves at states' discretion.
A summary of similarities is as follows.
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Structures of Reporting and Investigation Systems
All of the four states have the accident and serious incident reporting and investigation
system of the Investigation Authority as well as the incident reporting and investigation
systems of Civil Aviation Authority. In addition, all of the four states have voluntary re-
porting systems.
Definitions of Accidents which must be Reported to the Investigation Authority
The definitions of the accidents which must be reported to the Investigation Authority in
each state basically follow the definition by ICAO. That is, the accident is defined as an oc-
currence associated with the operation of an aircraft, in which a person is fatally or serious
injured, the aircraft receives substantial damage, or the aircraft is missing or completely
inaccessible.
Public Consultation Requirements and Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) Re-
quirements in Rulemaking Process
As regards the public consultation requirements, all of the four Civil Aviation Authorities
(the FAA of the U.S., EASA of the EU, CASA of Australia, and the JCAB of Japan)
are required to publish proposed rules together with related materials for consultation. In
addition, they are required to publish the comments received in the consultation and the
disposition of them.
As regards the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) requirements, in all of the four Civil
Aviation Authorities, the RIA includes the economic analysis of costs and benefits of the
proposed rule as well as its impacts on areas such as business environment, society, and en-
vironment. Furthermore, in addition to the analysis of the proposed rule. the identification
and the analysis of the possible alternative policies are also required.
The FAA of the U.S. and EASA of the EU are required to publish the results for con-
sultation. CASA of Australia and the JCAB of Japan., although not formally required,
generally publish the results as well.
A summary of differences is as follows.
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Threshold of Incidents which must be Reported to the Investigation Authority
Two unique characteristics of Australia were observed. First, the incidents which are re-
quired to be reported to the Investigation Authority are divided into two categories: the
incidents which are required to be reported immediately ("Immediately Reportable Mat-
ters"), and the incidents which are not ("Routine Reportable Matters").
Second, Routine Reportable Matters for air transport operation include the incidents
which are not considered serious incidents defined by ICAO, that is, "an incident involving
circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred." On the other hand, in the
other three states, all reportable incidents must be reported immediately and are considered
serious incidents defined by ICAO.
The reportable incidents which are not covered by the mandatory reporting systems
of Investigation Authority in Australia are covered by mandatory reporting systems of the
Civil Aviation Authorities or voluntary reporting systems in the other states.
An accident of air transport aircraft can become a major accident involving a large
number of fatalities. The case of Australia suggests that the incidents reportable to the
Investigation Authority can be flexibly set taking account of two things: (1) the likelihood
that safety lessons to prevent major accidents can be expected from the investigation and
(2) the amount of available resources of the Investigation Authority and the Civil Aviation
Authority.
Threshold of Incidents and Other Safety-related Occurrences which must be
Reported to the Civil Aviation Authority
It was observed that the MOR Scheme in the U.K. requires that incidents and other safety-
related occurrences in a relatively broader scope be reported than mandatory reporting
systems of the Civil Aviation Authorities in the other states.
Reportable occurrences under the MOR Scheme in the U.K. which are not covered
by the mandatory reporting systems of the Civil Aviation Authorities but are covered by
the voluntary reporting systems in the other states include occurrences related to human
errors during operation or deficiencies of procedures which could affect the safety of aircraft
operations.
Mandatory reporting systems and voluntary reporting systems have advantages and
disadvantages, and they supplement each other. Therefore, the threshold of severity of re-
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portable occurrences under the mandatory reporting systems should be set taking account
of the advantages and disadvantages of both systems as well as the available resources of
the Civil Aviation Authorities to analyze the reports.
Differences in Air Proximity Hazard Reporting and Investigation Systems
Unlike other incidents, there are notable differences in the air proximity hazard occurrence
reporting and investigation in the four states. The differences are a scope of air proximity
hazard occurrences to be reported and investigated, whether reporting is mandatory or
voluntary, and to whom the occurrences are reported.
In particular, the U.K. collects and investigates the broadest scope of the air proximity
hazard occurrences among the four states. Data suggests that some midair collision hazard
occurrences actually investigated and judged to have compromised safety of the aircraft in
the U.K. would not have been reported and investigated if they had happened in the U.S.
or Japan.
Since subjectivity is inherent in the risk of midair collision perceived by pilots and air
traffic controllers, a system like the one in the U.K., where a broad scope of occurrences
are reported and thoroughly investigated, may identify unknown hazards that could lead
to more serious events.
Differences in Voluntary Reporting Systems
Several differences were observed in voluntary reporting systems.
Target of reporting systems (organizations or individuals)
Among the voluntary reporting systems studied, only the VDRP of the U.S. is aimed at
organizations (companies management), not individuals. By providing voluntary reporting
systems which are aimed at organizations, it can be expected that organizations are encour-
aged to report safety-related occurrences, and the organizations, in turn, further encourage
their employees to report these occurrences.
System types
It was identified that the voluntary reporting systems whose target is individuals can be clas-
sified into three types. The three types are: (1) Non-company-specific Type, (2) Company-
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specific Type, and (3) Inter-company Information Sharing and Analysis Type.
Non-company-specific Type of systems collect and analyze reports at a national level.
In contrast, in Company-specific Type of systems, a specific voluntary reporting program is
established for each company based on the agreement between the management organization
of the systems and the company, and reports are collected and analyzed at each program
level. Inter-company Information Sharing and Analysis Type of systems share the safety
information with participating companies, and the management organizations of the systems
analyze reports collected through the participating companies on behalf of them.
These three types of systems are not exclusive. That is. the states can establish different
types of systems at the same time. In addition, each type of system has advantages and
disadvantages. Therefore, by establishing different types of systems, the state can expect
that they supplement each other.
Management of systems
It was identified the management organizations of voluntary reporting systems can be clas-
sified into three categories: (1) Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), (2) Investigation Authority
or other government agencies, and (3) Third-party organization. Each of these categories
has suitable types of systems. That is, the CAA is more suitable for Company-specific
Type of systems than Non-company-specific Type of systems and Inter-company Infor-
mation Sharing and Analysis Type of systems because the CAA can determine whether
corrective actions which are taken by a company responding to reports involving violations
of regulations are sufficient or not.
On the other hand, Investigation Authority or other government agencies and Third-
party organization are more suitable for Non-company-specific Type of systems and Inter-
company Information Sharing and Analysis Type of systems than Company-specific Type
of systems because they do not have authority to determine whether corrective actions
which are taken by a company responding to reports involving violations of regulations are
sufficient or not.
Limited immunity from enforcement actions by the Civil Aviation Authority
There is a difference in terms of whether or not limited immunity from enforcement actions
by the Civil Aviation Authority against reported violations of regulations is provided in the
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system. The U.S., the U.K., and Australia have voluntary reporting systems which provide
limited immunity. However, Japan does not have voluntary reporting systems which pro-
vide limited immunity. The fact that the number of reports submitted to the ASRS of the
U.S. is larger than that to the ASI-NET of Japan after taking account of the difference in
the size of aviation activities indicates that the limited immunity from enforcement actions
does indeed encourage voluntary reporting.
Persons covered by reporting systems
There is a difference in terms of the scope of persons covered by systems. The U.S., the
U.K., and Australia have voluntary reporting systems which cover most or all professional
groups. However, the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft of Japan covers only pilots and flight en-
gineers. The extension of coverage of the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft to other professional
groups such as mechanics and cabin crew may enable the identification of hazards in other
areas of aviation activity.
Security reports
Among the voluntary reporting systems studied, only REPCON of Australia clearly states,
by regulation, that to provide information about aviation security concerns to appropriate
person or organization is one of its purposes. Currently, in all voluntary reporting systems
studied, reports regarding safety and the ones regarding security are being dealt with under
a single system. Considering an extreme sensitive nature of the security reports, an estab-
lishment of a new system deals with the security reports may be appropriate.
Degree of database utilization
Compared to the other voluntary reporting systems, the ASRS of the U.S. has a well-
established system to respond to the database search requests from outside. Furthermore,
only the ASRS of the U.S gives the public access to the database. Effective database uti-
lization may create new knowledge which leads to the enhancement of aviation safety.
Exchange of Safety Information between States
The EU Member States. including the U.K.. are exchanging safety information with each
other, a purpose of which is to collect sufficient data to identify hazards or meaningful
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trends. On the other hand, it appears that the U.S., Australia, and Japan are not exchang-
ing the safety information with other states. The exchange of safety information between
states is worth considering for the responsible authorities in states which are currently not
so doing.
Implementation of International Standards by Industry's Voluntary Initiative
In 2005, ICAO adopted a Standard which requires the establishment of a flight data analysis
program by airlines. EASA of the EU and the JCAB of Japan have mandated it by regu-
lations. However, the FAA of the U.S. has not mandated it. Instead, the FAA of the U.S.
leaves it at the airlines' discretion, and by providing limited immunity from enforcement
actions against the violations of regulations, the FAA acquires the FOQA data from the
airlines in return.
Considering that the FAA has been able to achieve wide participation in the FOQA
program by major U.S. airlines on a voluntary basis, the policy which practically implements
the Standards adopted by ICAO by encouraging the industrys voluntary initiative may be
applied to other Standards which will be adopted in the future.
9.2 Conclusions
The aviation safety information feedback systems were found to play an important role to as-
sure the aviation safety, and the Investigation Authority and the Civil Aviation Authority in
each state are responsible for ensuring that these feedback systems function properly. That
is, the risk events, such as accidents, serious incidents, incidents, and other safety-related
occurrences, are reported and investigated, and corrective actions are taken to mitigate the
identified hazards without fail.
By conducting a comparative analysis of the feedback systems in the four contracting
states of the Chicago Convention, this thesis identified that each state has the reporting
and investigation systems with the similar structures. On the other hand, this thesis also
identified that there are several differences in the practices in the reporting and investigation
systems among the contracting states.
For the responsible authorities in the contracting states of the Chicago Convention,
learning practices in the feedback systems in other contracting states can offer the oppor-
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tunities to improve their own feedback systems. Based on the differences in the practices
identified in this thesis, best practices which could improve the feedback systems were ob-
served.
First, the U.K. collects and investigates the broadest scope of the air proximity haz-
ard occurrences among the four states. Considering the data which indicates that some
air proximity hazard occurrences actually investigated and judged to have compromised
safety of the aircraft in the U.K. would not have been reported and investigated if they
had happened in the U.S. or Japan, under the current systems, the U.S., Australia, and
Japan may be missing chances to identify some unknown air proximity hazards. Therefore,
establishing a system which collects and investigates a broader scope of air proximity haz-
ard occurrences than the current systems may be a policy option worth considering for the
responsible authorities in the U.S., Australia, and Japan.
Second, as regards the types of voluntary reporting systems, only the U.S. has has both a
system which is aimed at organizations (VDRP) and systems which are aimed at individuals
(ASRS and ASAP). On the other hand, the other three states have only systems which are
aimed at individuals.
It can be expected that the systems which are aimed at organizations and the systems
which are aimed at individuals work synergistically in encouraging reporting. Therefore,
establishing both kinds of voluntary reporting systems may be a policy option worth con-
sidering for the responsible authorities in the U.K., Australia, and Japan.
Third, as regards the types of voluntary reporting systems which are aimed at indi-
viduals, only the U.S. has two types of systems: a Non-company-specific Type of system
(ASRS) and a Company-specific Type of systems (ASAP). On the other hand, the other
three states have only one type of system.
As discussed in detail in Chapter 8, it can be expected that the different types of sys-
tems supplement each other. Therefore, establishing different types of voluntary reporting
systems may be a policy option worth considering for the responsible authorities in the
U.K., Australia. and Japan.
Fourth, this thesis identified that Japan does not have voluntary reporting systems
which provide limited immunity from enforcement actions against the violations of regula-
tions, whereas the other three states have voluntary reporting systems which provide limited
immunity. This thesis also presented data which indicates that the limited immunity does
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indeed encourage voluntary reporting. Therefore, providing limited immunity in the volun-
tary reporting system to encourage reporting may be a policy option worth considering for
the Civil Aviation Authority in Japan.
Fifth, this thesis identified that the U.S., the U.K., and Australia have voluntary report-
ing systems which cover most or all professional groups, whereas the ASI-NET for Large
Aircraft of Japan covers only pilots and flight engineers. The extension of coverage may
enable the identification of hazards in other areas of aviation activity. Therefore, the ex-
tension of coverage of the ASI-NET for Large Aircraft to other professional groups, such
as mechanics or cabin crew, may be a policy option worth considering for the responsible
authorities in Japan.
In considering policy options, it is also important for the responsible authorities in each
state to consider the circumstances specific to the state. Due to the circumstances specific
to the states, it may be difficult or undesirable for some states to adopt the practices in
other states. This appears to be one of the reasons why ICAO does not specify the details
of the reporting and investigation systems, adopts the details as Recommended Practices
instead of Standards, or provides the contracting states of the Chicago Convention with the
options not to comply with the Standards.
One example of the circumstances which can constrain responsible authorities to adopt
the policy options is the available resources such as budget and human resources. For ex-
ample., the investigation of serious incidents is prescribed as a Recommended Practice by
Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention, and in accordance with the Recommended Practice,
the Investigation Authority in Japan investigates all serious incidents (the Act for Establish-
ment of the Japan Transport Safety Board). On the other hand, the Investigation Authority
in Australia does not investigate all serious incidents due to resource constraints [81.
Another example of the circumstances which can constrain responsible authorities to
adopt the policy options is the national culture. One of the reasons why limited immunity
against the violations of regulations is not provided in the voluntary reporting system of
Japan may be due to cultural consideration. It may be more acceptable in Japanese culture
to take enforcement actions against the violations of regulations in order to promote the
compliance with the regulations, rather than to provide immunity to encourage reporting.
Therefore., the responsible authorities in each state should adopt the best practices in
other states while considering the circumstances specific to the state.
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Appendix A
Statistics of the Accident Rates
The statistics of the accident rates from 2001 to 2007 in the four states are presented to the
extent the data is available. Figure A-1 shows that the majority of fatal accidents involving
commercial jet aircraft occur at low altitudes or on runways during taxi, take-off, initial
climb, final approach, and landing phases. Therefore, in comparing the accident rates, the
accident rate per departure is preferable to the accident rate per flight hours.
The data sources are shown in Table A.1. Since the categorizations of the aircraft
operations are slightly different depending on states, a strict comparison is not appropriate.
However, it can be seen that the accident rates in Australia is a little higher than those in
the other three states.
Table A.1: Data sources
State IData Sources
U.S. [94]
U.K. [119]
Australia [7]
Japan [82]., [85]
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Taxi, load/
unload,
parked,.
tow Takeoff
Percentage of accidents/fatalities
Initial
climb
Climb
(flaps up) Cruise Descent
Initial
approach
Final
approach Landing
12% 11% 8% 12% 9% 5% 10% 9% 24%
0% 12% 17% 14% 19% 6% 10% 11% 11%
29% 22%
appoach\ Finai
1 v
<1% i% 1 14% 57% 11% 12% 3% 1%
Fatal Accidents
Onboard Fatalities
Exposure(Percentage of flight
time estimated for a
1..5 hour flight)
Percentages may not sum to 100% due to numerical rounding.
Figure A-1: Fatal accidents and onboard fatalities by phase of flight - worldwide commercial
jet fleet 1998-2007 [19]
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Figure A-2: Accident rates per 100,000 departures of scheduled public transport
Table A.2: Accident rates per 100,000 departures of scheduled public transport
State Average Standard Deviation (o)
U.S. 0.32 0.09
Australia 0.60 0.31
Japan 0.32 0.17
aThe data of the U.S is that of the scheduled flights conducted by the Part 121 Operators. The data of
Australia only includes that of VH -registered aircraft. The data of Japan includes that of the non-scheduled
international flights.
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Figure A-3: Accident rates per 100,000 flight hours of scheduled public transport
Table A.3: Accident rates per 100,000 flight hours of scheduled public transport
State Average Standard Deviation (o)
U.S. 0.19 0.06
Australia 0.33 0.18
Japan 0.17 0.09
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Figure A-4: Accident rates per 100,000 flight hours of non-scheduled public transport
Table A.4: Accident rates per 100,000 flight hours of non-scheduled public transport
bThe data of the U.S is that of the non-scheduled flights conducted by the Part 135 Operators. The data
of Australia only includes that of VH -registered aircraft.
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Figure A-5: Accident rates per 100,000 flight hours of public transport
Table A.5: Accident rates per 100,000 flight hours of public transport
State Average Standard Deviation (a)
U.S. 0.49 0.09
U.K. 0.46 0.20
Australia 1.44 0.66
cThe data of the U.S. is the sum of the data of the flights conducted by the Part 121 Operators plus the
data of the flights conducted by the Part 135 Operators. The data of the U.K. only includes that of the
aircraft whose authorized maximum take-off weight exceeds 5,700 kg. The data of Australia only includes
that of the VH -registered aircraft.
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Figure A-6: Accident rates per 100,000 flight hours of General Aviation
Table A.6: Accident rates per 100,000 flight hours of General Aviation
dThe data of Australia includes that of aerial work, flight training, the operation for the business use,
and the operation for private use, but excludes the data of sports aviation. It only includes that of the VH
-registered aircraft.
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Appendix B
Excerpts of Regulations regarding
Reportable Accidents and
Incidents
B.1 Regulations of the United States
B.1.1 Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations
Part 21 CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR PRODUCTS AND PARTS
Subpart A-General
Sec. 21.3 Reporting of failures, malfunctions, and defects.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, the holder of a Type Certificate
(including a Supplemental Type Certificate), a Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA).
or a TSO authorization, or the licensee of a Type Certificate shall report any failure.
malfunction, or defect in any product., part, process, or article manufactured by it
that it determines has resulted in any of the occurrences listed in paragraph (c) of
this section.
(b) The holder of a Type Certificate (including a Supplemental Type Certificate), a Parts
Manufacturer Approval (PMA), or a TSO authorization, or the licensee of a Type
Certificate shall report any defect in any product, part, or article manufactured by it
215
that has left its quality control system and that it determines could result in any of
the occurrences listed in paragraph (c) of this section.
(c) The following occurrences must be reported as provided in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
this section:
(1) Fires caused by a system or equipment failure, malfunction, or defect.
(2) An engine exhaust system failure, malfunction, or defect which causes damage
to the engine, adjacent aircraft structure, equipment, or components.
(3) The accumulation or circulation of toxic or noxious gases in the crew compart-
ment or passenger cabin.
(4) A malfunction, failure, or defect of a propeller control system.
(5) A propeller or rotorcraft hub or blade structural failure.
(6) Flammable fluid leakage in areas where an ignition source normally exists.
(7) A brake system failure caused by structural or material failure during operation.
(8) A significant aircraft primary structural defect or failure caused by any autoge-
nous condition (fatigue, understrength, corrosion, etc.).
(9) Any abnormal vibration or buffeting caused by a structural or system malfunc-
tion, defect, or failure.
(10) An engine failure.
(11) Any structural or flight control system malfunction, defect, or failure which
causes an interference with normal control of the aircraft or which derogates
the flying qualities.
(12) A complete loss of more than one electrical power generating system or hydraulic
power system during a given operation of the aircraft.
(13) A failure or malfunction of more than one attitude, airspeed, or altitude instru-
ment during a given operation of the aircraft.
(d) The requirements of paragraph (a) of this section do not apply to -
(1) Failures, malfunctions or defects that the holder of a Type Certificate (including
a Supplemental Type Certificate), Parts Manufacturer Approval (PMA), or TSO
authorization, or the licensee of a Type Certificate -
216
(i) Determines were caused by improper maintenance, or improper usage;
(ii) Knows were reported to the FAA by another person under the Federal Avi-
ation Regulations; or
(iii) Has already reported under the accident reporting provisions of Part 430 of
the regulations of the National Transportation Safety Board.
(2) Failures, malfunctions or defects in products, parts, or articles manufactured by
a foreign manufacturer under a U.S. Type Certificate issued under Sec. 21.29 or
Sec. 21.617, or exported to the United States under Sec. 21.502.
(e) ...
(f) ...
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Part 121 OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, AND SUP-
PLEMENTAL OPERATIONS
Subpart V-Records and Reports
Sec. 121.703 Service difficulty reports.
(a) Each certificate holder shall report the occurrence or detection of each failure, mal-
function, or defect concerning -
(1) Fires during flight and whether the related fire-warning system functioned prop-
erly;
(2) Fires during flight not protected by a related fire-warning system;
(3) False fire warning during flight;
(4) An engine exhaust system that causes damage during flight to the engine, adja-
cent structure, equipment, or components;
(5) An aircraft component that causes accumulation or circulation of smoke, vapor,
or toxic or noxious fumes in the crew compartment or passenger cabin during
flight;
(6) Engine shutdown during flight because of flameout;
(7) Engine shutdown during flight when external damage to the engine or airplane
structure occurs:
(8) Engine shutdown during flight due to foreign object ingestion or icing;
(9) Engine shutdown during flight of more than one engine;
(10) A propeller feathering system or ability of the system to control overspeed during
flight;
(11) A fuel or fuel-duniping system that affects fuel flow or causes hazardous leakage
during flight;
(12) An unwanted landing gear extension or retraction, or an unwanted opening or
closing of landing gear doors during flight;
(13) Brake system components that result in loss of brake actuating force when the
airplane is in motion on the ground;
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(14) Aircraft structure that requires major repair;
(15) Cracks, permanent deformation, or corrosion of aircraft structures, if more than
the maximum acceptable to the manufacturer or the FAA;
(16) Aircraft components or systems that result in taking emergency actions during
flight (except action to shut down an engine); and
(17) Emergency evacuation systems or components including all exit doors, passenger
emergency evacuation lighting systems, or evacuation equipment that are found
defective, or that fail to perform the intended functions during an actual emer-
gency or during training, testing, maintenance, demonstrations, or inadvertent
deployments.
(b) For the purpose of this section during flight means the period from the moment the
aircraft leaves the surface of the earth on takeoff until it touches down on landing.
(c) In addition to the reports required by paragraph (a) of this section, each certificate
holder shall report any other failure, malfunction, or defect in an aircraft that occurs
or is detected at any time if, in its opinion, that failure, malfunction, or defect has
endangered or may endanger the safe operation of an aircraft used by it.
(d) ...
(e) ...
(f) A certificate holder that is also the holder of a Type Certificate (including a Supple-
mental Type Certificate), a Parts Manufacturer Approval, or a Technical Standard
Order Authorization, or that is the licensee of a type certificate holder, need not re-
port a failure, malfunction., or defect under this section if the failure, malfunction,
or defect has been reported by it under 21.3 of this chapter or under the accident
reporting provisions of 14 CFR part 830.
(g) No person may withhold a report required by this section even though all information
required in this section is not available.
(h) When certificate holder gets additional information, including information from the
manufacturer or other agency, concerning a report required by this section., it shall
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expeditiously submit it as a supplement to the first report and reference the date and
place of submission of the first report.
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Part 125 CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A
SEATING CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM
PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF 6,000 POUNDS OR MORE
Subpart L-Records and Reports
Sec. 125.409 Service difficulty reports
(a) Each certificate holder shall report the occurrence or detection of each failure, mal-
function, or defect, in a form and manner prescribed by the Administrator.
(b) ...
Sec. 125.410 Service difficulty reports (structural).
(a) Each certificate holder shall report the occurrence or detection of each failure or defect
related to-
(1) Corrosion, cracks, or disbonding that requires replacement of the affected part;
(2) Corrosion, cracks, or disbonding that requires rework or blendout because the
corrosion, cracks, or disbonding exceeds the manufacturer's established allowable
damage limits;
(3) Cracks, fractures, or disbonding in a composite structure that the equipment
manufacturer has designated as a primary structure or a principal structural
element; or
(4) Repairs made in accordance with approved data not contained in the manufac-
turer's maintenance manual.
(b) In addition to the reports required by paragraph (a) of this section, each certificate
holder shall report any other failure or defect in aircraft structure that occurs or is
detected at any time if that failure or defect has endangered or may endanger the safe
operation of an aircraft.
(c) ...
(d) ...
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(e) A certificate holder that also is the holder of a Type Certificate (including a Supple-
mental Type Certificate), a Parts Manufacturer Approval, or a Technical Standard
Order authorization, or that is a licensee of a Type Certificate holder, need not report
a failure or defect under this section if the failure or defect has been reported by that
certificate holder under 21.3 of this chapter or under the accident reporting provisions
of 49 CFR part 830.
(f) A report required by this section may be submitted by a certificated repair station
when the reporting task has been assigned to that repair station by the part 125 cer-
tificate holder. However, the part 125 certificate holder remains primarily responsible
for ensuring compliance with the provisions of this section. The part 125 certificate
holder shall receive a copy of each report submitted by the repair station.
(g) No person inay withhold a report required by this section although all information
required by this section is not available.
(h) When a certificate holder gets supplemental information to complete the report re-
quired by this section, the certificate holder shall expeditiously submit that informa-
tion as a supplement to the original report and use the unique control number from
the original report.
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Part 135 OPERATING REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND ON-DEMAND
OPERATIONS AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH
AIRCRAFT
Subpart J-Maintenance, Preventive Maintenance, and Alterations
Sec. 135.415 Service difficulty reports
(a) Each certificate holder shall report the occurrence or detection of each failure, mal-
function, or defect in an aircraft concerning -
(1) Fires during flight and whether the related fire-warning system functioned prop-
erly;
(2) Fires during flight not protected by related fire-warning system;
(3) False fire-warning during flight:
(4) An exhaust system that causes damage during flight to the engine, adjacent
structure, equipment, or components;
(5) An aircraft component that causes accumulation or circulation of smoke, vapor,
or toxic or noxious fumes in the crew compartment or passenger cabin during
flight;
(6) Engine shutdown during flight because of flameout;
(7) Engine shutdown during flight when external damage to the engine or aircraft
structure occurs;
(8) Engine shutdown during flight due to foreign object ingestion or icing;
(9) Shutdown of more than one engine during flight;
(10) A propeller feathering system or ability of the system to control overspeed during
flight:
(11) A fuel or fuel-dumping system that affects fuel flow or causes hazardous leakage
during flight;
(12) An unwanted landing gear extension or retraction or opening or closing of landing
gear doors during flight;
(13) Brake system components that result in loss of brake actuating force when the
aircraft is in motion on the ground;
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(14) Aircraft structure that requires major repair;
(15) Cracks, permanent deformation, or corrosion of aircraft structures, if more than
the maximum acceptable to the manufacturer or the FAA; and
(16) Aircraft components or systems that result in taking emergency actions during
flight (except action to shut-down an engine).
(b) For the purpose of this section, during flight means the period from the moment the
aircraft leaves the surface of the earth on takeoff until it touches down on landing.
(c) In addition to the reports required by paragraph (a) of this section, each certificate
holder shall report any other failure, malfunction, or defect in an aircraft that occurs
or is detected at any time if, in its opinion, the failure, malfunction, or defect has
endangered or may endanger the safe operation of the aircraft.
(d) ...
(e) ...
(f) A certificate holder that is also the holder of a type certificate (including a supplemen-
tal type certificate), a Parts Manufacturer Approval, or a Technical Standard Order
Authorization, or that is the licensee of a type certificate need not report a failure.
malfunction, or defect under this section if the failure, malfunction, or defect has
been reported by it under 21.3 or 37.17 of this chapter or under the accident report-
ing provisions of part 830 of the regulations of the National Transportation Safety
Board.
(g) No person may withhold a report required by this section even though all information
required by this section is not available.
(h) When the certificate holder gets additional information, including information from
the manufacturer or other agency, concerning a report required by this section, it shall
expeditiously submit it as a supplement to the first report and reference the date and
place of submission of the first report.
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Part 145 REPAIR STATIONS
Subpart E-Operating Rules
Sec. 145.221 Service difficulty reports
(a) A certificated repair station must report to the FAA within 96 hours after it discovers
any serious failure, malfunction, or defect of an article. The report must be in a
format acceptable to the FAA.
(b) ...
(c) The holder of a repair station certificate that is also the holder of a part 121, 125, or
135 certificate; type certificate (including a supplemental type certificate); parts man-
ufacturer approval; or technical standard order authorization, or that is the licensee
of a type certificate holder, does not need to report a failure, malfunction, or defect
under this section if the failure, malfunction, or defect has been reported under parts
21, 121, 125, or 135 of this chapter.
(d) A certificated repair station may submit a service difficulty report for the following:
(1) A part 121 certificate holder, provided the report meets the requirements of part
121 of this chapter, as appropriate.
(2) A part 125 certificate holder, provided the report meets the requirements of part
125 of this chapter, as appropriate.
(3) A part 135 certificate holder, provided the report meets the requirements of part
135 of the chapter, as appropriate.
(e) A certificated repair station authorized to report a failure, malfunction, or defect
under paragraph (d) of this section must not report the same failure, malfunction,
or defect under paragraph (a) of this section. A copy of the report submitted under
paragraph (d) of this section must be forwarded to the certificate holder.
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B.2 Regulations of the United Kingdom
B.2.1 EU Council Directive 94/56/EC
LIST OF EXAMPLES OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS
The incidents listed below are typical examples of serious incidents. The list is not ex-
haustive and only serves as a guide to the definition of 'serious incident'.
- A near collision requiring an avoidance manoeuvre or when an avoiding manoeuvre
would have been appropriate to avoid a collision or an unsafe situation.
- Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) only marginally avoided.
- An aborted take-off on a closed or engaged runway, or a take-off from such runway
with marginal separation from obstacle(s).
- A landing or attempted landing on a closed or engaged runway.
- Gross failure to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial climb.
- All fires and smoke in the passenger compartment or in cargo compartments, or engine
fires, even though such fires are extinguished with extinguishing agents.
- Any events which required the emergency use of oxygen by the flight crew.
- Aircraft structural failure or engine disintegration which is not classified as an acci-
dent.
- Multiple malfunctions of one or more aircraft systems that seriously affect the opera-
tion of the aircraft.
- Any case of flight crew incapacitation in flight.
- Any fuel state which would require the declaration of an emergency by the pilot.
- Take-off or landing incidents, such as undershooting, overrunning or running off the
side of runways.
- System failures, weather phenomena, operation outside the approved flight envelope
or other occurrences which could have caused difficulties controlling the aircraft.
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- Failure of more than one system in a redundancy system which is mandatory for flight
guidance and navigation.
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B.2.2 Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Reg-
ulations 1996
2.-(1) In these Regulations, unless the context otherwise requires -
"accident" means an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes
place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such
time as all such persons have disembarked, in which -
(a) a person suffers a fatal or serious injury as a result of -
- being in or upon the aircraft,
- direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become
detached from the aircraft, or
- direct exposure to jet blast,
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by
other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas
normally available to the passengers and crew, or
(b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which -
- adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of
the aircraft, and
- would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component,
except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its
cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas,
tyres, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin: or
(c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible;
"incident" means an occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of
an aircraft which affects or would affect the safety of operation;
"serious incident" means an incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident
nearly occurred;
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B.2.3 CAP 382 "The Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme"
Part 1
List of Aircraft Operations, Maintenance, Repair and Manufacture - Related
Occurrences to be Reported
1 Aircraft flight operations
1.1 Operation of the aircraft
a) Avoidance manoeuvres:
" risk of collision with another aircraft, terrain or other object or an unsafe
situation when avoidance action would have been appropriate;
" an avoidance manoeuvre required to avoid a collision with another aircraft,
terrain or other object;
e an avoidance manoeuvre to avoid other unsafe situations.
b) Take-off or landing incidents, including precautionary or forced landings. In-
cidents such as under-shooting, overrunning or running off the side of runways.
Take-offs, rejected take-offs, landings or attempted landings on a closed, occupied
or incorrect runway. Runway incursions.
c) Inability to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial climb.
d) Critically low fuel quantity or inability to transfer fuel or use total quantity of
usable fuel.
e) Loss of control (including partial or temporary) regardless of cause.
f) Occurrences close to or above V1 resulting from or producing a hazardous or
potentially hazardous situation (e.g. rejected take-off, tail strike, engine-power
loss etc.).
g) Go around producing a hazardous or potentially hazardous situation.
h) Unintentional significant deviation from airspeed, intended track or altitude
(more than 300 ft) regardless of cause.
i) Descent below decision height/altitude or minimum descent height/altitude with-
out the required visual reference.
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j) Loss of position awareness relative to actual position or to other aircraft.
k) Breakdown in communication between flight crew "CRM" (crew resource man-
agement) or between flight crew and other parties (cabin crew, ATC [air traffic
control] engineering).
1) Heavy landing - a landing deemed to require a "heavy landing check".
m) Exceedance of fuel imbalance limits.
n) Incorrect setting of an "SSR" (secondary surveillance radar) code or of an al-
timeter subscale.
o) Incorrect programming of, or erroneous entries into, equipment used for naviga-
tion or performance calculations, or use of incorrect data.
p) Incorrect receipt or interpretation of radio-telephony messages.
q) Fuel system malfunctions or defects, which had an effect on fuel supply and/or
distribution.
r) Aircraft unintentionally departing from a paved surface.
s) Collision between an aircraft and any other aircraft, vehicle or other ground
object.
t) Inadvertent and/or incorrect operation of any controls.
u) Inability to achieve the intended aircraft configuration for any flight phase (e.g.
landing gear and gear doors, flaps, stabilisers, slats etc.).
v) A hazard or potential hazard which arises as a consequence of any deliberate
simulation of failure conditions for training, system checks or training purposes.
w) Abnormal vibration.
x) Operation of any primary warning system associated with manoeuvring the air-
craft e.g. configuration warning, stall warning (stick shaker), over-speed warning
etc. unless:
i) the crew conclusively established that the indication was false and provided
that the false warning did not result in difficulty or hazard arising from the
crew response to the warning; or
ii) operated for training or test purposes.
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y) "GPWS" (ground proximity warning system)/" TAWS" (terrain awareness and
warning system) "warning" when:
i) the aircraft comes into closer proximity to the ground than had been planned
or anticipated; or
ii) the warning is experienced in instrument meteorological conditions or at
night and is established as having been triggered by a high rate of descent
(mode 1); or
iii) the warning results from failure to select landing gear or landing flaps by the
appropriate point on the approach (mode 4); or
iv) any difficulty or hazard arises or might have arisen as a result of crew re-
sponse to the "warning" e.g. possible reduced separation from other traffic.
This could include warning of any mode or type i.e. genuine, nuisance or
false.
z) GPWS/TAWS "alert" when any difficulty or hazard arises or might have arisen
as a result of crew response to the "alert".
aa) "ACAS" (air collision advisory system)"RA"s (resolution advisories).
ab) Jet or prop blast incidents resulting in significant damage or serious injury.
ac) Landing at the wrong airfield.
1.2 Emergencies
a) Fire, explosion, smoke or toxic or noxious fumes, even though fires were extin-
guished.
b) The use of any non-standard procedure by the flight or cabin crew to deal with
an emergency when:
i) the procedure exists but is not used;
ii) the procedure does not exist;
iii) the procedure exists but is incomplete or inappropriate;
iv) the procedure is incorrect:
v) the incorrect procedure is used.
c) Inadequacy of any procedures designed to be used in an emergency, including
when being used for maintenance, training or test purposes.
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d) An event leading to an emergency evacuation.
e) Depressurisation.
f) The use of any emergency equipment or prescribed emergency procedures in
order to deal with a situation.
g) An event leading to the declaration of an emergency ("Mayday" or "PAN").
h) Failure of any emergency system or equipment, including all exit doors and light-
ing, to perform satisfactorily, including when being used for maintenance, train-
ing or test purposes.
i) Events requiring any use of emergency oxygen by any crew member.
1.3 Crew incapacitation
a) Incapacitation of any member of the flight crew, including that which occurs
prior to departure if it is considered that it could have resulted in incapacitation
after take-off.
b) Incapacitation of any member of the cabin crew which renders them unable to
perform essential emergency duties.
1.4 Injury Occurrences which have or could have led to significant injury to passengers or
crew but which are not considered reportable as an accident.
1.5 Meteorology
a) A lightning strike which resulted in damage to the aircraft or loss or malfunction
of any essential service.
b) A hail strike which resulted in damage to the aircraft or loss or malfunction of
any essential service.
c) Severe turbulence encounter, an encounter resulting in injury to occupants or
deemed to require a "turbulence check" of the aircraft.
d) A windshear encounter.
e) Icing encounter resulting in handling difficulties, damage to the aircraft or loss
or malfunction of any essential service.
1.6 Security
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a) Unlawful interference with the aircraft including a bomb threat or hijack.
b) Difficulty in controlling intoxicated, violent or unruly passengers.
c) Discovery of a stowaway.
1.7 Other occurrences
a) Repetitive instances of a specific type of occurrence which in isolation would not
be considered "reportable" but which due to the frequency with which they arise,
form a potential hazard.
b) A bird strike which resulted in damage to the aircraft or loss or malfunction of
any essential service.
c) Wake-turbulence encounters.
d) Any other occurrence of any type considered to have endangered or which might
have endangered the aircraft or its occupants on board the aircraft or persons
on the ground.
2 Aircraft technical
2.1 Structural
Not all structural failures need to be reported. Engineering judgment is required to
decide whether a failure is serious enough to be reported. The following examples can
be taken into consideration:
a) damage to a "PSE" (principal structural element) that has not been designated
as damage-tolerant (life-limited element). PSEs are those which contribute sig-
nificantly to carrying flight, ground, and pressurisation loads, and the failure of
which could result in a catastrophic failure of the aircraft:
b) defect or damage exceeding admissible damages to a PSE that has been desig-
nated as damage-tolerant;
c) damage to or defect exceeding allowed tolerances of a structural element, the
failure of which could reduce the structural stiffness to such an extent that the
required flutter, divergence or control reversal margins are no longer achieved;
d) damage to or defect of a structural element, which could result in the liberation
of items of mass that may injure occupants of the aircraft;
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e) damage to or defect of a structural element, which could jeopardise proper op-
eration of systems. See paragraph 2.2 below;
f) loss of any part of the aircraft structure in flight.
2.2 Systems
The following general criteria applicable to all systems are proposed:
a) loss, significant malfunction or defect of any system, subsystem or set of equip-
ment when standard operating procedures, drills etc. could not be satisfactorily
accomplished;
b) inability of the crew to control the system, for example:
i) uncommanded actions,
ii) incorrect and/or incomplete response, including limitation of movement or
stiffness,
iii) runaway,
iv) mechanical disconnection or failure;
c) failure or malfunction of the exclusive function(s) of the system (one system
could integrate several functions);
d) interference within or between systems;
e) failure or malfunction of the protection device or emergency system associated
with the system;
f) loss of redundancy of the system;
g) any occurrence resulting from unforeseen behaviour of a system.
h) for aircraft types with single main systems, subsystems or sets of equipment:
loss, significant malfunction or defect in any main system, subsystem or set of
equipment.
i) for aircraft types with multiple independent main systems, subsystems or sets
of equipment: the loss, significant malfunction or defect of more than one main
system. subsystem or set of equipment.
j) operation of any primary warning system associated with aircraft systems or
equipment unless the crew conclusively established that the indication was false,
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provided that the false warning did not result in difficulty or hazard arising from
the crew response to the warning;
k) leakage of hydraulic fluids, fuel, oil or other fluids which resulted in a fire hazard
or possible hazardous contamination of aircraft structure, systems or equipment,
or risk to occupants;
1) malfunction or defect of any indication system when this results in the possibility
of misleading indications to the crew;
m) any failure, malfunction or defect if it occurs at a critical phase of the flight and
is relevant to the system operation;
n) significant shortfall of the actual performances compared to the approved perfor-
mance which resulted in a hazardous situation (taking into account the accuracy
of the performance-calculation method) including braking action, fuel consump-
tion etc.;
o) asymmetry of flight controls; e.g. flaps, slats, spoilers etc.
The Appendix to this Schedule gives a list of examples of reportable occurrences
resulting from the application of these general criteria to specific systems.
2.3 Propulsion (including engines, propellers and rotor systems) and "APUs" (auxiliary
power units).
a) Flameout, shutdown or malfunction of any engine.
b) Overspeed or inability to control the speed of any high-speed rotating compo-
nent(for example: APU, air starter, air cycle machine, air turbine motor, pro-
peller or rotor).
c) Failure or malfunction of any part of an engine or powerplant resulting in any
one or more of the following:
i) non-containment of components/debris;
ii) uncontrolled internal or external fire, or hot gas breakout;
iii) thrust in a direction different from that demanded by the pilot;
iv) thrust-reversing system failing to operate or operating inadvertently;
v) inability to control power, thrust or revolutions per minute;
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vi) failure of the engine mount structure;
vii) partial or complete loss of a major part of the powerplant;
viii) dense visible fumes or concentrations of toxic products sufficient to incapac-
itate crew or passengers;
ix) inability, by use of normal procedures, to shutdown an engine;
x) inability to restart a serviceable engine.
d) An uncommanded thrust/power loss, change or oscillation which is classified as
a "LOTC" (loss of thrust or power control):
i) for a single-engine aircraft; or
ii) where it is considered excessive for the application; or
iii) where this could affect more than one engine in a multi-engine aircraft,
particularly in the case of a twin-engine aircraft; or
iv) for a multi-engine aircraft where the same, or similar, engine type is used in
an application where the event would be considered hazardous or critical.
e) Any defect in a life-controlled part causing its withdrawal before completion of
its full life.
f) Defects of common origin which could cause an in-flight shut-down rate so high
that there is the possibility of more than one engine being shut down on the
same flight.
g) An engine limiter or control device failing to operate when required or operating
inadvertently.
h) Exceedance of engine parameters.
i) "FOD" (foreign objects damage).
Propellers and transmission
a) Failure or malfunction of any part of a propeller or powerplant resulting in any
one or more of the following:
i) an overspeed of the propeller;
ii) the development of excessive drag;
iii) a thrust in the opposite direction to that commanded by the pilot;
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iv) a release of the propeller or any major portion of the propeller;
v) a failure that results in excessive imbalance;
vi) the unintended movement of the propeller blades below the established min-
imum in-flight low-pitch position;
vii) an inability to feather the propeller;
viii) an inability to change propeller pitch;
ix) an uncommanded change in pitch;
x) an uncontrollable torque or speed fluctuation;
xi) the release of low-energy parts.
Rotors and transmission
b) Damage or defect of main rotor gearbox/attachment which could lead to in-flight
separation of the rotor assembly and/or malfunctions of the rotor control.
c) Damage to tail rotor, transmission and equivalent systems.
APUs
d) Shut down or failure when the APU is required to be available by operational
requirements, e.g. ETOPS, "MEL" (minimum equipment list).
e) Inability to shut down the APU.
f) Overspeed.
g) Inability to start the APU when needed for operational reasons.
2.4 Human factors
Any incident where any feature or inadequacy of the aircraft design could have led to
an error of use that could contribute to a hazardous or catastrophic effect.
2.5 Other occurrences
a) Any incident where any feature or inadequacy of the aircraft design could have
led to an error of use that could contribute to a hazardous or catastrophic effect.
b) An occurrence not normally considered as reportable (e.g., furnishing and cabin
equipment, water systems), where the circumstances resulted in endangering the
aircraft or its occupants.
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c) A fire, explosion, smoke or toxic or noxious fumes.
d) Any other event which could endanger the aircraft, or affect the safety of the
occupants of the aircraft, or people or property in the vicinity of the aircraft or
on the ground.
e) Failure or defect of passenger address system resulting in loss of, or inaudible,
passenger address system.
f) Loss of pilot seat control during flight.
3 Aircraft maintenance and repair
a) Incorrect assembly of parts or components of the aircraft found during an inspection
or test procedure not intended for that specific purpose.
b) Hot bleed air leak resulting in structural damage.
c) Any defect in a life-controlled part causing retirement before completion of its full life.
d) Any damage or deterioration (e.g. fractures, cracks, corrosion, delamination, disbond-
ing etc.) resulting from any cause (e.g. as flutter, loss of stiffness or structural failure)
to:
i) a primary structure or a "PSE" (principal structure element) (as defined in
the manufacturers' Repair Manual) where such damage or deterioration exceeds
allowable limits specified in the Repair Manual and requires a repair or complete
or partial replacement;
ii) a secondary structure which consequently has or may have endangered the air-
craft:
iii) the engine, propeller or rotorcraft rotor system.
e) Any failure, malfunction or defect of any system or equipment, or damage or deterio-
ration thereof found as a result of compliance with an airworthiness directive or other
mandatory instruction issued by a regulatory authority, when:
i) it is detected for the first time by the reporting organisation implementing com-
pliance:
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ii) on any subsequent compliance, it exceeds the permissible limits quoted in the
instruction and/or published repair/rectification procedures are not available.
f) Failure of any emergency system or equipment, including all exit doors and lighting,
to perform satisfactorily, including when being used for maintenance or test purposes.
g) Non-compliance or significant errors in compliance with required maintenance proce-
dures.
h) Products, parts, appliances and materials of unknown or suspect origin.
i) Misleading, incorrect or insufficient maintenance data or procedures that could lead
to maintenance errors.
j) Any failure, malfunction or defect of ground equipment used for testing or check-
ing of aircraft systems and equipment when the required routine inspection and test
procedures did not clearly identify the problem, where this results in a hazardous
situation.
4 Ground services and facilities
4.1 "ANS" (Air navigation services)
See Part 2, list of reportable ANS-related occurrences.
4.2 Aerodrome and aerodrome facilities
a) Significant spillage during fuelling operations.
b) Loading of incorrect fuel quantities likely to have a significant effect on aircraft
endurance, performance, balance or structural strength.
c) Failure or significant deterioration of aerodrome aircraft operating surfaces.
4.3 Handling of passengers, baggage and cargo
a) Significant contamination of aircraft structure, systems and equipment arising
from the carriage of baggage or cargo.
b) Incorrect loading of passengers, baggage or cargo, likely to have a significant
effect on aircraft mass and/or balance.
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c) Incorrect stowage of baggage or cargo (including hand baggage) likely in any way
to endanger the aircraft, its equipment or occupants or to impede emergency
evacuation.
d) Inadequate stowage of cargo containers or other substantial items of cargo.
e) Carriage or attempted carriage of dangerous goods in contravention of applicable
regulations, including incorrect labelling and packaging of dangerous goods.
4.4 Aircraft ground handling and servicing
a) Failure, malfunction or defect of ground equipment used for the testing or check-
ing of aircraft systems and equipment when the required routine inspection and
test procedures did not clearly identify the problem, where this results in a haz-
ardous situation.
b) Non-compliance or significant errors in compliance with required servicing pro-
cedures.
c) Loading of contaminated or incorrect type of fuel or other essential fluids (in-
cluding oxygen and potable water).
Appendix to Part 1
The following subparagraphs give examples of reportable occurrences resulting from the
application of the general criteria to specific systems listed in paragraph 2.2 of Part 1.
1 Air conditioning/ventilation
a) complete loss of avionics cooling;
b) depressurisation.
2 Autoflight system
a) failure of the autoflight system to achieve the intended operation while engaged;
b) significant reported crew difficulty to control the aircraft linked to autoflight
system functioning;
c) failure of any autoflight system disconnect device;
d) uncommanded autoflight mode change.
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3 Communications
a) failure or defect of passenger address system resulting in loss of or inaudible
passenger address;
b) total loss of communication in flight.
4 Electrical system
a) loss of one electrical distribution system (AC/DC);
b) total loss or loss of more than one electrical generation system;
c) failure of the back up (emergency) electrical generation system.
5 Cockpit/Cabin/Cargo
a) pilot seat control loss during flight;
b) failure of any emergency system or equipment, including emergency evacuation
signalling system, all exit doors, emergency lighting, etc.;
c) loss of retention capability of the cargo loading system.
6 Fire protection system
a) fire warnings, except those immediately confirmed as false;
b) undetected failure or defect of-fire/smoke detection/protection system, which
could lead to loss or reduced fire detection/protection;
c) absence of warning in case of actual fire or smoke.
7 Flight controls
a) asymmetry of flaps, slats, spoilers, etc.;
b) limitation of movement, stiffness or poor or delayed response in the operation of
primary flight control systems or their associated tab and lock systems;
c) flight control surface runaway;
d) flight control surface vibration felt by the crew;
e) mechanical flight control disconnection or failure;
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f) significant interference with normal control of the aircraft or degradation of flying
qualities.
8 Fuel system
a) fuel quantity indicating system malfunction resulting in total loss or wrong indi-
cation of fuel quantity on board;
b) leakage of fuel which resulted in major loss, fire hazard, significant contamination:
c) malfunction or defects of the fuel jettisoning system which resulted in inadver-
tent loss of significant quantity, fire hazard, hazardous contamination of aircraft
equipment or inability to jettison fuel;
d) fuel system malfunctions or defects which had a significant effect on fuel supply
and/or distribution;
e) inability to transfer or use total quantity of usable fuel.
9 Hydraulics
a) loss of one hydraulic system (ETOPS only);
b) failure of the isolation system;
c) loss of more than one hydraulic circuit;
d) failure of the back-up hydraulic system;
e) inadvertent ram air turbine extension.
10 Ice detection/protection system
a) undetected loss or reduced performance of the anti-ice/de-ice system;
b) loss of more than one of the probe-heating systems;
c) inability to obtain symmetrical wing de-icing;
d) abnormal ice accumulation leading to significant effects on performance or han-
dling qualities;
e) crew vision significantly affected.
11 Indicating/warning/recording systems
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a) malfunction or defect of any indicating system when the possibility of significant
misleading indications to the crew could result in an inappropriate crew action
on an essential system;
b) loss of a red warning function on a system;
c) for glass cockpits: loss or malfunction of more than one display unit or computer
involved in the display/warning function.]
12 Landing gear system/brakes/tyres
a) brake fire;
b) significant loss of braking action;
c) asymmetrical braking action leading to significant path deviation;
d) failure of the landing gear free fall extension system (including during scheduled
tests);
e) unwanted landing gear or gear doors extension/retraction;
f) multiple tyre burst.
13 Navigation systems (including precision approach systems) and air data systems
a) total loss or multiple navigation equipment failures
b) total or multiple air data system equipment failures
c) significant misleading indications
d) significant navigation errors attributed to incorrect data or a database coding
error
e) unexpected deviations in lateral or vertical path not caused by pilot input
f) problems with ground navigational facilities leading to significant navigation er-
rors not associated with transitions from inertial navigation mode to radio nav-
igation mode.
14 Oxygen for pressurised aircraft
a) loss of oxygen supply in the cockpit
b) loss of oxygen supply to a significant number of passengers (more than 10 %),
including when found during maintenance or training or testing.
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15 Bleed air system
a) hot bleed air leak resulting in fire warning or structural damage
b) loss of all bleed air systems
c) failure of bleed air leak detection system.
d) Unsatisfactory ground de-icing/anti-icing.
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B.3 Regulations of Australia
B.3.1 Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003
23 Transport safety matters
(1) Each of the following occurrences involving a transport vehicle is a transport safety
matter for the purposes of this Act:
(a) the transport vehicle is destroyed;
(b) the transport vehicle is damaged;
(c) the transport vehicle is abandoned, disabled, stranded or missing in operation;
(d) a person dies as a result of an occurrence associated with the operation of the
transport vehicle;
(e) a person is injured or incapacitated as a result of an occurrence associated with
the operation of the transport vehicle;
(f) any property is damaged as a result of an occurrence associated with the opera-
tion of the transport vehicle;
(g) the transport vehicle is involved in a near-accident;
(h) the transport vehicle is involved in an occurrence that affected, or could have
affected. the safety of the operation of the vehicle
Other matters
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a transport safety matter also includes something that
occurred that affected, is affecting, or might affect, transport safety.
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B.3.2 Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003
2.3 Immediately reportable matters (Act s 3)
All aircraft operations
(1) For the purposes of the definition of immediately reportable matter in subsection 3
(1) of the Act, the following investigable matters, in relation to an aircraft operation
(other than an aircraft operation mentioned in subregulation 2.1 (2)), are prescribed:
(a) subject to subregulation (2), the death of, or a serious injury to:
(i) a person on board the aircraft or in contact with the aircraft or anything
attached to the aircraft or anything that has become detached from the
aircraft; or
(ii) a person who has been directly exposed to jet blast;
(b) the aircraft being missing;
(c) the aircraft suffering serious damage, or the existence of reasonable grounds for
believing that the aircraft has suffered serious damage;
(d) the aircraft being inaccessible and the existence of reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that the aircraft has been seriously damaged;
(e) breakdown of separation standards, being a failure to maintain a recognised
separation standard (vertical, lateral or longitudinal) between aircraft that are
being provided with an air traffic service separation service.
Note This may result from air traffic service, pilot or other actions. and may occur even if
only 1 of the aircraft involved is under control of an air traffic service.
(2) For paragraph (1) (a), the death of, or a serious injury to, a person does not
include:
(a) death or serious injury resulting from natural causes (except to a flight crew
member); or
(b) death or serious injury that is intentionally self-inflicted; or
(c) death or serious injury that is intentionally caused by another person; or
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(d) death or serious injury suffered by a stowaway in a part of the aircraft that is
not usually accessible to crew members or passengers after take-off; or
(e) death occurring more than 30 days after the occurrence that caused the death,
unless the death was caused by an injury that required admission to hospital
within 30 days after the occurrence.
Air transport operations
(3) For the purposes of the definition of immediately reportable matter in subsection 3 (1)
of the Act, the following investigable matters, in relation to an air transport operation
(other than an aircraft operation mentioned in subregulation 2.1 (2)), are prescribed:
(a) airprox;
(b) violation of controlled airspace;
(c) a near-collision involving aircraft manoeuvring on the ground;
(d) an occurrence in which flight into terrain is narrowly avoided;
(e) the rejection of a take-off from a closed or occupied runway;
(f) a take-off from a closed or occupied runway with marginal separation from an
obstacle or obstacles;
(g) a landing on a closed or occupied runway;
(h) a significant failure to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial
climb;
(i) a fire (even if subsequently extinguished), smoke, fumes or an explosion on or in
any part of the aircraft;
(j) an uncontained engine failure;
(k) a mechanical failure resulting in the shutdown of an engine;
(1) the use of any procedure for overcoming an emergency;
(in) an event requiring the use of oxygen by a flight crew member;
(n) malfunction of an aircraft system that seriously affects the operation of the air-
craft;
(o) a flight crew member becoming incapacitated during flight;
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(p) fuel exhaustion;
(q) the aircraft's supply of useable fuel becoming so low (whether or not as a result
of fuel starvation) that the pilot declares an emergency in flight;
(r) undershooting, over-running or running off the side of a runway during take-off
or landing, or any other similar occurrence;
(s) any of the following occurrences, if the occurrence causes difficulty controlling
the aircraft:
(i) a weather phenomenon;
(ii) operation outside the aircraft's approved envelope;
(t) the failure of 2 or more related redundant systems for flight guidance and navi-
gation;
(u) serious damage to, or destruction of, any property outside the aircraft caused by
contact with the aircraft or anything that has become detached from the aircraft.
2.4 Routine reportable matters (Act s 3)
Air Transport operations
(1) For the purposes of the definition of routine reportable matter in subsection 3 (1) of
the Act, the following investigable matters, in relation to an air transport operation
(other than an aircraft operation mentioned in subregulation 2.1 (2)), are prescribed:
(a) an injury, other than a serious injury, to:
(i) a person on board the aircraft or in contact with the aircraft or anything
attached to the aircraft or anything that has become detached from the
aircraft: or
(ii) a person who has been directly exposed to jet blast;
(b) the aircraft suffering damage that compromises or has the potential to compro-
mise the safety of the flight but is not serious damage;
(c) flight below the minimum altitude, except in accordance with a normal arrival
or departure procedure;
(d) a ground proximity warning system alert;
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(e) a critical rejected take-off, except on a closed or occupied runway;
(f) a runway incursion;
(g) any of the following occurrences, if the occurrence compromises or has the po-
tential to compromise the safety of the flight:
(i) a failure to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial climb;
(ii) malfunction of an aircraft system, if the malfunction does not seriously affect
the operation of the aircraft;
(iii) fuel starvation that does not require the declaration of an emergency; Note
Aircraft systems include flight guidance and navigation systems.
(h) any of the following occurrences, if the occurrence compromises or has the poten-
tial to compromise the safety of the flight but does not cause difficulty controlling
the aircraft:
(i) a weather phenomenon;
(ii) operation outside the aircraft's approved flight envelope;
(i) failure or inadequacy of a facility used in connection with the air transport op-
eration, such as:
(i) a navigation or communication aid; or
(ii) an air traffic control service or general operational service; or
(iii) an airfield facility, including lighting or a manoeuvring, taxiing or take-off
surface:
(j) misinterpretation by a flight crew member of information or instructions, includ-
ing:
(i) the incorrect setting of a transponder code; or
(ii) flight on a level or route different to the level or route allocated for the flight;
or
(iii) the incorrect receipt or interpretation of a significant radio, telephone or
electronic text message;
(k) breakdown of coordination, being an occurrence in which traffic related infor-
mation flow within the air traffic service system is late, incorrect, incomplete or
absent;
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(1) failure of air traffic services to provide adequate traffic information to a pilot in
relation to other aircraft;
Note The information may have been incomplete, incorrect, late or absent.
(in) a traffic collision avoidance system resolution advisory being given to the pilot
of the aircraft;
(n) an occurrence arising from the loading or carriage of passengers, cargo or fuel,
such as:
(i) the loading of an incorrect quantity of fuel, if the loading of the incorrect
quantity is likely to have a significant effect on aircraft endurance, perfor-
mance. balance or structural integrity; or
(ii) the loading of an incorrect type of fuel or other essential fluid, or contami-
nated fuel or other essential fluid; or
(iii) the incorrect loading of passengers, baggage or cargo, if the incorrect loading
has a significant effect on the mass or balance of the aircraft: or
(iv) the carriage of dangerous goods in contravention of Commonwealth, State
or Territory legislation; or
(v) the incorrect securing of cargo containers or significant items of cargo; or
(vi) the incorrect stowage of baggage or cargo, if the incorrect stowage is likely
to cause a hazard to the aircraft or its equipment or occupants, or to impede
emergency evacuation; or
(vii) a significant contamination of the aircraft structure, systems or equipment,
arising from the carriage of baggage or cargo; or
(viii) the presence of a violent or armed passenger;
(o) a collision with an animal, including a bird.
Aircraft operations other than air transport operations
(2) For the purposes of the definition of routine reportable matter in subsection 3 (1) of
the Act, the following investigable matters, in relation to an aircraft operation (other
than an aircraft operation mentioned in subregulation 2.1 (2) or an air transport
operation), are prescribed:
(a) an injury, other than a serious injury, to a person on board the aircraft;
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(b) a flight crew member becoming incapacitated while operating the aircraft;
(c) airprox;
(d) an occurrence in which flight into terrain is narrowly avoided;
(e) the use of any procedure for overcoming an emergency;
(f) an occurrence that results in difficulty controlling the aircraft, including any of
the following occurrences:
(i) an aircraft system failure;
(ii) a weather phenomenon;
(iii) operation outside the aircraft's approved flight envelope;
(g) fuel exhaustion;
(h) the aircraft's supply of useable fuel becoming so low (whether or not as a result
of fuel starvation) that the safety of the aircraft is compromised;
(i) a collision with an animal, including a bird, on a licensed aerodrome.
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B.3.3 Civil Aviation Regulations 1988
Part 4B Defect reporting
51 Reporting of defects in Australian aircraft - general
(1) Where a person who, in the course of his or her employment with an employer, is
engaged in the maintenance of an Australian aircraft becomes aware of the existence
of a defect in the aircraft, the person shall report the defect to his or her employer.
(2) Subject to subregulation (3). if a person engaged in the maintenance of an Australian
aircraft becomes aware of the existence of a major defect in the aircraft, the person
must report the defect to the holder of the certificate of registration for the aircraft
and to CASA.
Penalty: 25 penalty units.
(3) A person is not required to report a defect under subregulation(2) if:
(a) the person was engaged in the maintenance as an employee; or
(b) the person is the holder of the certificate of registration for the aircraft.
(4) If the holder of the certificate of registration for an Australian aircraft becomes aware
of the existence of a defect in the aircraft, he or she must:
(a) have an investigation made of the defect; and
(b) if the defect is a major defect - have a report made to CASA with respect to the
defect and to any matters revealed by the investigation.
Penalty: 25 penalty units.
51A Reporting of defects in Australian aircraft: major defects
(1) This regulation applies to major defects:
(a) that have caused, or that could cause, a primary structural failure in an aircraft;
or
(b) that have caused., or that could cause, a control system failure in an aircraft; or
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(c) that have caused, or that could cause, an engine structural failure in an aircraft;
or
(d) caused by, that have caused, or that could cause, fire in an aircraft.
(2) If a person connected with the operation of, or the carrying out of maintenance on, an
Australian aircraft discovers a defect in the aircraft, being a defect of a kind to which
this regulation applies, the person must report the defect to CASA immediately.
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
(2A) An offence against subregulation (2) is an offence of strict liability.
Note For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.
(3) ...
(4) ...
51B Defects discovered in complying with directions by CASA
(1) If a person discovers a defect in an aircraft in the course of complying with an airwor-
thiness directive or a direction given by CASA under regulation 38, the person must
report the defect to CASA.
Penalty: 25 penalty units.
(2) An offence against subregulation (1) is an offence of strict liability.
Note For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.
52 Defects discovered in aircraft components
(1) This regulation applies if:
(a) a person engaged in the maintenance of an aircraft component becomes aware of
a defect in the component; or
(b) a person engaged in the maintenance of an aircraft becomes aware of a defect in
an aircraft component that the person proposed to install in the aircraft in the
course of that maintenance; or
(c) a person who holds a certificate of approval that covers the maintenance of air-
craft components becomes aware of a defect in an aircraft component that he or
she owns: or
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(d) a person who holds an Air Operator's Certificate becomes aware of a defect in
an aircraft component that he or she owns and intends to install in an aircraft
used in operations under that Air Operator's Certificate.
(2) If the person owns the aircraft component:
(a) the person must have an investigation made of the defect; and
(b) if the defect is such that, if the component were installed in an aircraft, the safety
of the aircraft might be affected or the aircraft might become a danger to person
or property - the person must have a report made to CASA in relation to the
defect and any matters revealed by the investigation.
Penalty: 25 penalty units.
(3) If the person does not own the aircraft component the person must:
(a) have a report made to the owner of the component in relation to the defect; and
(b) if the person thinks that the defect is such that, if the component were installed
in an aircraft, the safety of the aircraft might become affected or the aircraft
might become a danger to person or property - have a report made to CASA in
relation to the defect.
Penalty: 25 penalty units.
(4) After the owner of an aircraft component receives the report mentioned in paragraph
(3) (a):
(a) the owner must have an investigation made of the defect; and
(b) if the defect is such that, if the component were installed in an aircraft, the safety
of the aircraft might be affected or the aircraft might become a danger to person
or property - the owner must have a report made to CASA in relation to the
defect and any matters revealed by the investigation.
Penalty: 25 penalty units.
(5) An offence against subregulation (4) is an offence of strict liability.
Note For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.
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B.3.4 Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998
21.003 Reporting failures, malfunctions, and defects
(1) The holder of a type certificate, a supplemental type certificate, an APMA or an ATSO
authorisation, or the licensee of a type certificate or supplemental type certificate,
must report to CASA any failure, malfunction, or defect in any of the following that
has resulted in any of the occurrences listed in subregulation (4):
(a) an aircraft, aircraft engine or propeller, or any other part or article manufactured
by it;
(b) a manufacturing process specified by it.
Penalty: 25 penalty units.
(2) The holder of a type certificate, a supplemental type certificate, an APMA, or an
ATSO authorisation, or the licensee of a type certificate or supplemental type cer-
tificate, must report to CASA any defect in any aircraft, aircraft engine or propeller,
or in any part, or article manufactured by it that has left its control and that could
result in any of the occurrences listed in subregulation (4).
Penalty: 25 penalty units.
(4) The following occurrences must be reported as provided in subregulations (1) and (2):
(a) fires caused by a system or equipment failure, malfunction, or defect;
(b) an engine exhaust system failure, malfunction, or defect which causes damage to
the engine, adjacent aircraft structure, equipment, or components;
(c) the accumulation or circulation of toxic or noxious gases in the crew compartment
or passenger cabin;
(d) a malfunction, failure, or defect of a propeller control system;
(e) a propeller or rotorcraft hub or blade structural failure;
(f) flammable fluid leakage in areas where an ignition source normally exists;
(g) a brake system failure caused by structural or material failure during operation;
(h) a significant aircraft primary structural defect or failure caused by any self-
generating condition (for example, fatigue or corrosion);
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(i) any abnormal vibration or buffeting caused by a structural or system malfunc-
tion, defect, or failure;
(j) an engine failure;
(k) any structural or flight control system malfunction, defect. or failure which causes
an interference with normal control of the aircraft or which derogates from the
flying qualities;
(1) a complete loss of more than one electrical power generating system or hydraulic
power system during a given operation of the aircraft;
(m) a failure or malfunction of more than one attitude, airspeed, or altitude instru-
ment during a given operation of the aircraft.
(5) This subregulation applies to:
(a) failures, malfunctions, or defects that the holder of a type certificate, a supple-
mental type certificate, an APMA or an ATSO authorisation, or the licensee of
a type certificate or supplemental type certificate:
(i) has reasonable grounds for believing were caused by improper maintenance,
or improper usage; or
(ii) has reasonable grounds for believing were reported to CASA by another
person under Part 4B of CAR 1988; or
(iii) has already reported under the accident reporting provisions of the Air Nav-
igation Act 1920; and
(b) failures, malfunctions, or defects in aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, or other
parts or articles:
(i) manufactured by a foreign manufacturer under a type certificate of the kind
mentioned in regulation 21.025 or 21.027 or issued under regulation 21.029,
or a letter of ATSO design approval under regulation 21.617; or
(ii) imported into Australian territory under regulation 21.500, 21.500A, 21.502
or 21.502A.
(6) For subregulations (1) and (2). a report must:
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(a) be given to CASA, in writing, within 3 working days after the person required
to make the report becomes aware, or could reasonably be expected to have
become aware, that the failure, malfunction, or defect required to be reported
has occurred; and
(b) ...
(7) Whenever the investigation of an accident or service difficulty report shows that an
article manufactured under an ATSO authorisation is unsafe because of a manufac-
turing or design defect, the manufacturer must, upon request of CASA, investigate
the defect and report to CASA the results of its investigation and any action taken
or proposed by the manufacturer to correct that defect.
Penalty: 25 penalty units.
(8) If action is required to correct the defect in an article manufactured under an ATSO,
the manufacturer must submit to CASA the data necessary for the issue of an appro-
priate airworthiness directive.
Penalty: 10 penalty units.
(9) An offence against subregulation (7) or (8) is an offence of strict liability.
Note For strict liability, see section 6.1 of the Criminal Code.
(10) It is a defence to a prosecution under subregulation (1) if the failure, malfunction or
defect is of a kind to which subregulation (5) applies.
Note A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matter mentioned in
subregulation (10) (see subsection 13.3 (3) of the Criminal Code).
Source FARs section 21.3 modified.
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B.3.5 Civil Aviation Advisory Publication 51-1(1)
1. Definitions
Major defects in relation to an aircraft, means a defect of such a kind that it may affect
the safety of the aircraft or cause the aircraft to become a danger to person or property.
Defect means an imperfection that impairs the structure, composition, or function of an
object or system.
Appendix A: Examples of Major Defects
Listed below are some representative examples of major defects. The list is not exhaus-
tive and there may be other defects that can be considered major. If you have any doubts
about whether the defect is in fact a major defect, seek advice from CASA SDR Unit:
(a) fires during flight, including whether or not the related fire warning system operated
correctly;
(b) false fire warning during flight;
(c) smoke, toxic or noxious fumes inside the aircraft;
(d) an engine exhaust system that causes damage during flight to the engine, adjacent
structure, equipment or components;
(e) unscheduled engine shut-down;
(f) on a multi-engine helicopter, loss of drive from one engine;
(g) inability to feather or unfeather a propeller, to shut-down an engine or to control
thrust:
(h) fuel system malfunction affecting fuel supply and distribution;
(i) significant contamination or leakage of fuel, oil or other fluids;
(j) use of incorrect fuel, oil or other fluids;
(k) landing gear failing to extend or retract, or inadvertent opening or closing of landing
gear doors during flight;
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(1) brake system defects that result in loss of braking when the aircraft is in motion on
the ground;
(m) malfunction, stiffness, slackness or limited range of movement of any flight controls;
(n) significant failure or malfunction of the instrument, electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic,
ice-protection, radio, navigation system or emergency equipment;
(o) uncontrollable cabin pressure, except the inability to pressurise immediately after
take-off due to doors not being fully closed;
(p) cracks or corrosion in primary structure;
(q) any malfunction, failure or defect affecting the performance of any system or compo-
nent essential to the safe operation of the aircraft;
(r) under CAR 51B, any defect found as a result of an AD where no limits are specified
or the defect is outside any limits specified in the AD;
(s) malfunction of systems or components, including auxiliary power units (APU), essen-
tial to the safe operation of those aircraft approved for extended twin engine operations
(ETOPS) irrespective of the type of operation being, or intended to be, conducted;
259
B.4 Regulations of Japan
B.4.1 Ordinance for Enforcement of Civil Aeronautics Acta
(Reporting of events where it is considered that accidents nearly occurred.)
Article 166-4. The events in the Article 76-2 of the Act to be specified by Ordinances of
the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism are the following:
(i) Take-offs or aborted take-offs on a closed or engaged runway.
(ii) Landings or attempted landings on a closed or engaged runway.
(iii) Overrunning, undershooting. or running off the side of runways (limited to cases where
the aircraft became unable to move on the ground by itself).
(iv) An event leading to an emergency evacuation in which an emergency egress system is
utilized.
(v) An event in which the flight crew took an emergency maneuver to avoid a collision or
contact with terrain or water surface during flight.
(vi) Engine damage (limited to cases where its fragments penetrated its cowling, or when
its internal structure was heavily damaged.)
(vii) Sustained halt, or loss of power or thrust produced by an engine (more than one
engine for multiple-engine aircraft) during flight (except for cases when an engine was
shut off intentionally in powered gliders).
(viii) An event when the operation of the aircraft could not be continued because of damage
to propellers, rotors, gears, rudders, ailerons, or flaps.
(ix) Multiple malfunctions of one or more aircraft systems seriously affecting the operation
of the aircraft.
(x) Fire or smoke in an aircraft or fire in the fire control area of an engine.
(xi) Unusual drop in air pressure in an aircraft.
(xii) Critically low fuel quantity that resulted in taking emergency actions.
aTranslated by the author.
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(xiii) Unusual meteorological situations including disturbance of airstream, malfunction-
ing equipment, or flight exceeding operating limitation speed, limit load factor, or
operating limitation altitude, which affected maneuvering of the aircraft.
(xiv) Flight crew incapacitation in flight.
(xv) An event where parts detached from the aircraft collided with persons.
(xvi) Any situations equivalent to the items listed above.
(Reporting of events which affect safety)
Article 221-2. The events in Article 111-4 of the Act to be specified by Ordinances of the
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism are the following:
(i) Accidents listed in Article 76 Paragraph (1) of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
(ii) Events stipulated in Article 76-2 of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
(iii) Events which occurred during operation of aircraft, as listed below.
(a) An event when an aircraft sustained structural damage (except for cases when
the repair for the aircraft does not fall under the category of major repair or
minor repair listed in the table in Article 5-6.)
(b) An event when an aircraft system which is of importance for safety malfunc-
tioned.
(c) An event when an emergency system or equipment malfunctioned.
(d) An event when a significant deviation from the planned path or altitude or op-
erations beyond operating limitations occurred.
(e) Events other than those listed from (a) to (d) requiring an emergency maneuver
or emergency action for safety.
(iv) Other than those listed from (i) to (iii), aircraft structural damage, a failure of an
emergency system, incorrect installation of aircraft equipments or parts, or other
events which affected the safe operation of aircraft.
B.4.2 Advisory Circular 6 -0 0 1 b
The occurrences to be reported to the JCAB are as follows:
1. Explosion, fire, smoke, unusual smell, or toxic or noxious fumes.
2. False fire warning during flight.
3. Engine shutdown during flight of more than one engine.
4. Failure of main structure of an engine, failures which occurred simultaneously in
multiple engines during flight, or critical failure of fuel, exhaust, thrust, or thrust
reverse system of engines.
5. Failure of propeller control system or structural failure of propellers.
6. Leakage of fuel, lubricant oil, or hydraulic fluids (including the leakage in fuel-dumping
system)
7. Failure of gears or flaps.
8. Failure or malfunction of battery, hydraulic power unit, or other power units, and
their power distribution systems.
9. Malfunction of pressurization system or use of emergency or backup oxygen system,
which caused a significant change of the flight plan.
10. Failure of wheels, brake system or tires, which poses a danger to the operation on the
ground.
11. Icing which exceeded the capacity of de-icing and anti-icing (including performance
degradation considered to be caused by icing.)
12. Alarm which indicates that hatches or doors are not completely closed during flight.
13. Damage to aircraft structure caused by cracks, corrosion, buckling or separation or
the case in which multiple fasteners loosen or come off, any of which requires major
repair.
14. Detachment of aircraft parts.
bTranslated by the author.
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15. Failure, malfunction, or defect of aircraft control system, which affects maneuvering
(including the fixity of the control system or the augmentation of the maneuvering
power considered to be caused by icing.)
16. Failure, malfunction, or defect of equipment or aircraft systems, which required emer-
gency maneuvers.
17. Emergency evacuation systems or components (evacuation doors, emergency evacua-
tion lighting systems, and evacuation slides or rafts) that are found defective, or that
fail to perform the intended functions during an actual emergency or during training,
testing, maintenance, demonstrations, or inadvertent deployments (limited to those
related to air transport services or aerial work services).
18. Failure of functions of aircraft systems or components, which are critical for airworthi-
ness but cannot be checked during normal flights (cabin altitude alert system, oxygen
masks for passengers, over-speed warning system, stall warning system, and ram air
turbines) (limited to those related to air transport services or aerial work services).
19. Other failures, malfunctions, or defects, which affect, or could affect the operation of
the aircraft.
Items 1 to 16 must also be reported to the organizations responsible for aircraft or aircraft
components design.
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B.4.3 Advisory Circular 6-002c
The occurrences to be reported to the JCAB are as follows:
1. Fires caused by a system or equipment failure, malfunction, or defect.
2. An engine exhaust system failure, malfunction, or defect which causes damage to the
engine, adjacent aircraft structure, equipment, or components.
3. The accumulation or circulation of toxic or noxious gases in the crew compartment
or passenger cabin.
4. A malfunction, failure, or defect of a propeller control system.
5. A propeller or rotorcraft hub or blade structural failure.
6. Flammable fluid leakage in areas where an ignition source normally exists.
7. A brake system failure caused by structural or material failure during operation.
8. A significant aircraft primary structural defect or failure caused by any autogenous
condition (fatigue, understrength, corrosion, etc.).
9. Any abnormal vibration or buffeting caused by a structural or system malfunction.
defect, or failure.
10. An engine failure.
11. Any structural or flight control system malfunction, defect, or failure which causes an
interference with normal control of the aircraft or which derogates the flying qualities.
12. A complete loss of more than one electrical power generating system or hydraulic
power system during a given operation of the aircraft.
13. A failure or malfunction of more than one attitude, airspeed, or altitude instrument
during a given operation of the aircraft.
14. Detachment of aircraft parts.
Other occurrences should also be reported if they are considered to be useful for early detec-
tion or prevention of failures or for improvement of inspection or maintenance techniques.
cTranslated by the author.
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Appendix C
Guidance on the Categorisation of
Transport Safety Matters Provided
by Australian Transport Safety
Bureau
In the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), the Investigation Authority in Aus-
tralia, each investigation of "transport safety matter" (accident, serious incident, and in-
cident) is categorized on a Level 1 to 5 in order of priority. Below is a guidance on the
categorization of transport safety matters provided by the ATSB.
Level 1
" An accident involving one or more High Capacity Air Transport
scheduled) passenger aircraft with fatalities.
" An accident involving one or more High Capacity Air Transport
scheduled) passenger aircraft without fatalities
(scheduled and non-
(scheduled and non-
where there was a significant risk of fatalities or serious injuries and a substantial
commitment of investigative resources is likely to significantly mitigate future
High Capacity Air Transport accidents.
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* A serious incident (as defined by ICAO) involving one or more High Capacity Air
Transport (scheduled and non-scheduled) passenger aircraft
- where there was a significant risk of fatalities or serious injuries and a substantial
commitment of investigative resources is likely to significantly mitigate future
High Capacity Air Transport (scheduled and non-scheduled) accidents.
Level 2
" An accident involving one or more High Capacity Air Transport cargo aircraft with
fatalities and serious injuries.
" An accident involving one or more High Capacity Air Transport cargo aircraft without
fatalities and serious injuries
- where there was a significant risk of fatalities or serious injuries and a substantial
commitment of investigative resources is likely to significantly mitigate future
High Capacity Air Transport cargo aircraft accidents.
" An accident involving one or more Low Capacity Air Transport (scheduled) passenger
aircraft with a significant number of fatalities (for example. it may involve more than
five fatalities) and serious injuries.
" An accident involving one or more Low Capacity Air Transport (scheduled) passenger
aircraft without fatalities or with a relatively low level of fatalities (eg less than five)
and serious injuries
- where there was a significant risk of more fatalities or serious injuries and a sub-
stantial commitment of investigative resources is likely to significantly mitigate
future Low Capacity Air Transport (scheduled) accidents.
" A serious incident (as defined by ICAO) involving one or more Low Capacity Air
Transport (scheduled) passenger aircraft
- where there was a significant risk of multiple fatalities (eg more than five) and se-
rious injuries and a substantial commitment of investigative resources is likely to
significantly mitigate future Low Capacity Air Transport (scheduled) accidents.
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* An accident involving one or more Low Capacity charter (non-scheduled) aircraft with
fare-paying passengers and multiple fatalities and serious injuries (for example it may
involve more than five fatalities)
- where a substantial commitment of investigative resources is likely to signif-
icantly mitigate future Low Capacity Air Transport (scheduled) and charter
(non-scheduled) accidents.
Level 3
" An accident involving one or more Low Capacity Air Transport passenger (scheduled)
or charter (non-scheduled) aircraft with fatalities and/or serious injuries not classified
as a level 2 investigation.
" An accident involving Air Transport cargo operations with fatalities.
" An accident involving one or more training aircraft with fatalities.
" An accident (as defined by ICAO) without fatalities involving one or more High or
Low Capacity Air Transport aircraft not classified as a level 1 or 2 investigation and
where investigation is likely to significantly mitigate future accidents.
" An accident involving one or more general aviation aircraft (other than sport aviation)
with fatalities.
" An accident involving one or more charter or other general aviation aircraft
- where there was a significant risk of fatalities or serious injuries and a substantial
commitment of investigative resources would significantly mitigate accidents.
" A serious incident (as defined by ICAO) involving one or more High or Low Capacity
Air Transport passenger aircraft not classified as a level 1 or 2 investigation and where
investigation is likely to significantly mitigate future accidents.
" A serious incident (as defined by ICAO) involving one or more Air Transport cargo,
charter or training aircraft where investigation is likely to significantly mitigate future
accidents.
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* An incident involving one or more High or Low Capacity Air Transport aircraft where
investigation is likely to significantly mitigate future accidents.
Level 4
" An accident involving a foreign aircraft covered by Article 26 of the Chicago Conven-
tion that is not being investigated as level 1, 2, or 3.
" An accident (as defined by ICAO) involving one or more charter or general aviation
aircraft (other than sport aviation) without fatalities
- where a limited commitment of investigative resources could significantly miti-
gate future aviation accidents.
" An accident or serious incident (as defined by ICAO) involving Australian designed
and manufactured aircraft types on the Australian Register with international safety
implications not being investigated as level 1, 2, or 3.
" An accident or serious incident (as defined by ICAO) involving one or more High or
Low Capacity Air Transport aircraft not being investigated as level 1, 2, or 3.
" A serious incident (as defined by ICAO) involving one or more non Air Transport
aircraft
- where a limited commitment of investigative resources could significantly miti-
gate future accidents.
Level 5
" An accident (including with fatalities) or serious incident involving a sport aviation
aircraft unless foreign and required to be investigated under Article 26 of the Chicago
Convention.
" An accident involving aircraft without fatalities
- where the potential safety lessons do not, after initial review, justify the commit-
ment of investigative resources. Basic incident data will be filed for statistical
purposes.
" A serious incident or incident involving aircraft
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where the potential safety lessons do not, after initial review, justify the commit-
ment of investigative resources. Basic incident data will be filed for statistical
purposes.
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Appendix D
Australian Government's Seven
Principles for Best Practice
Consultation
In 2006, the Australian Government adopted a government-wide policy on consultation,
which sets out best practice principles to be followed by all agencies when developing reg-
ulations. The seven principles for best practice consultation which are contained in the
policy are shown below.
Continuity - Consultation should be a continuous process that starts early in the policy
development process.
Targeting - Consultation should be widely based to ensure it captures the diversity of
stakeholders affected by the proposed changes. This includes state, territory and
local governments, as appropriate, and relevant Australian Government departments
and agencies.
Appropriate Timeliness - Consultation should start when policy objectives and options are
being identified. Throughout the consultation process, stakeholders should be given
sufficient time to provide considered responses.
Accessibility - Stakeholder groups should be informed of proposed consultation and be
provided with information about proposals through a range of means appropriate to
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these groups.
Transparency - Policy agencies need to explain clearly the objectives of the consultation
process and the regulation policy framework within which consultations will take
place, and provide feedback on how they have taken consultation responses into con-
sideration.
Consistency and Flexibility - Consistent consultation procedures can make it easier for
stakeholders to participate. However, this must be balanced with the need for consul-
tation arrangements to be designed to suit the circumstances of the particular proposal
under consideration.
Evaluation and Review - Policy agencies should evaluate consultation processes and con-
tinue to examine ways of making them more effective.
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Appendix E
Voluntary Reporting Systems in
the World
The voluntary reporting systems have been widely applied throughout the world. Table E.1
lists the voluntary reporting systems in the world. The list is not totally inclusive.
In 1988. the International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems (ICASS) Group was
formed to promote confidential reporting systems. The reporting systems written in bold-
face in Table E.1 are current members of the ICASS Group.
The ICASS Group holds meetings periodically to exchange information and discuss the
future development of the confidential reporting systems. The principal objectives of the
ICASS Group are:
" To provide advice and assistance in the start up and operation of a confidential re-
porting system.
" To facilitate the exchange of safety related information between independent confi-
dential aviation reporting systems.
" To identify solutions to common problems in the operation of such systems.
Membership with full voting rights are available to reporting systems which are:
" Confidential
" Independent of commercial and regulatory interests
" Operating on a national or international level
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Table E.1: Voluntary reporting systems in the world [21], [105]
State I Name Start-up Year
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 1976
U.S. Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) 1994
Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program (VDRP) 1990
U.K. Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting 1982
Programme (CHIRP)
Australia REPCON 1988
Aviation Self Reporting Scheme (ASRS) 2004
Japan Aviation Safety Information Network for Large Aircraft 1999
(ASI-NET) for Small Aircraft 2004
Brazil Flight Safety Confidential Report (RCSV) 1997
Canada SECURITAS 1995
China Sino Confidential Aviation Safety System (SCASS) 2004
France Confidential Events Reporting System 2000
Germany EUCARE 1992
Russia Voluntary Aviation Safety Reporting System (VASRP) 1992
Singapore SINgapore Confidential Aviation Incident Reporting 2004
(SINCAIR)
South Korea Korean Confidential Incident Reporting System (KAIRS) 2000
Spain Safety Occurrence Reporting System (SNS) 2007
Taiwan Taiwan Aviation Confidential Reporting System 2000
(TACARE)
The ICASS Group has been recognized by ICAO. States planning to institute confi-
dential reporting systems are referred to the ICASS Group for assistance in design and
implementation stages of new systems [24], [105].
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